

DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES:
A LOOK AT THE RECORD
PART IV

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OVERVIEW

As the second session of the 98th Congress began, the economy was in the second year of its struggle to recover from the steepest economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930's. Although unemployment was declining, nine million Americans remained jobless at the beginning of 1984, nearly one million more than when President Reagan took office. America's basic industries, long the envy of the world, were reeling from the combined effects of recession and the pressures of ever tougher international competition, rapid and destabilizing technological change, and the breakdown of a stable world currency system.

The Administration's fiscal policies had burdened the country with the largest deficits in our Nation's history, and with a mounting pile of debt that has placed a mortgage on our children's future. The deficits had pushed real interest rates to record levels and those high interest rates had helped to create a dollar with an extremely high value relative to other currencies, opening U.S. markets to a floodtide of cheap foreign imports and crippling the ability of American goods to compete in international markets. When Congress convened in January, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit had just reached a record-breaking \$69.3 billion in 1983. When the session ended, the trade deficit was nearing a new record of \$123.3 billion for all of 1984. This record-shattering deficit explains, in large part, why there were still 8.2 million unemployed Americans at the close of 1984.

When the second session convened, our Nation's debt stood at \$1.433 trillion. At the end of December of 1984, the debt stood at \$1.664 trillion, an increase of \$231 billion in just twelve months. If the government continues to increase its debt at this rate, by the end of this decade we will have a debt close to \$3 trillion, more than three times what the debt was in 1980. In 1984, the Administration spent 37 cents of every dollar collected in individual income taxes just to pay the net interest cost on the debt.

Senate Democrats did their part to face these issues head on, by proposing a host of concrete policy alternatives designed to reduce the deficit, to lead our Nation back to economic preeminence in the world, and to assure that in the future, America will remain second to none.

In February 1983, Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd asked Senator Edward Kennedy to chair a task force of Senate Democrats to look beyond the short run business cycle to focus on the country's long-range economic challenges. The task force met regularly over a period of nine months before presenting its report to the full conference of Democratic Senators. The Democratic Conference unanimously endorsed the proposals it contained. A steering group of Democratic Senators under the leadership of Senators Carl Levin, Tom Eagleton, and Edward Kennedy oversaw the drafting of legislation embodying the Conference proposal, which was introduced as the Economic Cooperation and Competitiveness Act of 1984 on June 27, 1984. The legislation outlines a comprehensive approach to tackling the job of modernizing America's industries and restoring our competitive edge in the world. Key provisions include a tripartite Council on Economic Cooperation and Competitiveness composed of business, labor, and government representatives; an aggressive trade policy to open new markets and assure fair treatment from our trading partners; adjustment assistance for individuals and communities to help them respond to rapidly changing economic circumstances; and increased emphasis on education, training, and research and development.

Senate Democrats have also offered their own prescriptions for bringing the Federal deficits under control. In February 1984, President Reagan submitted a budget request to Congress which contained a 1985 deficit of \$197 billion, reaching \$248 billion by 1989. It was a budget that was met with immediate and nearly unanimous, bipartisan rejection. Faced with this crisis of confidence in its fiscal policy, the Administration resorted to a series of closed meetings designed to fashion a more acceptable alternative. However, the Administration insisted that the effort be limited to a "downpayment" on the deficit, ruling out Democratic proposals to double the amount of deficit reduction that the Administration had set as its target. While Democrats initially were invited to participate in these meetings, White House representatives quickly made clear that the Administration was not prepared to meet them halfway. In the end, closed door meetings, from which Democrats were excluded, produced a new budget proposal which was unveiled with much fanfare and dubbed the "Rose Garden" deficit plan.

That plan, however, actually would have resulted not in lower deficits, but in higher deficits each year. Rather than lend support to such a proposal, Senate Democrats produced a budget plan of their own, which would have cut the deficit by \$200 billion and which, unlike the Administration plan, would have produced declining, rather than increasing, deficits in future years. Further, the proposal reflected

a different set of priorities than the plan supported by the majority, containing fewer cuts in vital programs such as Medicare and a more restrained and affordable rate of increase in the Pentagon budget. The proposal failed on a near-party line vote.

Beyond offering their budget plan, Senate Democrats also worked together to modify the budget resolution put forward by the Republican majority, and the Deficit Reduction Act to implement its provisions, in order to protect Medicare beneficiaries from deep cuts that would have increased their out-of-pocket medical expenses and to assure that Congress would have sufficient flexibility within overall spending limits to shift funds between the Pentagon budget and domestic programs.

AGRICULTURE

INTRODUCTION

Under this Administration, farmers' fortunes are as bleak as at any other time in our history. Since 1981, net farm income, adjusted for inflation, has remained consistently below the average level achieved during the previous four years. In 1983, cash receipts declined from the previous year's level, the first time that had occurred in six years. Exports remain below the peak level achieved in 1980-81. The average real value of farmland has declined each year since 1981 and by 1984 was 20% below the level of 1980.

During 1984, Democrats sought on a number of occasions to assist farmers hurt by the Administration's farm policies and to help them emerge from their financial difficulty.

THE RECORD:

- 1) Baker motion to table the Melcher amendment (to the Export Administration Act Amendment) revising the wheat price support program to allow a 20% acreage diversion program (instead of 30%), to allow haying and grazing on the diverted acreage, to establish target prices of \$4.40 per bushel for 1984 and \$4.50 per bushel for 1985, to require compliance with the acreage diversion program in order to be eligible for loans and other programs, and to extend the registration deadline for the program from March 16 to March 30. (Vote No. 26—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

81% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

85% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 52-42.

March 1, 1984.

The Melcher amendment was designed to stimulate participation in the wheat program and thereby stabilize prices while assuring farmers a decent income. Farmers are especially hard hit by the high valued dollar, which makes U.S. exports unaffordably expensive for most other nations, and by

declining cash receipts and real farmland value, which is used as collateral for many farm loans. By encouraging participation in the wheat program, wheat surpluses can be reduced and farm income raised, thereby allowing farmers to help themselves out of the credit crunch.

The amendment was offered because this Administration's farm policies have been a dismal failure at maintaining, let alone increasing, the farmer's standard of living. And they have been a disaster in controlling farm program expenditures. In 1983, Federal outlays for agricultural programs were \$22 billion, yet farmers were worse off than when program costs were averaging \$5 billion a year. A majority of Republicans opposed the Melcher amendment, and it was defeated.

- 2) Baker motion to table the Pryor-Huddleston-Bumpers amendment to assist farmers who lost their crops due to grain elevator and commodity warehouse bankruptcies. (Vote No. 36—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

83% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

100% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 61-34.

March 22, 1984.

The Pryor-Huddleston-Bumpers amendment was an effort to help farmers hard hit by the bankruptcy of grain elevators or warehouses where their crops were stored. Some 3,600 farmers were affected by the bankruptcies. Despite the need for some relief, the Administration opposed the amendment, as did the Republican Majority, and it was tabled.

- 3) Baker motion to table the Bumpers-Eagleton-Exon amendment to the Agricultural Programs Adjustment Act of 1984 requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to make determinations of production losses on the basis of actual production only. (Vote No. 37—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

80% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

93% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 58-36.

March 22, 1984.

The Bumpers-Eagleton-Exon amendment sought to correct a change in disaster loan eligibility criteria made by USDA in 1983. Under the new rules, a farmer who participated in the PIK land set-aside program would have the commodities he received counted as production, as well as what he

produced on land he actually planted. To qualify for disaster aid, a farmer must be located in a qualifying county and have lost 30% of his production. But under the new rules, a farmer could lose half of his actual crop and still not be eligible because counting PIK commodities as production would bring his loss to less than 30%.

The amendment was designed to help farmers who had experienced an economic disaster beyond their control, rather than ignoring them as the Administration did. It also would have set criteria to ensure aid would reach farmers with legitimate need, to prevent the Administration's practice of declaring a county a disaster area but then applying individual eligibility rules so strict that not a single farmer qualified for disaster aid within that county. The Republican Majority opposed the amendment, which was tabled.

- 4) Cochran motion to table the Bumpers, et al, amendment (to the Agricultural Appropriation Act for FY 1985) expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should report to Congress by October 2, 1984, the specific steps the Administration will take to increase farm income, expand farm exports, assure an adequate flow of credit, and otherwise ameliorate the adverse impacts on the farm community that its policies have created. (Vote No. 230—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

100% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

100% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 46-34.

August 10, 1984.

The Bumpers amendment sought to elicit the policies that the Administration intended to pursue over the next four years and to focus attention on the Administration's neglect of the farmer's critical economic situation and on OMB Director David Stockman's testimony that one of his top priorities in 1985 would be cuts in farm programs. Democrats who proposed the amendment believed that, unless the Administration's plans for farm programs were made public, the prospects for gaining significant improvements in them were slim. One hundred percent Republican opposition assured defeat of the Bumpers proposal.

ASSISTANCE FOR THE UNEMPLOYED

INTRODUCTION

During the 1981-82 recession, the unemployment rate rose to its highest level since the end of the Great Depression. Virtually all workers laid off during this period suffered a drastic reduction of income. Life savings were quickly consumed, and homes and farms were lost to foreclosure. Even where jobless workers qualified for unemployment benefits, those benefits barely enabled families to "keep their heads above water" and often were exhausted long before there was any reasonable prospect of finding another job. There was an unprecedented rise in demand for the aid available from emergency shelters and soup kitchens for the destitute. One observer after another noted that a large proportion of the increased demand was coming from intact families, many of whom had been attached to the workforce for years.

The financial calamity was only part of the story of the suffering of jobless workers and their families. Millions of American workers depend upon employment-related health insurance benefits to cushion them and their family members against the rapidly rising costs for medical care. When they lost their jobs, generally they lost those health benefits. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that 5 million persons lost coverage in this fashion.

Democrats recognized these problems early on, and worked throughout the period of the recession to provide adequate unemployment insurance benefits, health insurance for the unemployed, and increased aid for emergency food and shelter, as well as broad-scale economic proposals to bring the Nation out of the recession. (See earlier volumes of Democratic Alternatives.) Even when the economy finally began to emerge from the trough of the recession in early 1983, and the unemployment rate began to go down, Democrats did not forget that many continued to suffer because they were the last to feel the effects of the recovery, or appeared to be individually or regionally bypassed by it.

This was true particularly with respect to the problem of the large number of unemployed workers and their families who had lost their health insurance benefits when the family breadwinners were laid off. In April of 1984, Republican Senator John Heinz (Pa.) and Democratic Senator Don Riegle (Mich.) proposed an amendment to the Deficit Reduction Act (then called the "Deficit Reduction

Tax Act of 1984") to authorize a two-year program of grants to States to provide health care insurance to qualified unemployed workers. The Heinz-Riegle proposal also required employers offering health insurance to their employees to extend such coverage at least three months after termination of an employee.

Amendment proponents argued that such a program was still badly needed by the long-term unemployed who remained jobless despite the improvement in the overall economy. Despite the bipartisan sponsorship of the amendment, and the fact that the program it created was considerably smaller and less expensive than earlier proposals on the same subject, the amendment was rejected when 80 percent of voting Republicans voted against it.

In August, Senator Dixon and others sought to preserve a minimal funding level for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program that had been established at the height of the recession. Several nonpartisan organizations had estimated that the number of homeless persons in the nation exceeded a quarter of a million and had confirmed that hundreds of thousands often experienced hunger. A substantial reduction in funding for this program would threaten the lives of many who had nowhere else to turn. Proponents sought to add \$60 million to the funds already available for that emergency program. On this amendment, although 67 percent of voting Republicans voted against it, Democrats and moderate Republicans prevailed, and the amendment was agreed to by the Senate.

THE RECORD

- 1) Heinz-Riegle, et al, amendment (to the Dole-Long modified amendment to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984) to authorize a two-year program of grants to States to provide health care insurance to qualified unemployed workers; to require private employers with 10 or more employees to offer "open seasons" in company health benefit plans to workers whose spouses were laid off and lost health benefits; and to require employers with 25 or more employees to extend company-provided health benefits for 3 months after termination of employment (with costs shared between employee and employer just as during employment). (Vote No. 62—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

80% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

67% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 39-57.

April 11, 1984.

- 2) Dixon, et al, amendment (to the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1984) appropriating an additional \$60 million for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program to be distributed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and administered by private voluntary humanitarian organizations and local governments. (Vote No. 218—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

67% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

91% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was approved, 57-40.

August 8, 1984.

CIVIL RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION

Democrats provided leadership on two important civil rights issues during the Second Session of the 98th Congress—one pertaining to preservation of basic anti-discrimination law threatened by a Supreme Court decision in the so-called *Grove City* case, and the other to equal treatment of women in the workplace.

THE RECORD

The Civil Rights Act of 1984

- 1) Byrd question of germaneness of the Byrd, et al. amendment (as a substitute for the first committee amendment) adding the Civil Rights Act of 1984 (*Grove City*) to the Continuing Resolution—H.J. Res. 648. (Vote No. 253—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

87% of the Democrats voting voted that the amendment was germane.

78% of the Republicans voting voted that it was not germane.

The amendment was declared germane, 51-48.

September 27, 1984.

- 2) Packwood motion to table the Byrd, et al. amendment to add the Civil Rights Act of 1984 (*Grove City*) to the Continuing Resolution—H.J. Res. 648. (Vote No. 262—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

95% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

93% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 53-45.

October 2, 1984.

On February 28, 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Grove City College vs. Bell* issued a decision which severely limits the judicial and executive branch interpretation and enforcement of Title IX of the

Education Amendments of 1972, the landmark legislation that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in educational institutions.

The *Grove City* decision, while specifically addressing the Title IX Program, similarly threatens three other landmark civil rights laws which contain identical anti-discrimination legislative language and which, therefore, well may be held to the same standards enunciated in *Grove City*. Those three laws are Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that prohibits racial discrimination, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which prohibits discrimination against handicapped Americans, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.

The Reagan Administration, in an *amicus* brief filed in the case, argued in favor of the restrictive interpretation ultimately taken by the Court.

On April 12, 1984, legislation was introduced in both the House (H.R. 5490) and the Senate (S. 2568) to overturn the *Grove City* decision and return the law to its status before that decision (the *status quo ante*). That legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1984, addressed all four affected civil rights statutes. It was introduced in both Houses with broad bipartisan support; the Senate bill had 63 cosponsors. It was the subject of numerous and thorough hearings in Congress, and, in June, the House of Representatives passed the bill by a vote of 375 to 32.

Senate Democrats were at the forefront of efforts to move this critical legislation through the Labor and Human Resources Committee and onto the Senate floor for debate and action. They were aided in this by key Republican cosponsors of the legislation, but were thwarted by Republican opposition to the bill, led primarily by Senator Orrin Hatch and encouraged by the Reagan Administration. This opposition prevented the bill from emerging from the Labor and Human Resources Committee.

It became increasingly clear late in the session that the legislation would never emerge from Committee. Sponsors then began seeking the assistance of the Republican Leadership in by-passing the Committee and scheduling the bill for floor consideration. However, despite some expressions of support from the Republican leadership, it became obvious in the final weeks of the session that the bill would not be brought to the floor in the 98th Congress.

With no other alternative available, Senate Democratic Leader Robert Byrd, on behalf of his colleagues and supporters of the legislation, offered the major provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1984 as an amendment to the Joint Resolution providing Continuing Appropriations for FY 1985.

Senator Byrd's amendment was a compromise version drafted to address the major objections offered to the original legislation. Senator Byrd and the chief sponsors of the amendment made it clear that they would prefer the legislation to be scheduled and debated as a separate bill, and would withdraw the amendment if the Majority Leader would assure the bill's consideration before the end of the 98th Congress. However, such assurances were not forthcoming.

The Republican-led opposition to the civil rights amendment fought back by offering several highly controversial measures as further amendments. These included a proposal establishing tax credits for tuition paid for enrolling children in private schools, a measure prohibiting court-ordered busing of school children to achieve desegregation objectives, and an anti-gun control measure. The Senate invoked cloture to limit debate of the Byrd civil rights amendment. However, while the vote on such a motion often is indicative of support and opposition for the amendment in question, in this case, the overwhelming favorable vote is deceptive because as many as 25 or more opponents changed their votes at the last minute to support cloture when it became clear that the cloture motion would prevail.

There were two key votes on the Byrd amendment to add the Civil Rights Act of 1984 to the Continuing Resolution. The first was the vote on the question of whether the amendment was germane to the bill. The Senate declared the amendment germane by a vote of 51-48. If the amendment had been declared nongermane, it would have fallen and further debate and consideration would not have been possible. While 12 Republicans voted that it was germane, the vote was carried by Democrats, 39 of whom voted "yes." The second key vote was a motion to table the Byrd amendment. Only 4 Republicans joined 41 Democrats in voting against the motion to table. Thus, that motion prevailed, 53-45, and further action on the Civil Rights Act of 1984 in the 98th Congress was prevented.

Sex Equity

- 3) Byrd question of germaneness of the Cranston, et al, amendment (to the Continuing Resolution—H.J. Res. 648) prohibiting appropriations of funds for the Office of Personnel Management unless a study on pay equity is reported to Congress by September 1, 1985. (Vote No. 273—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

82% of Democrats voting voted that the amendment was germane.

92% of Republicans voting voted that the amendment was nongermane.

The amendment was declared nongermane, 41-57.

October 4, 1984.

In June, 1984, legislation passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 415 to 6 requiring the Office of Personnel Management to undertake a study of the Federal job classification system in order to determine if the wages paid in job classifications filled predominantly by female workers are set lower than the wages paid in job classifications filled predominantly by male workers, and, if so, whether it is because of the sex of the employees, or because of intrinsic differences in the relative value of the work performed, the qualifications required for the jobs, or the working conditions. Senate proponents were unable to secure action on the House-passed legislation.

On October 4, 1984, Senator Cranston offered an amendment to the Continuing Resolution to require such a study. The amendment was drafted to ensure it was germane to the appropriations bill to which it was offered.

Proponents said that such a study is overdue, and argued that since the basis of the current Federal workforce classification system was established in 1923, tremendous changes had occurred in the workforce and in the role of women who work for the Federal government, and a history of numerous kinds of discrimination against women in employment had developed.

After opponents of the study argued that undertaking the study would lead to efforts to enact pay equity requirements within the Federal government and, eventually, in the private sector, the Senate voted to declare the amendment nongermane, with 37 Democrats and 4 Republicans voting "yea" (that it was germane) and 8 Democrats and 49 Republicans voting "nay." This vote prevented further consideration of the amendment.

DEFENSE POLICY

INTRODUCTION

While Democrats consistently supported a strong defense program funded by appropriate levels of spending during the Reagan Administration, they became increasingly concerned over several critical problems endemic to that program. These problems can be summarized as: (1) unbalanced priorities which overemphasized strategic weapons procurement at the expense of conventional readiness; (2) insistence on funding expensive strategic weapons systems with marginal utility; (3) slipshod management of the Department of Defense which has wasted too many dollars; and (4) failure to convince our NATO allies to bear their fair share of the defense burden of the alliance. Democrats continued to offer proposals and floor amendments to the FY 1985 Defense Authorization and Appropriations bills to correct these deficiencies.

THE RECORD

Shortchanging Conventional Readiness by an Overemphasis on Strategic Weapons Procurement

The Administration is funding too many strategic systems—two new bombers and two new strategic missiles, for example. During the first four Reagan defense budgets, funds for procurement increased in real terms by 61 percent, while operations and maintenance (or "readiness") funding increased only 22 percent. Real growth in procurement has been triple that for operations and maintenance.

The result of these skewed priorities, in combination with the lack of oversight over basic Pentagon spending practices, has been a disappointing record in basic combat readiness.

For example, the Army's backlog of tanks, helicopters, and other equipment to be overhauled increased 34 percent between 1980 and the end of 1984. The Air Force's backlog of buildings and

facilities needing maintenance and repair increased by 45 percent between 1980 and the end of 1984. The Navy's backlog of unrepaired buildings and facilities increased 31 percent between 1980 and the end of 1984. The U.S. supply of ammunition to sustain a conventional conflict in the European theater against a Warsaw Pact invasion was 10 days at the end of 1984. After the exhaustion of conventional ammunition, the only choice is to fight a nuclear war or face a conventional defeat in Europe.

During the period 1980-84, the Pentagon budget increased \$116 billion, or 40 percent in constant dollars. Yet the Administration has little to show in increased American ability to sustain a conventional conflict, according to a study by the House Armed Services Committee.

The House Armed Services Committee report on readiness concluded that: the U.S. Navy cannot sustain full combat air and surface operations for more than a week; U.S. air forces are not capable of conducting sustained conventional war operations in response to an attack by the Soviet Union because of shortages of aircraft, spare parts, and support elements; the U.S. Army does not have the personnel and materiel to sustain combat operations in a major contingency.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff war exercise in 1983 found that U.S. forces are prepared logistically only for a short, limited conflict, and that stocks of conventional munitions are well below minimum levels acceptable for a small conventional engagement.

In addition, the Administration has allowed the size and strength of U.S. maritime capability to atrophy to a point where we would not be able to support a Vietnam-size contingency for a sustained period of time because of the lack of ships to transport needed materials.

- 1) Tower motion to table the Leahy, et al, amendment eliminating \$2.62 billion for the production of 21 MX missiles and transferring \$442.8 million for operations and maintenance, \$878 million for the improvement of conventional forces of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and \$92.6 million for the improvement of the National Guard and reserve forces for a total overall reduction of \$1.208 billion. (Vote No. 131—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

77% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

87% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 55-41.

June 14, 1984.

Proponents of the Leahy amendment argued that the defense budget has become overbalanced toward nuclear weapons. Direct challenges to the United States or the NATO alliance are more likely to come from conventional rather than nuclear means—in particular if our conventional forces are not ready to sustain a prolonged battle. Putting money into necessary improvements of our conventional forces and combat readiness would do more to strengthen our defense than production of the MX. The amendment would shift \$1.4 billion of the funds earmarked for the MX to reinvestment in conventional forces; the remaining \$1.2 billion savings would reduce the deficit. The nuclear balance does not depend on the MX. The Trident D-5, which will be brought onstream by the late 1980's, has identical offensive capability to the MX, without the vulnerability of MX missiles deployed in Minuteman silos that makes the MX system useless as a second-strike weapon. (See the arguments associated with Vote No. 132 later in this section.)

Promoting Expensive Strategic Weapons Systems Which Are Either Redundant or of Marginal Utility

The Administration has sought costly weapons systems of questionable utility. The exorbitant cost of these weapons systems drains precious resources from qualitatively superior systems. The two glaring examples are the B-1 bomber and the MX missile.

The B-1 bomber will be essentially unable to successfully perform its key mission, penetration of Soviet air defense, shortly after it is produced. Secretary Weinberger has stated that by the early 1990's, sending the B-1 into Soviet territory would be a "suicide mission" because of the capability of the Russian air defenses to identify, track, and shoot down the aircraft. In contrast, the Stealth bomber, now under advanced development, will be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses well into the next century, and will require the Soviets to entirely revamp their air defense system at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars. The total cost of the B-1, over \$20 billion, is a dubious expenditure and drains funds from aggressively developing the superior Stealth aircraft. Indeed, it has been necessary for Senate Democrats to offer amendments to every defense authorization and appropriations bill over the last two years to protect the Stealth funding accounts from being raided to add funds for the B-1 program. The attempt by the Air Force to promote an expanded B-1 program, beyond the current policy of 100 aircraft, has been headed off for the time being only because of strong statements and amendments by Senate Democrats. If the Air Force is successful in forcing an expanded B-1 program, the Stealth bomber may yet be stillborn.

The MX missile was promoted by the Administration as a major addition to the American arsenal and as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The total bill for the MX in FY 1985 alone is over \$4 billion. The missile does provide an increase in the American arsenal, in that it has 10 warheads (instead of three carried by the Minuteman it replaces) and has an improved guidance system for better accuracy.

However, the basing mode virtually abandons the traditional standard of survivability—which is the cornerstone of our philosophy of deterrence. Ninety-five percent of our current land-based ICBM's, which will include the MX in currently vulnerable Minuteman silos, would be destroyed in a Soviet first-strike attack. This might force us into a "launch upon warning" strategy which, given the very short time frame of 20-30 minutes, would lead us into a dangerous hair-trigger situation where catastrophic errors could be made.

It would be preferable to reinstate the "standard of survivability"—meaning a significant number of our land-based missiles could survive a Soviet attack and respond with devastating firepower against the USSR. A promising new initiative to emphasize survivability and stability for our strategic forces would be accelerated development of the smaller, mobile Midgetman missile.

In terms of arms control, the Administration believes the MX provides bargaining leverage with the Soviets in the Geneva negotiations. Although it is very difficult to assess the amount of leverage the MX program does provide the United States in those negotiations, one could assume that all major elements of the American arsenal have some weight. On the other hand, there has been general agreement with the conclusions of the Scowcroft Commission that we should make every effort to convince the Soviets to move toward a more stable situation emphasizing non-MIRVed strategic missiles. It is, therefore, more attractive to emphasize the development of Midgetman as a mechanism with which to achieve a more survivable and stable strategic balance.

- 2) Tower motion to table Chiles, et al, amendment prohibiting the obligation of funds for the deployment of an MX missile and stating the sense of the Congress that efforts to modernize the land-based strategic force should be focused on small, mobile, single-warhead ICBM's—such as the so-called Midgetman missile. (Vote No. 132—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

88% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

81% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled 49-48, with the Vice President voting yea to break the tie.

June 14, 1984.

Proponents of the Chiles amendment argued that it was not an anti-MX amendment, but instead, one designed to retain the traditional viability of our strategic triad. Such viability can only be sustained if the major systems composing each leg of the triad retain substantial survivability in the event of a Soviet attack. Such survivability is the keystone of our strategy of deterrence, which deliberately forecloses any policy of an American first-strike, and relies on our capability of absorbing a Soviet first-strike and retaining deadly second-strike retaliatory capability. The amendment sought to move toward the recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission—that we put into place a small, mobile, single-warhead ICBM which does retain second-strike viability.

The amendment would have put the Midgetman on a faster track and would have retained the MX as a bargaining chip. While not affecting deployment of the 21 MX missiles then authorized, the amendment would have given the U.S. an option to produce a Midgetman sooner, possibly in six or seven years, while keeping the MX production line ready if Midgetman proves not to be the best alternative for our land-based force.

Although this specific amendment failed by one vote, its essential outline succeeded as an integral part of the FY 1985 authorization conference agreement and also of the Defense Appropriations bill. The final success of this policy was a tribute to the work of many Democrats in attempting to compensate for the complete failure of the Administration to develop a basing mode for the MX which gave it enough survivability to justify its cost. The Conference agreement "fenced" the \$1.5 billion for 21 MX production missiles in 1985 (i.e., prevented its expenditure) until after a complete review and affirmative votes by the Congress in March of 1985.

Waste and Mismanagement of the Department of Defense in the Reagan Administration

The constant stream of revelations about excessive prices for spare parts, tools, equipment components, and weapons systems purchased by the Defense Department received high visibility during 1983 and 1984. In the area of spare parts alone, for instance, the probability of waste reached staggering proportions. The FY 1984 defense budget includes \$22 billion for some four million spare parts. The potential waste in this area alone amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Administration fought every reform sponsored by Congress to change the way DOD does business. The pricing scandals were first revealed by the independent Inspector General of DOD, an

office created by Congress over the opposition of the Administration (which wanted an Inspector General to be located in the Defense Secretary's office). The Pentagon has actively opposed the development of warranty requirements for new weapons systems, instituted by amendment on the Senate floor. It has not implemented the new Bureau of Independent Weapons Testing and Evaluation, also instituted by an amendment on the Senate floor. It opposed a Senate initiative to create a hard-hitting Office of Competition Advocate General in each of the services, designed to increase competition in procurement contracting.

The Weinberger Pentagon has attempted to convince us that oversight and reform of its system for purchasing tools, spare parts, equipment components, etc., have reduced the problem of overpricing and lack of quality control to manageable proportions. Yet, a June 1984 report to Congress mandated by Senator Byrd, concluded that reform has had little or no impact—the Federal Office of Procurement Policy found that "there is little evidence that DOD activities have complied with the requirements" of either internal Pentagon reform programs or the mandates from the Congress. The report concluded that the Secretary of Defense has been unable to "manage and improve the overall procurement system." Most of the revelations of overpricing and lack of quality control have come as the result of the activities of the Independent Inspector General, "whistleblowers" in DOD and the services, and investigations by nonprofit private groups.

In addition, instead of rewarding Pentagon employees who call attention to excesses, the Pentagon system persecutes them, making "whistleblowing" a hazardous activity. Indeed, the Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board recently stated that if an employee is caught revealing excesses or wrongdoing he gets his head "blown off."

- 3) Baker motion to table Dixon, et al, motion to recommit the bill to the Armed Services Committee with instructions to report the bill back with such changes as needed to authorize total new budget authority for defense-related programs for FY 1985 of not more than \$293.7 billion, reducing real growth from roughly 7 percent to 5 percent. (Vote No. 130—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

80% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

87% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 55-43.

June 14, 1984.

Proponents argued that 5 percent real growth is entirely adequate to meet U.S. defense needs. Unrealistically high defense budgets threaten to bankrupt the economy, ensure continuation of \$200 billion deficits, and threaten the public consensus for adequate defense spending. Soviet defense spending grew at a rate of about 2 percent annually from 1976 to 1982 and only 3 or 4 percent in 1982-83, according to preliminary estimates from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Furthermore, U.S. policy has been that a 3 percent real growth annual increase in defense spending by our allies reflects a responsible burden for defense matters.

The constant revelations of overpricing for spare parts and other systems have eroded the confidence of the people and Congress in the management of the Department of Defense. The Department should be able to rise to the challenge of meeting all its essential priorities within a real growth level at least double that which our allies are currently achieving.

NATO Burden-sharing

A series of alliance meetings in 1977-78 reached an agreement that NATO member countries should increase their real growth in defense spending on a 3 percent per year basis. The U.S. has exceeded the 3 percent annual increase for the last 4 years, while our allies have increased their spending by barely half the target. U.S. stocks of ammunition in Europe, already well above NATO goals, will be further increased by the commitment of \$52 billion over the next five years. In contrast, most allies plan little or no progress toward NATO's 30-day stockpile goals in their current five-year projections even though some types of munitions are in critically short supply.

Our allies committed themselves six years ago to a \$1 billion project to provide facilities to arm, fuel, and shelter the \$50 billion worth of reinforcing U.S. aircraft that would be put in Europe within 10 days of an attack. Less than 20 percent of the minimal essential facilities are in place. By their unwillingness to fulfill their commitment, the NATO allies moved themselves—and the United States—closer to a choice between capitulation to the USSR as a result of purely conventional intimidation, and early resort to nuclear weapons. "Early resort" should be interpreted as a matter of days—not weeks or months—according to General Bernard Rogers, the European NATO Supreme Commander. Americans and Europeans should question why their huge defense investment buys only a limited conventional defense and relies on such an untenable military strategy. In an era of pronounced NATO theater nuclear disadvantage and rough strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the USSR, it makes no sense.

- 4) Tower motion to table Nunn perfecting amendment (to the Nunn-Roth amendment) limiting to 326,414 the ceiling on U.S. forces stationed in Europe in support of NATO in FY 1986; providing for a three-year period beginning in FY 1987 that this ceiling would be reduced each year by 30,000 unless European NATO members have increased their defense spending by an aggregate average of at least 3 percent, after inflation; permits the Secretary to waive the required reduction if he certifies that European NATO members have accomplished three specified objectives during the previous calendar year and provides that the ceiling would be reduced by 10,000 for each objective the Secretary is unable to certify; among other provisions. (Vote No. 149—98th Congress, 2nd Session.)

86% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

92% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 55-41.

June 20, 1984.

The Nunn amendment recognized that continued, even redoubled, U.S. sacrifices to improve conventional defenses and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe are to no avail without similar allied efforts. Proponents argued that European intentions should be put to a reasonable test by measuring programmatic progress. If, over a two-year period—during which adequate contingency planning could be done and preparations made—the allies are unwilling to make essential improvements to which they have agreed, and if it is evident that they are content with a "tripwire" defense for Western Europe, reductions in our European effort are in order. In summary, the U.S. cannot continue to expend billions to prepare for the conventional war our allies are not prepared to fight.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

The Budget

The Administration's fiscal policies have burdened the country with the largest and fastest growing deficits in our Nation's history. Those deficits are responsible for the mounting pile of debt that has mortgaged our future and that of our children.

When the second session of the 98th Congress began, the Nation's debt stood at \$1.433 trillion. Nine months later, when Congress adjourned, the debt had risen by \$140 billion to \$1.6 trillion. If the government were to continue increasing its debt at this rate, by the end of the decade we will have a debt of over \$3 trillion, more than three times the debt in 1980. The cost incurred to finance this debt is enormous. In FY 1984, 37 cents of each dollar collected in individual income taxes was spent just to pay the net interest cost on the Federal debt.

Seeing that the Reagan Administration and the Senate Republican majority were unable or unwilling to take fair and realistic steps to control the budget hemorrhage, Senate Democrats repeatedly offered their own prescription for bringing Federal budget deficits under control. In February 1984, the Administration submitted a budget request to Congress which contained an FY 1985 deficit of \$197 billion, reaching \$248 billion by 1989. It was a budget that met with immediate and nearly unanimous bipartisan rejection.

Faced with this crisis of confidence in its fiscal leadership, the Administration resorted to a series of closed meetings designed to fashion a more acceptable alternative. However, the Administration insisted that the effort be limited to a "down payment" on the deficit, ruling out Democratic proposals to double the amount of deficit reduction that the Administration had set as its

target. While Democrats initially were invited to participate in these meetings, White House representatives quickly made clear that the Administration was not prepared to meet them halfway. In the end, the closed door meetings, from which Democrats were excluded, produced a new budget proposal that was unveiled with much fanfare and dubbed the "Rose Garden" deficit reduction plan.

That plan, however, actually would have resulted not in lower deficits, but in rising deficits each year. Rather than lend support to such a proposal, Senate Democrats produced a budget plan of their own. This budget plan would have cut the deficit by \$200 billion over three years and, unlike the Administration plan, would have produced declining deficits in future years. Further, the plan reflected a different set of priorities than the plan supported by the majority. The Democratic proposal contained fewer cuts in essential programs such as Medicare and a restrained, more affordable, but still generous growth rate in the Pentagon budget. The proposal failed on a near-party line tie vote when it was offered as an amendment to the Deficit Reduction Act, the bill serving as the vehicle for the bulk of the "Rose Garden" plan.

In addition, Senate Democrats worked together to seek to modify the Deficit Reduction Act to protect Medicare beneficiaries from deep cuts that would have increased their out-of-pocket medical expenses. (See MEDICARE chapter.) Democrats also sought to assure that Congress would have sufficient flexibility within overall spending limits to shift funds between the Pentagon's budget and domestic programs.

Senate Democrats also worked to preserve the budget process during the year. When, after more than two months of effort, progress on the FY 1985 budget resolution was blocked by White House intransigence over the level of Pentagon spending, Senate Democrats supported Senator Chiles' effort to force action on the budget resolution by delaying consideration of needed appropriation bills until the Majority agreed to serious consideration of a compromise on the level of Pentagon spending.

THE RECORD

- 1) Chiles amendment (to the Baker amendment—the "Rose Garden" budget plan—to the Deficit Reduction Act) setting forth a three-year budget plan providing for 4 percent real growth in defense spending, 2 percent nominal growth in nondefense programs, \$31 billion in additional revenue (achieved by delaying tax indexing for two years, with exceptions for personal exemption and zero bracket amounts to protect low- and moderate-income households), and expressing the sense of the Congress that appropriations for defense and nondefense discretionary spending should be capped at \$431.3 billion in FY 1985, \$462.8 billion in 1986, and \$497.5 billion in 1987. The plan provided for approximately \$200 billion in deficit reductions over the three-year period and would result in declining deficits of \$173.8 billion, \$170.7 billion, and \$169.0 billion in the FY 1985-87 period. (Vote No. 88—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

100% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

89% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected on a tie vote, 49-49.

May 8, 1984.

The Chiles amendment represented the major Democratic alternative to the White House "Rose Garden" budget plan. It would have provided not only for lower deficits than the "Rose Garden" budget (as embodied in the original Baker amendment), but for deficits that declined each year. Under the Republican plan, deficits would have risen from an estimated \$180.7 billion in FY 1985, to \$185.6 billion in 1986, and \$203.5 billion in 1987.

The key elements of the Chiles amendment were a more sustainable 4 percent real increase in the rate of growth in military spending for one year (with exceptions for certain high priority programs such as education and law enforcement), and a delay in tax indexing to raise needed revenues. The combination of these three elements would reduce the deficit by about \$200 billion over the three-year period, FY 1985-87, while the Republican plan provided for only \$150 billion in deficit reduction over the same period (using the Administration's accounting system).

The Chiles amendment also preserved the flexibility of the Appropriations Committees to allocate funds between defense and nondefense programs in proportion to need and unexpected contingencies. The Republican budget, on the other hand, could have prevented Congress from responding quickly to changing domestic events and resultant needs, such as emergency funding for flood control, fighting forest fires, and amelioration of the effects of other natural disasters.

- (2) Domenici motion to table the Bradley, et al, amendment to reduce the real increase in defense spending from the 7 percent level in the Republican plan to 5 percent, provide \$3.6 billion in additional funds for high priority nondefense discretionary programs, including education, medical research, and environmental programs, and restore \$600 million of the \$9 billion in Medicare cuts contained in the Republicans' proposal. The Medicare restoration struck the proposed increase in the part B deductible and returned the proposed part B premium increase to current law so that premium increases would be related to the general inflation rate instead of the higher inflation in health care costs. The amendment reduced the deficit by \$3 billion more than the Republican "Rose Garden" budget over the FY 1985-87 period. (Vote No. 89—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

88% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

90% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 51-43.

May 8, 1984.

The Bradley amendment was another attempt by Democrats to modify the "Rose Garden" budget plan proposed by the Republican majority. As with the Chiles amendment, the Bradley amendment resulted in greater deficit reduction than the GOP budget, but also restructured funding priorities to provide a more sustainable rate of increase in the defense budget while counteracting some of the sharp cuts in critical programs that had been made since 1981.

The one-year freeze in nondefense discretionary appropriations contained in the "Rose Garden" budget continued a funding level that had driven education assistance to a 20-year low, and jeopardized cleanup of toxic waste dumps and progress in life- and money-saving medical research. Furthermore, the Medicare cuts proposed by the Republicans would force the elderly to shoulder an unfair burden in reducing the deficit.

- (3) Baker motion to table the Chafee, et al, amendment to combine the separate caps for defense and nondefense appropriations (as contained in the "Rose Garden" budget) into a single cap and to reduce the total capped funding level by a total of \$16.7 billion below the total of the two caps in the Republican budget. The amendment resulted in appropriations caps of \$434.5 billion in FY 1985, \$472.3 billion in 1986, and \$514.7 billion in 1987. The "Rose Garden" budget (Baker amendment) provided for total appropriations of \$436.8 billion in FY 1985, \$477.9 billion in 1986, and \$523.4 billion in 1987. (Vote No. 93—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

93% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

85% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 48-46.

May 10, 1984.

Moderate Republicans, along with most Democrats, supported the Chafee amendment in an attempt to provide needed flexibility to Congress to respond to changing circumstances in the future. The "Rose Garden" budget plan locked in separate caps for defense and nondefense appropriations for the next three years, thereby preventing any shift of funds between the categories even if warranted by events. While many Democrats were concerned that the Chafee amendment did not go far enough in reducing the budget deficit, they nonetheless supported the effort as an improvement in the GOP budget.

- (4) Weicker motion to table the Kennedy amendment adding \$322 million to the nondefense discretionary appropriations cap in the Baker amendment to provide for a 7 percent increase during FY 1985-87 in five primary health care block grant programs—alcohol and drug abuse, mental health, maternal and child health, migrant health centers, and childhood immunization—and providing \$4.4 million for child abuse prevention and treatment over the same period. (Vote No. 98—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

70% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

96% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 63-32.

May 17, 1984.

The Kennedy amendment attempted to restore a degree of fairness and compassion to Federal budget priorities. Since 1981, these five health grant programs had lost an average of one-half their purchasing power (after adjustment for inflation) and, under the "Rose Garden" budget, their funding continued to fall. Purchasing power for child abuse prevention and treatment programs also had lost much of their purchasing power. While the defense budget has risen by over 60 percent in three years, the proponents of the amendment argued that it is unfair to continue to concentrate deficit reductions in programs that assist those least able to help themselves. Furthermore, the amendment's increased funding added less than one-tenth of one percent to the total budget deficits anticipated over the FY 1985-87 period. (See also comments on the same amendment in the chapter on HUMAN SERVICES.)

- 5) Baker modified amendment containing the Administration's "Rose Garden" budget plan (with slight changes). The amendment provided for 6.8 percent real growth in defense spending in FY 1985 and 5 percent real growth in FY 1986 and 1987, and 1.5 percent nominal growth in nondefense discretionary appropriations in FY 1985 and inflation adjusted growth in FY 1986 and F 1987; it also created a new point of

order against appropriations bills that exceed the caps for defense and nondefense programs. The overall budget resulted in deficits of \$181.7 billion in FY 1985, \$187.2 billion in 1986, and \$204 billion in 1987. (Vote No. 100—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

73% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

100% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 65-32.

May 17, 1984.

The Baker amendment, embodying the "Rose Garden" budget plan, did not deal realistically with the deficit issue. While deficits under the GOP plan were somewhat lower than they would have been if no action were taken, the budget still provided for increasing deficits for each of the next three years. This marked the first time that the Senate went on record endorsing a budget plan that provided for continually growing deficits.

The "Rose Garden" budget was developed by the Republicans behind closed doors, without any input from Democrats. It failed to address the major concerns of many Democrats—including producing significant deficit reductions that would yield declining budget deficits; a more realistic and sustainable growth in the defense budget; protection for those Americans who have borne the brunt of previous budget cuts; and a delay in further revenue losses until the budget deficit can be brought under control. Consequently, it was opposed by most Democratic Senators.

- 6) Adoption of the First Budget Resolution for FY 1985 which contains the Administration's "Rose Garden" budget plan. The budget provided for increasing deficits of \$181.7 billion in FY 1985, \$187.2 billion in 1986, and \$204 billion in 1987, and a public debt reaching \$2.4 trillion by FY 1987—more than double the debt at the end of FY 1981. The budget provided for revenue increases of \$45.5 billion over the three years; real growth of defense spending of about 6.8 percent in FY 1985 and 5 percent each in FY 1986 and 1987; and \$19.9 billion in cuts in entitlement programs, mostly Medicare. (Vote No. 103—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

97% of Democrats voting opposed the resolution.

93% of Republicans voting supported the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to, 41-34.

May 18, 1984.

The budget resolution assumed enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 as passed by the Senate May 17, 1984. Therefore, the budget resolution, by definition, endorsed the "Rose Garden"

deficit reduction plan and was the first budget ever passed by the Senate which provided for increasing deficits in the future. As such, the resolution failed to deal with the deficit problem while continuing the excessively rapid increase in military spending endorsed by the President.

- (7) Mattingly motion to table the Chiles point of order that the Mattingly amendment to the Deficit Reduction Act that authorized the President to veto line items of appropriations bills in FY 1985 or FY 1986 and allowed for a simple majority of Congress (instead of two-thirds) to override any such veto. (Vote No. 86—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

79% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

71% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion to table the point of order was defeated, 45-46. On a subsequent vote, the point of order was sustained, 56-34, and the amendment fell.

May 3, 1984.

The Mattingly amendment would have disrupted the constitutional balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. Although the amendment granted broad new powers to the President, it would not have affected the fastest growing part of the budget—interest costs on the national debt—nor would it affect some \$400 billion in spending for entitlement programs.

Since this Administration is unlikely to veto major line items in a military spending bill, the amendment put all of the pressure for deficit reduction on nondefense discretionary spending, a portion of the budget equaling \$163 billion in FY 1984, which comprises only 17 percent of Federal spending, and which already was projected to decline as a share of the budget between FY 1985 and FY 1990.

The President already has the power to propose rescissions of line items he thinks are too costly or ill advised. But following its first year in office, the Administration cut back on the number of requests for rescissions to the point where it virtually abandoned this method of controlling spending.

- 8) Baker motion to waive section 303(a) of the Budget Act in order to permit consideration of the Agriculture Appropriations Bill for FY 1985. (Section 303(a) prohibits the consideration of any spending bill until a concurrent resolution on the budget pertaining to the year for which the bill appropriates funds has been adopted by Congress.) (Vote No. 214—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

70% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to waive.

94% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was agreed to, 63-34, and the bill subsequently was considered.

August 8, 1984.

The Budget Act requires that Congress agree to a budget resolution by May 15 of each year. In 1984, however, because of an impasse with the White House and the Senate Republican majority over the level of military spending, the conference committee on the budget deadlocked and Congress still had been unable to adopt a budget nearly three months after the deadline set by law. Allowing spending bills to go forward when there was no budget resolution to guide their overall level would have made a mockery of the Congressional budget process and undermined confidence in the ability of Congress to do its job.

The Democrats opposed considering this appropriations bill in order to put pressure on the Republicans to negotiate seriously on a compromise to the budget stalemate. The Budget Act has proved useful in restraining spending and establishing overall budget priorities and should not be abandoned for the sake of expediency and political convenience. (Two previous votes were held on cloture motions to bring debate to a close on the Baker motion to waive Section 303(a); see information on Vote Nos. 211 and 213 in the Appendix. In both cases, Democrats supported the effort by Senator Chiles to extend debate on the budget waiver.)

- 9) Reconsideration of Vote No. 290 by which the Senate defeated the joint resolution increasing the public debt limit to \$1.8328 trillion. (Vote No. 292—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

100% of Democrats voting opposed the increase in the debt limit.

90% of Republicans voting supported the increase in the debt limit.

The resolution passed, 37-30.

October 12, 1984.

The resolution contained the single largest increase in the public debt ever approved by the Congress—\$251 billion. The new debt limit was nearly double the level on the day President Reagan was inaugurated. Republicans failed to address the deficit in May when they supported the "Rose Garden" budget plan that contained increasing deficits over the next three years. This debt limit was the product of that budget plan.

ENERGY

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several decades, a bipartisan consensus has been developed on the broad outlines of a national energy policy. This consensus includes a balanced Federal program of research and development to facilitate the creation of a range of energy technologies; and the timely and efficient development of petroleum and natural gas reserves, including publicly-owned onshore reserves.

Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration has made a concerted effort to dismantle major components of this consensus policy. This is of particular importance in view of recent developments in energy markets—events that could have major impacts on the patterns of domestic energy production, refining, and distribution.

The wave of mergers in recent years involving a number of the major oil companies is of particular importance. The long-term public policy implications of such mergers are not clearly understood—in terms of their impacts on oil exploration and development, production, and domestic energy markets in general. The impact of such mergers on the independent sector of the domestic oil and gas industry, including retailers, is of particular concern.

In the face of some of the largest corporate mergers in history, Senate Republicans opposed measures advocated by Senate Democrats to inhibit merger activity for six months. This six-month period would have allowed Congress to evaluate the implications of such activity for public policy.

As in the first session of the 98th Congress, the Senate Republican Majority continued in the second session to oppose a balanced approach to the development of alternative energy technologies, such as solar energy, while Senate Democrats have supported a restoration of balance in Federal efforts to develop energy technologies and opposed the drastic cuts in the Federal budget for research and development in fossil and renewable energy technologies.

Democrats sought unsuccessfully to bring consistency to Federal leasing programs for oil and gas development by requiring competitive bidding for onshore leasing of publicly-owned lands with oil and gas reserves. (Currently, competitive bidding is required for offshore leasing, but not onshore leasing.) The result of this practice has been Federal government leasing of large tracts of land, worth millions of dollars, to a few companies at very little cost to the companies. Consequently, the federal government, as well as many State governments, does not receive a fair return for such leases.

THE RECORD

Oil Company Mergers

- 1) Heinz motion to table the Johnston amendment (to the Export Administration Act Amendment of 1984, S. 979) prohibiting the issuance of any Federal lease or rights-of-way to a company that is a party to a merger consummated after February 27, 1984, and prior to six months following the date of enactment of this Act, if either of the merging companies possess more than 10 million barrels of proven reserves of crude oil or natural gas equivalents. (Vote No. 24—98th Congress, Second Session)

77% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

80% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 52-42.

February 29, 1984.

Recently there has been substantial concern with respect to the economic and other effects of large-scale corporate mergers involving major oil companies. Within a period of a few months, it was announced in the press that Standard Oil of California (SoCal) was acquiring Gulf Oil for \$13.3 billion and Texaco was acquiring Superior Oil for \$5.7 billion. The issues raised regarding these mergers included a concern that a larger share of domestic oil reserves would be concentrated in the hands of fewer companies; that there would be fewer domestic markets; and that mergers would result in a decline in exploration for new oil reserves.

The amendment offered by Senator Johnston, while not prohibiting mergers outright, would have inhibited mergers for six months, thereby providing Congress time to evaluate short and long-term

economic impacts and other implications of such mergers for the oil industry, national energy policy, and credit markets. Solid Republican opposition defeated the Johnston amendment.

Solar Energy R&D

- 2) Hatfield motion to table the DeConcini amendment (to the Energy-Water Appropriation Bill for FY 1985—H.R. 5653) to increase by \$5 million funds available for solar-thermal research in the Department of Energy and offsetting the increase by reducing appropriations for the high energy physics (nuclear fusion) program. (Vote No. 153—98th Congress, Second Session)

71% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table

92% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 60-33.

June 21, 1984.

For almost a decade, there has been a bipartisan consensus in energy policy which supports the balanced development of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear energy technologies. This includes support for energy conservation, as well for renewable energy resources, such as solar energy.

The Reagan Administration has departed from this consensus, and, for example, slashed funding for solar energy research and development by about 88% since coming into office.

Democrats support efforts to restore a balanced approach to Federal energy research and development programs and a vigorous Federal R&D program to produce alternative energy technologies, including solar technologies such as a solar absorption cooling and passive solar cooling. Such technologies could make a significant contribution to energy needs in many regions of the Nation, such as the Southwest, and could contribute to U.S. efforts to use energy more efficiently.

Senator DeConcini sought to increase funds for solar-thermal research by \$5 million for FY 1985, but this effort, supported by 71 percent of Democrats, was successfully opposed by over 90 percent of voting Republicans.

Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing

- 3) Bumpers question of germaneness of the Bumpers amendment (to the FY 1985 Continuing Appropriations Bill—H.J. Res 648) which would require the Secretary of the Interior to use competitive bidding to lease any onshore lands for oil and gas development. (Vote No. 265—98th Congress, Second Session)

67% of Democrats voting voted that the amendment was germane.

91% of Republicans voting voted that the amendment was nongermane.

The amendment was declared nongermane, 33-63.

October 3, 1984.

Over the past several years, millions of acres of publicly-owned lands have been leased by the Federal government for oil and natural gas exploration. However, leasing of these lands is not conducted through a system of competitive bidding, as is the practice for offshore oil and gas development on the Outer Continental Shelf. As a consequence, there have been abuses in onshore leasing programs as well as a loss of revenue to the Federal government.

The Bumpers amendment would have required the Interior Department to use a competitive system for leases on public lands in order to eliminate the abuses of the existing system, and to ensure a fair return to the Federal government for publicly-owned oil and gas resources.

The amendment was defeated when most voting Republicans voted that it was not germane to consider it as an amendment to the legislation to which it was offered.

ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

During the last few decades a national consensus has developed in support of an aggressive Federal and State program to address the rapidly expanding problem of public exposure to toxic wastes from the thousands of toxic waste dumps which are being discovered across the United States. In 1980, Congress passed the so-called "Superfund" legislation that established a program to clean up these dumps and eliminate the significant hazards they pose to public health. This legislation provided the Environmental Protection Agency with necessary emergency authority to clean up toxic waste sites, and established a \$1.6 billion "Superfund" to finance cleanup operations. This fund obtains revenues largely from taxes on petroleum and petro-chemical products. The authority to levy such taxes expires in 1985.

In the second session of the 98th Congress, Democratic Senators sought to reauthorize and expand "Superfund" taxes, an initiative that would have provided additional funds to address the growing threat to the public health.

The threat to public health posed by toxic chemical waste dumps located around the nation has become a major public concern. In 1984 it was estimated by the Environmental Protection Agency that there could be as many as 22,000 toxic waste dumps around the country, and that as many as 2,200 ultimately might be placed on the National Priority List. Nonetheless, since the passage of the "Superfund" law, the Administration has made progress in cleaning up such dumps only very slowly. Only six sites were cleaned up during the Reagan Administration's first term.

THE RECORD

- 1) Bradley question of germaneness of the Bradley-Lautenberg amendment (to the 1985 Continuing Appropriations Bill—H.J. Res. 648) authorizing \$6 billion over five years for the "Superfund" for cleanup of toxic waste dumps. (Vote No. 264—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

70% of Democrats voting voted that the amendment was germane.

85% of Republicans voting voted that the amendment was nongermane.

The amendment was declared nongermane.

October 2, 1984.

In response to the growing public concern about toxic waste, Congress initiated efforts to reauthorize and expand the "Superfund" law in 1984, rather than wait until 1985 when the Superfund taxes were due to expire. Despite opposition by the Reagan Administration to reauthorizing Superfund in 1984, the House passed a \$10.2 billion, five-year reauthorization bill in the summer of 1984. In contrast, legislation to reauthorize the Superfund program was stalled in the Senate. Senate Democrats attempted to gain action by offering a floor amendment to the 1985 Continuing Resolution when it became clear late in the session that the Republican leadership would not schedule the bill for floor consideration.

Unfortunately, Republicans succeeded in preventing action on the amendment by declaring that it was not germane to the bill to which it was offered.

FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

Because the Administration's foreign policy has been at times overreactive, overly militaristic, uncoordinated, and oftentimes difficult to comprehend, the Minority has attempted to compel the Administration to explain its policies to the American people in a coherent fashion.

Lebanon stands out as a case in point. In August 1982, U.S. Marines were sent to Lebanon as part of a multinational force to facilitate the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut, a mission which most in the Congress believed was attainable and a mission with which most in Congress agreed, due to its limited scope. When the mission was completed, the Marines were withdrawn.

However, following the massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Shatila and Sabra refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut, the Marines returned to Beirut on September 25, 1982, as part of a multinational peacekeeping force. The American people were led to believe that this would be a temporary presence in order to allow time for the Lebanese Government to exercise control over the greater Beirut area.

In September 1983, the Administration requested legislation authorizing the continued participation of the U.S. Marines in the multinational peacekeeping force for another 18 months.

Subsequently, the Democrats offered an alternative to the authorization which would have required the President to report to Congress under the War Powers Resolution concerning the circumstances necessitating the introduction of U.S. troops into Lebanon, the constitutional and legislative authority for their introduction, and the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or their involvement. In addition, the Democrats would have required the President to describe the specific goals of U.S. policy in Lebanon, the specific roles and missions of the U.S. forces in Lebanon, and the

specific criteria that were being applied to determine when they had accomplished their roles and missions. If the reports were not forthcoming, then the President would have had to withdraw the Marines within 60 days.

The Democratic alternative was defeated 55-45 on September 29, 1983, by a straight party line vote, thereby denying the American people the information that Senate Democrats were attempting to obtain from the President.

Less than a month later, on October 23, 1983, 241 American servicemen were killed in a terrorist bombing attack on the U.S. military headquarters at the Beirut Airport. On March 30, 1984, the President announced the U.S. role in the multinational force was being terminated. Warring intercommunal factions in Lebanon, along with Syria, had forced the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines.

In the closing days of the 98th Congress, the Senate voted 57-42 against an amendment offered by Senator Daniel Inouye to prohibit any further aid going to the Contras fighting the Nicaraguan Government. Most Democrats supported the amendment for obvious reasons. The Administration's original justification for arming and training the Contras operating from Honduran soil against Nicaragua was to interdict the alleged flow of arms going from Nicaragua to the guerrillas in El Salvador. The original plan called for the training of 1,500 Nicaraguan exiles.

However, the Contra army grew to 15,000 guerrillas and the Administration's rationale for supporting this army began shifting. From the original, narrowly-defined purpose of arms interdiction, the objective became one of harassing the Sandinistas in the hope of convincing them to end their support for the Salvadoran insurgency. Finally, the Administration argued that continued funding for the Contras was vital to keep pressure on Nicaragua to open up its internal political processes.

Democrats raised the question as to what the Administration's real goals were in Nicaragua. When answers were not forthcoming and the rationale continued to shift, most Senators on the Democratic side of the aisle opted to cut the funding for this operation.

Efforts on the part of Democrats to bring foreign aid spending in line with the Administration's cutback in domestic programs also failed during 1984. The Senate, largely on a party line vote, defeated 54-46 an amendment offered by Senator David Pryor to cut \$211.5 million from the

\$917 million in military assistance program monies requested by the Administration. The \$917 million figure represented a 600 percent increase in the MAP program from fiscal year 1981. Another amendment, one offered by Senator Christopher Dodd to delete from the second supplemental appropriations bill \$386 million in foreign assistance which had not been authorized by Congress, was also defeated, largely along party lines.

Senator Dodd's amendment to prohibit the use of any funds, directly or indirectly, for planning, directing, executing, or supporting acts of terrorism against Nicaragua was tabled 47-43, largely along party lines. A similar amendment was defeated 53-45 recently, once again largely along party lines.

Democrats also attempted to have the Senate go on record in opposition to U.S. government support for any individual or group in Central America which is known by our government to have as one of its intentions the violent overthrow of any Central American government with which we have full diplomatic relations. Once again, this amendment to the supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1984 was tabled by a vote of 51-44, largely along party lines.

Largely because of the Lebanon experience, Senate Democrats have been concerned that the War Powers Resolution needs strengthening. Since U.S. involvement in Central America has been escalating, Senator Leahy offered an amendment on April 4, 1984, which would have amended the War Powers Resolution as it affected El Salvador. The amendment would have prohibited the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into or over El Salvador for combat purposes unless the President first obtained a declaration of war or a specific authorization for the use of U.S. combat forces in El Salvador. The amendment was tabled 59-36, largely along party lines.

Senate Democrats remain deeply concerned that our institutional responsibilities and prerogatives under the Constitution continue to be eroded by this Administration. In an effort to begin reversing this trend, Senators Sasser, Inouye, and Bingaman offered an amendment on the FY 1984 Supplemental Appropriations bill placing a limitation on the use of military facilities in Honduras. Six airfields were ordered constructed or improved to accommodate U.S. military aircraft operations in Honduras in 1983 and 1984, all without specific congressional authorization. These airfields were being paid for with tax dollars taken from the Department of Defense's operations and maintenance account, which is intended to pay for such readiness items as spare parts, ammunition, and fuel.

Also, the Sasser-Inouye-Bingaman amendment would have limited to training exercises the use of the so-called temporary facilities in Honduras, financed by the Pentagon. In addition, the amendment would have prohibited any Pentagon funds from being used to convert a temporary facility into a permanent base unless specifically authorized by Congress. This was a modest attempt to bring some integrity into the congressional exercise over the power of the purse. But once again, Democratic efforts were thwarted on a party line vote of 50-44.

THE RECORD

Central America

- 1) Kasten motion to table the Specter amendment (taking with it the Leahy-Dodd-Pell second degree amendment to withhold all military assistance to El Salvador until Salvadoran authorities had obtained a verdict in the trial of the National Guardsmen charged with the murder of four U.S. churchwomen. The Leahy, et al, proposal amended an amendment offered by Senator Specter which would have withheld 30 percent of the appropriations for military assistance to El Salvador during FY 1984 until Salvadoran authorities brought to trial the National Guardsmen charged with the murder of four U.S. churchwomen and obtained a verdict. (Vote No. 49—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

75% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

83% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 54-39.

April 3, 1984.

The Leahy amendment was consistent with the law established in the original 1984 appropriations act as a means designed to motivate the Salvadoran judicial system to deal with the murder case of the four U.S. churchwomen. Democrats argued that Congress should not ignore the failure of Salvadoran officials to achieve a verdict in that case and should not undermine the penalty which was included in legislation enacted by Congress in 1983 and which was signed by the President.

Democrats pointed out that one national guardsman arrested had confessed to his own participation and implicated four others. The murderers of the churchwomen were identified hours after the crime, yet three years later no one had been brought to justice. Therefore, Democrats believed if

the limitation were not maintained, the United States would look foolish by permitting a loophole through which El Salvador could receive additional assistance without complying with the conditions already laid down by the Congress.

- 2) Baker motion to table the Leahy, et al, amendment to the War Powers Resolution which would have prohibited the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into or over El Salvador for combat purposes unless the President first obtained a declaration of war from the Congress or a specific authorization for use of U.S. combat forces in El Salvador. (Vote No. 51—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

76% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

91% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 59-36.

April 4, 1984.

The supporters of the Leahy amendment argued that U.S. policy was leading this Nation into direct involvement in the armed conflict in El Salvador. The Minority pointed out that the escalation of the number of military advisers in El Salvador was a troubling development, and an Americanization of the war would give the Salvadoran army less incentive to fight the insurgents themselves. Democrats pointed out that the amendment was tailored in such a way so as not to take sides with any faction in El Salvador and it did not limit the ability of the President to respond to an emergency situation presenting a clear and present danger of hostile attack on the United States or in evacuating Americans from El Salvador.

Democrats also argued that the Constitution intended that Congress play some role in a decision to send troops into war and that Congress should not shirk its constitutional responsibility. The amendment sought to prevent an unfortunate military involvement, such as occurred in Lebanon, by clarifying the authority of the President to engage American troops in combat.

- 3) Rudman motion to table the Dodd amendment to prohibit the use of any funds, directly or indirectly, for planning, directing, executing, or supporting acts of terrorism in, over, or offshore the territory of Nicaragua. (Vote No. 53—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

92% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

86% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 47-43.

April 4, 1984.

Democrats argued that the Contras fighting the government of Nicaragua engage in terrorist activities against the innocent civilian population of that country, and that U.S. funds should not be used to aid such activities.

- 4) Stevens motion to table the Levin-Inouye amendment to prohibit the use of funds for covert assistance to any individual or group in Central America which is not a part of a country's armed forces and which is known by the U.S. government to have, as one of its intentions, the violent overthrow of any Central American government with which the U.S. has full diplomatic relations. (Vote No. 54—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

88% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

85% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 51-44.

April 5, 1984.

The Democratic proponents of the amendment stated that they only sought to codify in law the assurance already given by President Reagan that the "U.S. does not seek to destabilize or overthrow the government of Nicaragua; nor to impose or compel any particular form of government there." Democrats also maintained that the U.S. could not avoid indirect responsibility for the destruction of lives and property in Nicaragua carried out by agents our government was funding.

- 5) Stevens motion to table the Sasser-Inouye-Bingaman, et al, modified amendment to limit U.S. armed forces' use of temporary facilities in Honduras, financed by Department of Defense operation and maintenance funds, only to training exercises unless the facilities are deemed necessary for the evacuation or self-defense of U.S. personnel and to prohibit any DOD funds from being used to convert a temporary facility into a permanent base unless specifically authorized by Congress. (Vote No. 55—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

98% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

92% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 50-44.

April 5, 1984.

Democrats asserted that U.S. combat engineers were in the process of building two more airfields near Honduras—bringing to eight the number ordered constructed in the prior year. These projects were being undertaken without specific congressional authorization and paid for by tax dollars taken from the operations and maintenance account which was established to fund fuel, ammunition,

and spare parts for our own armed forces. Democrats expressed concern that the U.S. was building up quickly a permanent military infrastructure in Honduras which could easily lead to the loss of American lives, and that the buildup should cease without Congressional approval.

- 6) Dodd amendment prohibiting the appropriation of funds for planning or supporting acts of terrorism in, over, or offshore the territory of Nicaragua. The Dodd amendment defined terrorism as an act which (1) would endanger human life, that is a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within such jurisdiction, and (2) would appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. (Vote No. 271—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

80% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

81% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 53-45.

October 3, 1984.

Democrats argued that the purpose of the amendment was to eliminate a glaring and dangerous contradiction in American foreign policy. In Senator Dodd's words: "On the one hand, our government has made very clear on repeated occasions its adamant opposition to terrorism as a political tactic." On the other hand, there had been numerous published reports of innocent civilians being killed in Nicaragua by U.S.-funded counter-revolutionaries. Democrats maintained that these actions constituted an unconscionable and dangerous inconsistency in American policy.

- 7) Inouye modified amendment prohibiting the use of any funds for the support, directly or indirectly, of military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual except: (1) \$2 million solely for the safe and expeditious withdrawal from Nicaragua of any individual engaged in military or paramilitary operations in that nation, and (2) \$4 million solely for humanitarian support outside Nicaragua for individuals and their families who have been engaged in paramilitary operations in Nicaragua and who are not equipped for military or paramilitary operations while outside Nicaragua. (Vote No. 269—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

77% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

85% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 57-42.

October 3, 1984.

Democrats argued that the U.S. had lost complete control over the activities of the Contras who were fighting to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. The Administration had originally justified funding for the Contras on the basis of interdicting arms that were allegedly being delivered to the guerrillas in El Salvador from Nicaragua. However, the operation had gone beyond that initial justification. Finally, Democrats argued that the Nicaraguan operations were slowly eroding the credibility of the CIA and thereby bringing serious damage to an important national security agency of our government.

Embassy Security

- 8) Rudman motion to table the Biden amendment prohibiting the appropriation of funds for embassy security abroad until the President certified to the Congress that: (1) the funds provided for U.S. embassy security were sufficient to provide adequate security at an acceptable level of security risk, or (2) the funds were insufficient and that an acceptable level of security could be achieved by such additional funds as the President may specify. (Vote No. 275—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

82% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

100% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 61-37.

October 4, 1984.

Following the September 20, 1984, terrorist bombing raid on the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut, the Administration stated that an urgent authorization request of \$366 million would be submitted to Congress in order to enhance the security of our embassies around the world. However, in its formal submission to Congress, the Administration requested only \$110 million. As a result, Democrats called into question the "hoopla" surrounding the press conference where it was announced that the Administration required \$336 million on an urgent basis to deal with potential terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies abroad.

Senator Biden characterized his proposal as an accountability amendment in order to avoid any President going before the American people and implying that the reason that a tragedy occurred was because Congress failed to provide resources necessary to avoid such a tragedy. In other words, the President should certify to Congress that his request is what he actually needs to get the job done.

Foreign Assistance

- 9) Dodd-Glenn, et al, amendment stipulating that the appropriation levels in the second supplemental for FY 1984 could not exceed those levels already authorized for foreign aid. The amendment would have achieved a savings of \$386 million in the foreign assistance section of the supplemental. (Vote No. 215—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

77% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

95% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 62-37.

August 8, 1984.

Democrats argued that the amendment was intended to bring the appropriations bill into compliance with the requirement that all appropriations first have to be authorized. The Senate Appropriations Committee's bill contained \$1 billion in new foreign aid spending, including full funding for the first installment of the Administration's proposed five-year program for Central America, which had yet to be authorized by Congress. The Minority pointed out that the appropriations bill did contain funding for those Central American programs already authorized by Congress, including nearly \$68 million in military aid, and that millions of dollars remained unspent from prior continuing resolutions and supplemental appropriations.

- 10) Kasten motion to table the Melcher-Baucus, et al, amendment earmarking 5% of the money available to the Economic Support Fund for use only for primary health care services and basic health education. (Vote No. 266—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

100% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

94% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 51-46.

October 3, 1984

Democrats pointed out that 40,000 children in the developing world die each day, most from the effects of malnutrition, infections, and repeated bouts of diarrhea. Since a number of economic support fund recipient countries have extremely urgent health and malnutrition problems but do not receive development assistance aid, a 5 percent allocation of ESF funds to provide basic health care services seemed to be a reasonable effort to address this problem.

Democrats also pointed out that the elements of the basic health care package were inexpensive and readily available. For example, low-cost vaccination techniques have been developed to combat polio and five other infectious diseases which annually cripple some 5 million people and kill 5 million more. Oral rehydration packets, which cost as little as five cents each, have demonstrated how to save the lives of millions of infants. Thus, many of those most vulnerable can be treated at a minimal cost. Based on the most conservative estimates, Democrats pointed out that the lives of at least 500,000 infants could be saved if ESF funds were targeted to address this problem.

- 11) Kasten motion to table the Zorinsky, et al, amendment prohibiting the appropriation of funds for the U.S. share of capital stock of the Inter-American Investment Corporation, thereby reducing foreign assistance funds by \$13 million. (Vote No. 267—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

91% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

85% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 50-49.

October 3, 1984.

Democrats expressed concern that the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for fiscal year 1985 contained funds for the Central American Development Organization, the authorization for which had been rejected by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Democrats pointed out that it was surprising to authorize the United States to join yet another multilateral aid institution, at the very same time the country was facing the most serious budget deficit in its history and at a time when Congress perpetually found itself unwilling or unable to fund fully other Multilateral Development Bank commitments previously authorized by Congress. In addition, the IIC duplicated the work of other longstanding institutions and therefore was wasteful of American taxpayers' dollars.

- 12) Pryor, et al, amendment reducing foreign military assistance appropriations by \$211.5 million, exempting Egypt and Israel from the cuts as signatories of the Camp David Accords. (Vote No. 268—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

78% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

80% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 54-46.

October 3, 1984.

Democrats pointed out that the Senate Appropriations Committee had recommended \$917 million in total military assistance program funds for fiscal year 1985, an increase in this program of some 600 percent since 1981. Democrats also pointed out that while the Administration was cutting programs for the elderly, the disabled, and school children at home, and even limiting growth in our own defense budget to a 5 or 6 percent annual real increase, it was unreasonable to provide such an inordinate amount of grant military aid to other countries, particularly at a time of such budget stringency at home.

HUMAN SERVICES

INTRODUCTION

Two record votes illustrate the leadership provided by Democrats in resisting Republican willingness to limit progress in providing needed care for children, the infirm, and the elderly. One relates to care for children in the before- and after-school hours while their parents are at work; the other sought to expand the availability of interventive public health services vital to the well being of poor children, families, and elderly persons.

THE RECORD

- 1) Baker motion to table the Riegle, et al, amendment (to the Education for Economic Security Act—the so-called "Math7Science bill"—S. 1285) authorizing \$15 million for each of the years FY 1985-87 to establish a program, administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to encourage schools and private facilities to provide care before and after school and during holidays and vacation periods for school age children who would have no supervision at home during these times. (Vote No. 162—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

83% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

85% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 51-42.

June 27, 1984.

The Riegle amendment addressed the nationally recognized and growing problem of "latch-key" children in America—those children who are left unsupervised for periods of time before and/or after school by a working parent or parents. The amendment provided "start up" funds (with total funding of \$15 million a year for three years) for establishment of a Federal-State-local partnership which would use public school buildings to provide care for these children. (The House had unanimously passed a companion bill on May 14, 1984, providing \$30 million per year.)

Arguing that the need for these services already was being addressed by State, local, and private efforts, and that this was not an appropriate function for Federal government involvement, Republicans were successful in tabling the amendment 51-42.

- 2) Weicker motion to table the Kennedy amendment (to the Baker amendment to the Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984)—H.R. 2163/H.R. 4170, (Vote No. 98—98th Congress, 2nd Session).

70% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

96% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 63-32.

May 17, 1984

The Kennedy amendment was an effort to assure that funding increases, over the President's requested budget, would be available in the fiscal year 1985 budget for primary health care and child abuse programs serving America's poor children and adults. Specifically, the Kennedy amendment would have provided additional funding for fiscal year 1985-87 amounting to a 7 percent increase for five primary health care block grant programs: alcohol and drug abuse, mental health, maternal and child health, migrant health centers, and childhood immunization—bringing funding for these programs up to the levels established in the House budget resolution for FY 1985. It also would have added \$4.4 million over the same period for child abuse prevention and treatment. Proponents documented the need for increases in these programs and the effects of the substantial cuts made in these programs during the previous 3 years of the Reagan Administration.

With 96 percent of Republicans voting to table the amendment, the motion to table succeeded.

JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS

INTRODUCTION

During the last session, the Reagan Administration nominated a candidate for a judgeship on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit who had no trial experience, notwithstanding the fact that such experience is one of the basic criteria for American Bar Association (ABA) endorsement of such judicial nominees. There also was information indicating that the nominee, James Harvie Wilkinson III, had conducted a lobbying campaign in his own behalf in an effort to influence the ABA's recommendations. Democrats, seeking to force additional consideration of the nomination, stood together on two key procedural votes when the nomination was brought before the full Senate—a motion by Senator Kennedy to recommit the nomination to Committee for further consideration, and a Republican attempt to shut off extended debate on the nomination. Succeeding, with limited Republican support, in defeating the motion to invoke cloture, Democrats were able to force a re-opening of Judiciary Committee hearings to take further testimony with respect to the unresolved questions concerning the nominee.

Following the hearing, 81 percent of voting Democrats voted to oppose the nomination, after Republicans were successful in imposing cloture. However, with overwhelming Republican support, the nomination was approved.

THE RECORD

- 1) Kennedy motion to recommit to the Judiciary Committee the nomination of James Harvie Wilkinson III, of Virginia, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Vote 110—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

79% of Democrats voting supported the motion to recommit.

90% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The motion was rejected, 36-54.

May 24, 1984.

- 2) Baker, et al, motion to close further debate on the nomination of James Harvie Wilkinson III, of Virginia, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Vote 208—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

85% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to close debate.

93% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was rejected, 57-39, 3/5ths not having voted in the affirmative.

July 31, 1984.

- 3) Baker, et al, motion to close further debate (i.e., impose cloture) on the nomination of James Harvie Wilkinson III, of Virginia, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Second cloture motion filed on this nomination.) (Vote 225—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

74% of Democrats voting opposed the motion to close debate.

98% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was agreed to, 65-32, 3/5ths of having voted in the affirmative.

August 9, 1984.

- 4) Confirmation of the nomination of James Harvie Wilkinson of Virginia, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Vote 226—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

81% of Democrats voting opposed confirmation.

91% of Republicans voting supported confirmation.

The nomination was confirmed, 58-39.

August 9, 1984.

MEDICARE

INTRODUCTION

In no issue area were Democrats more deeply involved in attempts to soften the impact of Administration proposals than in their work to moderate the Administration's proposals for Medicare benefit cuts and out-of-pocket cost increases. In his 1985 budget, President Reagan proposed billions of dollars of Medicare cuts that would have made considerably more difficult the plight of the elderly who now cannot afford their medical care bills even with Medicare's help.

The legislation on which this issue first confronted the Senate in 1984 was the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (then known as the Deficit Reduction Tax Act). Included in the version of that legislation reported from the Finance Committee were a number of the President's Medicare proposals; those accepted by the Committee increased costs for the elderly and disabled recipients of Medicare by an estimated \$9.9 billion over the next five years. Senate Democrats led the effort to reduce these increased costs, but on three separate votes Democratic efforts were defeated by the Republican majority, which succeeded in retaining all of the cuts in Medicare proposed by the Finance Committee when the bill passed the Senate. Only the stalwart opposition by Democratic House conferees on the bill resulted in elimination or moderation of most of the Medicare provisions that were at the expense of beneficiaries.

THE RECORD

- 1) Dole motion to table Division I of the Kennedy-Cranston amendment to the Baker amendment, striking the sections of the bill which permanently would index the Medicare Part B premium paid by enrollees to the level needed to cover 25 percent of the program's costs, and that would index the Medicare Part B deductible paid by participants in 1985, 1986, and 1987 to the growth in medical care costs in those years. These provisions would cost Medicare beneficiaries an additional \$1.525 billion over the three-year period 1985-1987. (Vote No. 90—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

77 percent of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

94 percent of Republicans voting supported for the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 58-36.

May 9, 1984.

In the first amendment, Senators Kennedy and Cranston sought to eliminate both proposed increases in premiums paid to gain Medicare coverage of doctors' bills and proposed increases in the deductibles that Medicare beneficiaries must pay each year before Medicare will pay remaining bills. This amendment was defeated when 94 percent of voting Republicans voted to table it.

- 2) Dole motion to table the Kennedy-Cranston amendment to the Baker amendment, deleting the provision of the bill which would delay Medicare Parts A and B eligibility until the first day of the month following the month in which a person's 65th birthday occurs, instead of the first day of the month in which the birthday falls, at a cost of \$630 billion to Medicare beneficiaries between 1985 and 1987. (Vote No. 91—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

74 percent of Democrats voting opposed the motion to table.

92 percent of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 59-36.

May 9, 1984.

Soon after the vote on the Kennedy-Cranston amendment described above (No. 1), those same Senators sought to remove another unfair provision—delaying eligibility for Medicare for all persons from the first day of the month in which the 65th birthday falls to the first day of the following month. This provision affected only sick or injured elderly persons—to the tune of over \$600 million over a 3-year period. Again, the Majority succeeded in tabling the amendment.

- 3) Baucus, et al, perfecting amendment to the Baker amendment, striking the proposed increase in the Medicare Part B (physicians' services coverage) deductible, limiting the increase in the Part B premium to one year (1986) beyond that provided in current law (so that in 1987 the premium again will be indexed according to general inflation rather than the higher rate of medical care cost inflation), and requiring the Secretary of HHS to monitor physician behavior with respect to costs and charges imposed on Medicare beneficiaries and report to the Congress every six months during the two-year physician fee freeze contained in the Baker amendment. (Vote 97—98th Congress, 2nd Session)

90 percent of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

87 percent of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 44-50.

May 17, 1984.

When the two (Kennedy-Cranston) amendments were defeated, Senator Baucus offered a modest but important amendment to eliminate the proposed increase in the deductible and to hold the premium increase to one year. The amendment was defeated when 87 percent of voting Republicans voted against it.

APPENDIX

ROLLCALL VOTES REFERRED TO IN DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES, PART IV

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 24

98th Congress
2nd Session

February 29, 1984, 6:10 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-1993

EXPORT ADMINISTRATION

BILL NO.: S. 979

AMENDMENT NO.: 2760

TITLE: "Export Administration Act Amendment of 1984."

SUBJECT: Heinz motion to table the Johnston amendment prohibiting the issuance of any Federal lease or rights-of-way to a company party to a merger consummated after February 27, 1984, and prior to six months following the date of enactment of this Act, if either of the merging companies possess more than 10 million barrels of proved reserves of crude oil or natural gas equivalents.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment argued that Congress needs time to evaluate the impact of energy company mergers on the industry, national energy policy, and credit markets, in order to determine what long-range policy should be. The amendment would not prohibit mergers outright, but is designed to inhibit the merger wave for 6 months. They maintained that if antitrust enforcement agencies continue their hands-off approach and the rumored takeovers occur, the industry will be consolidated in the hands of a few, massive amounts of credit will have been absorbed for unproductive yet costly acquisitions of existing reserves rather than exploration, domestic production will fall further, and national energy policy will be left in shambles. Although the major oil companies promised lively exploration if oil were decontrolled, domestic production has dropped over the last 10 years from 9.2 million to 8.6 million barrels a day in the continental U.S., reserves have dropped from 35.3 billion barrels to 29.4 billion, and rigs in operation have dropped by 55 percent since 1981. Energy policy is way off the track Congress set. According to Business Week 1983 mergers were at a 9-year high of 2,533, with a 50 percent increase in the dollar volume from \$53.8 billion in 1982 to \$73.1 billion. Congress must act now, they contended, or risk being overtaken by events that may prove to be contrary to the public interest.

(OVER)

S. 979: Vote Nos. 18, 21-30.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (52)			NAYS (42)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (9 or 23%)		Republicans (43 or 80%)	Democrats (31 or 77%)		Republicans (11 or 20%)	Democrats (4)	Republicans (1)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Matsunaga	Andrews	Cranston ²	Pressler ²
Boren	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Meicher	Cohen	Dodd ²	
Burdick	Baker	Lugar	Bingaman	Metzenbaum	D'Amato	Glenn ²	
Dixon	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bradley	Mitchell	Gorton	Hart ²	
Eagleton	Chafee	Mattingly	Bumpers	Moynihan	Hatfield		
Heflin	Cochran	McClure	Byrd	Nunn	Hawkins		
Huddleston	Danforth	Murkowski	Chiles	Pell	Humphrey		
Long	Denton	Nickles	Exon	Proxmire	Packwood		
Randolph	Dole	Percy	Ford	Pryor	Rudman	DeConcini	
	Domenici	Quayle	Hollings	Riegle	Specter		
	Durenberger	Roth	Inouye	Sarbanes	Warner		
	East	Simpson	Johnston	Sasser			
	Evans	Stafford	Kennedy	Stennis			
	Garn	Stevens	Lautenberg	Tsongas			
	Goldwater	Symms	Leahy	Zorinsky			
	Grassley	Thurmond	Levin				
	Hatch	Tower					
	Hecht	Trible					
	Heinz	Wallop					
	Helms	Weicker					
	Jepsen	Wilson					
	Kassebaum						

VOTING PRESENT (1)

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—78%
Republicans—80%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (52)
Democrats—9 or 17%
Republicans—43 or 83%

Against (42)
Democrats—31 or 74%
Republicans—11 or 26%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Opponents contended that the amendment is broad, ambiguous, and unfair. Even though it is intended to be a temporary measure, it might well be extended. Although it is difficult to determine who would be affected because of the arbitrary 10 million barrel reserve threshold, it would probably touch 150 companies. These firms could not merge with any other company regardless of size, and regardless of financial condition. The companies near the threshold who may justifiably need to merge within the next 6 months, would find their competitiveness in the oil and gas industry severely curtailed if they were faced with this permanent bar from bidding, especially in light of the amount of land the Federal government owns. This deprivation of rights, which is an effective prohibition, could make their survival impossible. It is too drastic. This amendment has not been scrutinized in hearings and could be detrimental to an industry that is, after all, more diversified than many others. In addition, this amendment is unquestionably nongermane since it pertains to the Mineral Leasing Act, not the Export Administration Act.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 26

98th Congress
2nd Session

March 1, 1984, 3:38 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-2086

EXPORT ADMINISTRATION

BILL NO.: S. 979

AMENDMENT NO.: 2763

TITLE: "Export Administration Act Amendment of 1984."

SUBJECT: Baker motion to table the Melcher, et al, amendment (taking with it the Melcher, et al, substitute amendment adding sense of the Congress language that conservation cost-sharing assistance should be provided for FY 1985 at not less than the FY 1984 level) adding a new wheat price support title which would provide for 20 percent acreage diversion with no payment, instead of 30 percent as under the current program; reinstating the provision allowing unlimited use of the reduced acreage for haying and grazing; establishing per bushel target prices at \$4.40 for 1984 and \$4.50 for 1985; requiring farmers to comply with the acreage limitation program to be eligible for loans, purchases, and payments on their 1984 wheat crop; extending the program registration period from March 16, 1984, to March 30, 1984; and retaining the current PIK and summer fallow program. (See also Vote Nos. 30, 38, 39, and 228.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment declared that it would stimulate increased participation in the wheat program by decreasing the "heavy-handed" 30 percent acreage set-aside requirement to a more reasonable 20 percent; reinstating the haying and grazing allowance provision which was unnecessarily and wastefully deleted from the Administration's program; and offering realistic and flexible target prices. It attempts to achieve a compromise between the Administration's current program and the House-passed proposal (H.R. 4072) and to address the concerns of the National Association of Wheat Growers, who have indicated a willingness to accept lower target prices in exchange for a more effective and well-designed program. This proposal offers such a plan and also could net \$3.273 billion in savings over the next five years, according to CBO estimates. Farmers are not finding the current wheat program to be financially attractive, and low participation will lead to increased wheat supply surpluses, lower farm prices, and higher program costs. Since the Department of Agriculture and the Administra-

(OVER)

S. 979: Vote Nos. 18, 21-30.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (52)			NAYS (42)			NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (8 or 19%)	Republicans (44 or 85%)		Democrats (34 or 81%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (3)
Biden	Armstrong	Jepsen	Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor	Cranston ²	McClure ²
Bradley	Baker	Kasten	Bentsen	Johnston	Andrews	Glenn ²	Percy ²
Lautenberg	Chafee	Laxalt	Bingaman	Kennedy	Boschwitz	Hart ²	Weicker ²
Long	Cochran	Lugar	Boren	Leahy	Durenberger		
Metzenbaum	Cohen	Mathias	Bumpers	Levin	Hatfield		
Moynihan	D'Amato	Mattingly	Burdick	Matsunaga	Kassebaum		
Proxmire	Danforth	Murkowski	Byrd	Melcher	Nickles		
Tsongas	Denton	Packwood	Chiles	Mitchell	Pressler		
	Dole	Quayle	DeConcini	Nunn			
	Domenici	Roth	Dixon	Pell			
	East	Rudman	Dodd	Pryor			
	Evans	Simpson	Eagleton	Randolph			
	Garn	Specter	Exon	Riegle			
	Goldwater	Stafford	Ford	Sarbanes			
	Gorton	Stevens	Heflin	Sasser			
	Grassley	Symms	Hollings	Stennis			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Huddleston	Zorinsky			
	Hawkins	Tower					
	Hecht	Trible					
	Heinz	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—81%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (52)
Democrats—8 or 15%
Republicans—44 or 85%

Against (42)
Democrats—34 or 81%
Republicans—8 or 19%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

tion seem unwilling to deal with these problems, Congress must act. This amendment would save the wheat program from possible collapse and provide farmers with the minimal assistance needed to be able to avoid financial disaster because of high interest rates, worldwide surpluses, and plummeting land values. Although the amendment is not parliamentarily germane, they agreed, agricultural exports are vital to the nation's economy and are directly affected by export policy.

Opponents of the amendment asserted that it would be too costly and would neither effectively reduce wheat surpluses nor solve the fundamental problem of imbalanced supply and demand. The Department of Agriculture estimates that the proposed program would cost \$500 million without "making a dent" in the wheat surpluses. Any increased participation would be more than offset by production from the additional 10 percent of acreage allowed to be cultivated. Changing the program at this late date, they noted, would also be inequitable and costly for producers who have already complied with the 30 percent acreage diversion requirement. Considering the nation's record-high deficits, rising wheat target prices, and skyrocketing farm program costs, Congress should not spend an additional \$500 million for a farm program which neither addresses the basic problem of the agriculture industry nor would succeed in reducing product surpluses.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 36

98th Congress
2nd Session

March 22, 1984, 11:33 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3060

WHEAT AND OTHER PRICE SUPPORTS

BILL NO.: H.R. 4072

AMENDMENT NO.: 2818

TITLE: "Agricultural Programs Adjustment Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Baker motion to table the Pryor-Huddleston-Bumpers, et al, modified amendment requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to conduct an interest-free payment-in-kind (PIK) grain and cotton loan program through the Commodity Credit Corporation to compensate depositors who lost their crops due to grain elevator and commodity warehouse bankruptcies which occurred between the date of the Soviet grain embargo and the date of the enactment of this bill; authorizing the Secretary to substitute another commodity in an amount, type, and quality deemed sufficient to compensate the depositor if sufficient quantities of the original commodity lost are unavailable; and requiring repayment within 10 years. (This amendment would affect 3,600 farmers in Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, Texas, Missouri, Kentucky, Iowa, Indiana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Washington, Minnesota, and Illinois.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment asserted that it was an equitable proposal to assist farmers who suffered crop losses because of warehouse insolvencies resulting from the government-enforced Soviet grain embargo. It would be a short-term program which could be handled by current USDA personnel, and any Federal expenditures would ultimately be recovered since the commodity loans must be paid back in kind. The program could even result in Federal savings. Commodity storage costs would be reduced, and tax revenue could be generated if the farmers sold the commodities commercially. Since effected farmers lost their crops through no fault of their own, Congress should aid their recovery from these and other recent losses due to the faltering agricultural economy.

(OVER)

H.R. 4072: Vote Nos. 36-39.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (61)			NAYS (34)		NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (7 or 17%)	Republicans (54 or 100%)		Democrats (34 or 83%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (4)	Republicans (1)
Bradley	Abdnor	Jepsen	Baucus	Johnston	Cranston ²	Percy ²
Heflin	Andrews	Kassebaum	Bentsen	Kennedy	DeConcini ²	
Mitchell	Armstrong	Kasten	Biden	Lautenberg	Hart ²	
Moynihan	Baker	Laxalt	Bingaman	Leahy	Huddleston ²	
Nunn	Boschwitz	Lugar	Boren	Levin		
Pell	Chafee	Mathias	Bumpers	Long		
Proxmire	Cochran	Mattingly	Burdick	Matsunaga		
	Cohen	McClure	Byrd	Melcher		
	D'Amato	Murkowski	Chiles	Metzenbaum		
	Danforth	Nickles	Dixon	Pryor		
	Denton	Packwood	Dodd	Randolph		
	Dole	Pressler	Eagleton	Riegle		
	Domenici	Quayle	Exon	Sarbanes		
	Durenberger	Roth	Ford	Sasser		
	East	Rudman	Glenn	Stennis		
	Evans	Simpson	Hollings	Tsongas		
	Garn	Specter	Inouye	Zorinsky		
	Goldwater	Stafford				
	Gorton	Stevens				
	Grassley	Symms				
	Hatch	Thurmond				
	Hatfield	Tower				
	Hawkins	Trible				
	Hecht	Wallop				
	Heinz	Warner				
	Helms	Weicker				
	Humphrey	Wilson				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—83%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (61)
Democrats—7 or 11%
Republicans—54 or 89%

Against (34)
Democrats—34 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%

Opponents of the amendment contended that current Federal programs should be utilized to assist the relatively small group of persons who suffered commodity losses because of the grain embargo. The long-term solution should be passage of the bankruptcy reform bill, S. 445, which would preserve the rights of farmers and others who store grain in warehouses that become insolvent. This amendment is not properly targeted since anyone who stored grain in an insolvent warehouse would be eligible, whether they produced the commodity or merely owned it. Furthermore, because of the success of the 1983 PIK program, the CCC may not own sufficient inventories of the various commodities to fill the loan requests. If farmers object to substituting loans of equivalent value for amounts of other products, the CCC might be asked to purchase the commodity on the open market, a potentially expensive proposition. Individuals who have taken tax deductions on these losses, they added, would reap a double benefit if they became eligible for 10-year non-interest loans. Others pointed out that the amendment was not germane, would open the bill to further amendment, and could threaten final passage and Presidential approval.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 37

98th Congress
2nd Session

March 22, 1984, 12:16 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3063

WHEAT AND OTHER PRICE SUPPORTS

BILL NO.: H.R. 4072

AMENDMENT NO.: 2813

TITLE: "Agricultural Programs Adjustment Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Baker motion to table the Bumpers-Eagleton-Exon, et al, amendment requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to base single enterprise production loss determinations on actual production only, and prohibiting the Secretary from including production determinations from sources such as PIK or land diversion programs, in making farm disaster emergency loan determinations.

NOTE: Proponents noted that the amendment was agreed to November 10, 1983, but not made legally binding by conferees on H.J. Res. 413. Under this amendment, USDA would be required to use the same procedures for determining loan eligibility for farmers as was used for county determinations which excluded acreage enrolled in the PIK program. Under those rules, 1,554 of the 3,168 counties in the country have been declared disaster counties. To be considered for an emergency loan, a farmer must be located in a qualified county, and prove that 1 percent of actual production was lost. Last year, however, without precedent, the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) treated diverted land as having produced a normal yield for purposes of determining an individual's loss. As a result, it is possible for a county to be declared a disaster area by USDA, but not a single farmer in the county to be eligible for a disaster loan. This rules change is unfair to farmers who were not told when they set land aside that they might adversely affect their eligibility for relief in the event of a natural disaster. The double standard between the treatment of counties and individual farmers has allowed USDA to make many disaster declarations, with attendant publicity, and then refuse disaster aid to farmers from that county who apply. Thus, the Administration has made a mockery of the program's basic purpose, solely to save money. USDA has also distorted actual farm income by counting PIK payments as 100 percent of farm program yield when those payments were, in fact, 20-25 percent lower. Proponents further argued that the amendment applies to market rate loans so that even under the most adverse conditions, the

(OVER)

H.R. 4072: Vote Nos. 36-39.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (58)			NAYS (36)			NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (8 or 20%)	Republicans (50 or 93%)		Democrats (32 or 80%)	Republicans (4 or 7%)		Democrats (5)	Republicans (1)
Biden	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Kennedy	Grassley	Cranston-2	Percy-2
Bradley	Andrews	Kasten	Bentsen	Lautenberg	Hatfield	DeConcini-2	
Heflin	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bingaman	Leahy	Jepsen	Dodd-2	
Long	Baker	Lugar	Boren	Levin	Packwood	Hart-2	
Mitchell	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bumpers	Matsunaga		Huddleston-2	
Moynihan	Chafee	Mattingly	Burdick	Melcher			
Proxmire	Cochran	McClure	Byrd	Metzenbaum			
Tsongas	Cohen	Murkowski	Chiles	Nunn			
	D'Amato	Nickles	Dixon	Pell			
	Danforth	Pressler	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Denton	Quayle	Exon	Randolph			
	Dole	Roth	Ford	Riegle			
	Domenici	Rudman	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Durenberger	Simpson	Hollings	Sasser			
	East	Specter	Inouye	Stennis			
	Evans	Stafford	Johnston	Zorinsky			
	Garn	Stevens					
	Goldwater	Symms					
	Gorton	Thurmond					
	Hatch	Tower					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Weicker					
	Humphrey	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—80%
Republicans—93%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (58)
Democrats—8 or 14%
Republicans—50 or 86%

Against (36)
Democrats—32 or 89%
Republicans—4 or 11%

maximum cost would be \$210 million over 7 years. The actual cost, they contended, would probably be much less. They emphasized farmers' need for help in the wake of farmland damage totaling \$10 billion due to last year's natural disasters, and noted that even when a farmer does not incur production expenses on uncultivated land, he still must pay the mortgage, taxes, and install soil conservation measures.

Opponents argued that the amendment is inconsistent with the bill's purpose of reducing program costs in order to control the deficit which has driven interest rates up, contributing to farmers' poor financial condition. The amendment would permit \$5 billion in new loan activity and cost the Treasury \$1 billion over 7 years due to the subsidized 5 percent interest rate—spending that would surely invite a veto. Wheat farmers who signed up for the PIK program had the benefit of guaranteed payments—at about 95 percent of former yield—which were paid regardless of any disaster. The Administration has explained that the process was changed so that counties with heavy PIK participation would not be denied disaster county designation in the event of a natural disaster, and to prevent an individual operator who suffered a qualifying loss from being denied consideration for a loan as a result of heavy PIK participation by other farmers in his county. Calculations of farm income include the normal year's yield from unplanted PIK acreage to insure that all acreage is considered in the determination, but also to insure that the operator's legitimate loss on the acres in production is not diminished. They further argued that PIK is unique and should be able to operate under different circumstances.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 49

98th Congress
2nd Session

April 3, 1984, 5:53 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3690

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 492

AMENDMENT NO.: 2881

SUBJECT: Kasten motion to table the Specter amendment (taking with it the Leahy-Dodd-Pell second degree amendment to withhold all military assistance to El Salvador until Salvadoran authorities have obtained a verdict in the trial of the National Guardsmen charged with the murder of four U.S. churchwomen) to withhold 30 percent of the appropriations for military assistance to El Salvador during FY 1984 until Salvadoran authorities have brought to trial the National Guardsmen charged with the murder of four U.S. churchwomen and have obtained a verdict.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment contended that its condition is consistent with the law established in the original 1984 appropriation, as a method designed to motivate the El Salvadoran judicial system to deal with the churchwomen's murder case. Congress should not ignore the failure of Salvadoran officials to achieve a verdict in that case and should not undermine the penalty which was included in the previous year, as approved by Congress and signed by the President. Dereliction in completing the investigation, and other evidence, indicates that there has been a coverup by high officials, beginning within days of the killings. This case does not involve the complexities inherent in the case of the murdered labor advisors. One national guardsman arrested has confessed his own participation and implicated 4 others. The murderers of the churchwomen could be identified hours after the crime, yet 3 years later no one has been brought to justice. There is no excuse for the delay in bringing this case to trial. The conditioning of funds in the previous year's appropriation had an impact on the Salvadoran government's efforts to bring those responsible to justice. If this limitation is not maintained, the United

(OVER)

H.J. Res. 492: Vote Nos. 40-44, 46-56, 155, 156.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (54)			NAYS (39)			NOT VOTING (7)	
Democrats (10 or 25%)	Republicans (44 or 83%)		Democrats (30 or 75%)	Republicans (9 or 17%)		Democrats (5)	Republicans (2)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Jepsen	Baucus	Leahy	Cohen	Burdick ¹	Baker ²
Boren	Andrews	Kassebaum	Biden	Levin	D'Amato	DeConcini ¹	Stafford ¹
Chiles	Armstrong	Kasten	Bingaman	Matsunaga	Hatfield	Dixon ²	
Heflin	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Bradley	Melcher	Heinz	Harr ²	
Hollings	Chafee	Lugar	Bumpers	Metzenbaum	Mathias	Tsongas ²	
Inouye	Cochran	Mattingly	Byrd	Mitchell	Packwood		
Johnston	Danforth	McClure	Cranston	Moynihan	Pressler		
Long	Denton	Murkowski	Dodd	Pell	Specter		
Nunn	Dole	Nickles	Eagleton	Proxmire	Weicker		
Stennis	Domenici	Percy	Exon	Pryor			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Ford	Randolph			
	East	Roth	Glenn	Riegle			
	Evans	Rudman	Huddleston	Sarbanes			
	Garn	Simpson	Kennedy	Sasser			
	Goldwater	Stevens	Lautenberg	Zorinsky			
	Gorton	Symms					
	Grassley	Thurmond					
	Hatch	Tower					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—75%
Republicans—83%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (54)
Democrats—10 or 19%
Republicans—44 or 81%

Against (39)
• Democrats—30 or 77%
Republicans—9 or 23%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

States will look foolish by permitting a loophole through which El Salvador can receive additional assistance without complying with the condition.

Opponents of the amendment contended that the compromise amount was achieved after considering all the facts, and the bill should be moved along. Cutting off all funds would subject El Salvador to greater peril and is not necessary to keep pressure on the government to try the case. The Administration has shown that an emergency exists; it is unwise to tie the President's hands by limiting the funds. The Salvadoran judicial system is different from ours, and at this point in the case, no new testimony or evidence will be accepted before a jury is impaneled. The Salvadoran officials have taken steps to set a trial, and the language in last year's bill had a positive effect on their handling of the case. This, however, is not the time for a further limitation; the time to consider conditions is on an authorization bill or regular appropriations bill.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 51

98th Congress
2nd Session

April 4, 1984, 4:11 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3758

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 492

AMENDMENT NO.: 2887

SUBJECT: Baker motion to table the Leahy, et al, amendment to the War Powers Resolution to prohibit the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into or over El Salvador for combat purposes (delivering weapons fire upon an enemy) unless the President first obtains a declaration of war or a specific authorization for use of U.S. combat forces in El Salvador; and to provide expedited procedures for Congressional consideration of the President's legislative request to introduce armed forces into or over El Salvador.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment contended that U.S. foreign policy is headed toward involving our troops in armed conflict in El Salvador. The escalation of the number of military advisers in El Salvador concerns the American people, and an Americanization of the war would give the Salvadoran army less incentive to fight to achieve victory themselves. This amendment is tailored so that it does not take sides with any faction in El Salvador and it does not limit the ability of the President to respond to an emergency situation presenting a clear and present danger of hostile attack on the United States or to evacuate Americans from El Salvador. The Constitution intended that Congress play some role in a decision to send troops into war as evidenced in its statement that only Congress can declare war. Congress should not shirk its constitutional responsibility. This amendment seeks to prevent unfortunate military involvement, such as occurred in Lebanon, by clarifying the authority of the President to engage American troops in combat. It does not deny the President any authority as
(OVER)

H.J. Res. 492: Vote Nos. 40-44, 46-56, 155, 156.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (59)			NAYS (36)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (10 or 24%)	Republicans (49 or 91%)		Democrats (31 or 76%)	Republicans (5 or 9%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (1)
Boren	Abdnor	Jepsen	Baucus	Lautenberg	Andrews	Burdick ¹	Stafford ¹
Chiles	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Benksen	Leahy	Hatfield	DeConcini ¹	
Glenn	Baker	Kasten	Biden	Levin	Pressler	Hart ²	
Heflin	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Bingaman	Matsunaga	Specter	Tsongas ²	
Huddleston	Chafee	Lugar	Bradley	Melcher	Weicker		
Johnston	Cochran	Mathias	Bumpers	Metzenbaum			
Long	Cohen	Mattingly	Byrd	Mitchell			
Nunn	D'Amato	McClure	Cranston	Moynihan			
Stennis	Danforth	Murkowski	Dixon	Pell			
Zorinsky	Denton	Nickles	Dodd	Proxmire			
	Dole	Packwood	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Domenici	Percy	Exon	Randolph			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Ford	Riegle			
	East	Roth	Hollings	Sarbanes			
	Evans	Rudman	Inouye	Sasser			
	Garn	Simpson	Kennedy				
	Goldwater	Stevens					
	Gorton	Symms					
	Grassley	Thurmond					
	Hatch	Tower					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—76%
Republicans—91%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (59)
Democrats—10 or 17%
Republicans—49 or 83%

Against (36)
• Democrats—31 or 86%
Republicans—5 or 14%

Commander in Chief, but simply reaffirms the intent of the founders that a commitment of American lives be made only with the full support of the American people as represented by their elected officials. Opponents of the amendment contended that the Founding Fathers, in making the President Commander in Chief, intended that he have control over the Armed Forces. Because of the near disastrous effects of the control by the Continental Congress of the Army under the Articles of Confederation during the Revolutionary War, the framers decided that Congress should not have control over movement or denial of troops, except through the power of the purse. The language of the amendment usurps the President's authority as Commander in Chief; Congress should not take away the flexibility of the President in dealing with situations involving U.S. security. For the Congress to declare itself in supreme direction over the Armed Forces is a violation of the separation of powers. Some claimed the amendment redundant because the War Powers Act ensures that Congress will be consulted in the case of U.S. troops being introduced into hostilities or into a situation involving imminent hostilities. This language, some contended, would weaken the War Powers Act which should be vigorously upheld and fully implemented to prevent abuses by the Executive. The present amendment is too broadly worded and could be prone to overly general application.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 53

98th Congress
2nd Session

April 4, 1984, 10:00 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3796

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 492

AMENDMENT NO.: 2888

SUBJECT: Rudman motion to table the Dodd amendment to prohibit the use of any funds, directly or indirectly, for planning, directing, executing, or supporting acts of terrorism in, over, or offshore the territory of Nicaragua. (See also Vote Nos. 52, 54, and 59.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment noted that their amendment rather than eliminating the requested \$21 million to aid the contras in Nicaragua only required that no funds be used to support acts of terrorism. While the U.S. is committed to fighting international terrorism, it acts with hypocrisy when terrorism is used by the contras against Nicaragua. By giving a moral and financial blank check to the contras, we threaten our proud national tradition, as well as our current efforts to combat international terrorism. American tax money is being used to destroy farms, ambush peasants, sink fishing boats, and kill children. Therefore, President Reagan must be told that the American people oppose use of this money to support people who engage in such terrorism.

Opponents of the amendment cited the President's statement that the funds were sought not to overthrow the government but to bring the Sandinistas to meaningful negotiation.

H.J. Res. 492: Vote Nos. 40-44, 46-56, 155, 156.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (47)			NAYS (43)			NOT VOTING (10)	
Democrats (3 or 8%)	Republicans (44 or 86%)		Democrats (36 or 92%)	Republicans (7 or 14%)		Democrats (6)	Republicans (4)
Heflin	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Lautenberg	Andrews	Bentsen ⁻²	Hawkins ⁻²
Hollings	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Leahy	Boschwitz	Burdick ⁻¹	Mathias ⁻²
Long	Baker	Lugar	Bingaman	Levin	Cohen	DeConcini ⁻¹	Stafford ⁻¹
	Chafee	Mattingly	Boren	Matsunaga	Grassley	Glenn ⁻²	Weicker ⁻²
	Cochran	McClure	Bradley	Melcher	Hatfield	Hart ⁻²	
	D'Amato	Murkowski	Bumpers	Metzenbaum	Heinz	Stennis ⁻²	
	Danforth	Nickles	Byrd	Mitchell	Packwood		
	Denton	Percy	Chiles	Moynihan			
	Dole	Pressler	Cranston	Nunn			
	Domenici	Quayle	Dixon	Pell			
	Durenberger	Roth	Dodd	Proxmire			
	East	Rudman	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Evans	Simpson	Exon	Randolph			
	Garn	Specter	Ford	Riegle			
	Goldwater	Stevens	Huddleston	Sarbanes			
	Gorton	Symms	Inouye	Sasser			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Johnston	Tsongas			
	Hecht	Tower	Kennedy	Zorinsky			
	Helms	Trible					
	Humphrey	Wallop					
	Jepsen	Warner					
	Kassebaum	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—92%
Republicans—86%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (47)
Democrats—3 or 6%
Republicans—44 or 94%

Against (43)
Democrats—36 or 84%
Republicans—7 or 16%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 54

98th Congress
2nd Session

April 5, 1984, 11:14 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3853

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 492

AMENDMENT NO.: 2889

SUBJECT: Stevens motion to table the Levin-Inouye amendment prohibiting funds for covert assistance to any individual or group in Central America which is not part of a country's armed forces and which is known by the U.S. government to have as one of its intentions the violent overthrow of any Central American government with which the U.S. has full diplomatic relations. (See also Vote Nos. 52, 53, and 59.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it only sought to codify the assurance given by President Reagan that "the U.S. does not seek to destabilize or overthrow the government of Nicaragua; nor to impose or compel any particular form of government there." It reaffirms U.S. support for Article 18 of the OAS Charter. The U.S. cannot ignore responsibility for the destruction of lives and ships by agents it is funding.

Opponents maintained that this amendment would accomplish every objective that the other amendments voted down would accomplish. Nothing can justify the military buildup that has occurred in the last few months in Nicaragua, and the contra activity is the only thing keeping them busy. This amendment would bring about the execution of the 8,000 supporters who seek to pressure the immense military machine in Nicaragua. They need dollars and ammunition to continue their fight. Some opposed covert funding, in general, but voted to table this amendment, feeling that limitations on such funding are meaningless and dilatory.

H.J. Res. 492: Vote Nos. 40-44, 46-56, 155, 156.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (51)			NAYS (44)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (5 or 12%)	Republicans (46 or 85%)		Democrats (36 or 88%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (1)
Boren	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Lautenberg	Andrews	Burdick ⁻¹	Stafford ⁻¹
Chiles	Armstrong	Kasten	Bentsen	Leahy	Cohen	DeConcini ⁻¹	
Heflin	Baker	Laxalt	Biden	Levin	Grassley	Hart ⁻²	
Johnston	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Matsunaga	Hatfield	Nunn ⁻²	
Long	Chafee	Mattingly	Bradley	Melcher	Heinz		
	Cochran	McClure	Bumpers	Metzenbaum	Mathias		
	D'Amato	Murkowski	Byrd	Mitchell	Pressler		
	Danforth	Nickles	Cranston	Moynihan	Weicker		
	Denton	Packwood	Dixon	Pell			
	Dole	Percy	Dodd	Proxmire			
	Domenici	Quayle	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Durenberger	Roth	Exon	Randolph			
	East	Rudman	Ford	Riegle			
	Evans	Simpson	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Garn	Specter	Hollings	Sasser			
	Goldwater	Stevens	Huddleston	Stennis			
	Gorton	Symms	Inouye	Tsongas			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Kennedy	Zorinsky			
	Hawkins	Tower					
	Hecht	Trible					
	Helms	Wallop					
	Humphrey	Warner					
	Jepsen	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—88%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—5 or 10%
Republicans—46 or 90%

Against (44)
Democrats—36 or 82%
Republicans—8 or 18%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 55

98th Congress
2nd Session

April 5, 1984, 2:49 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3874

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 492

AMENDMENT NO.: 2890

SUBJECT: Stevens motion to table the Sasser-Inouye-Bingaman, et al, modified amendment to limit U.S. forces use of temporary facilities in Honduras, financed by DOD operation and maintenance funds, only to training exercises unless the facilities are deemed necessary for the evacuation or self-defense of U.S. personnel and to prohibit any DOD funds from being used to convert a temporary facility into a permanent base unless specifically authorized by Congress.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment asserted that U.S. combat engineers are in the process of building two more airfields near Honduras—bringing to eight the number ordered constructed in the last year or so. These projects, they contended, are being undertaken without specific Congressional approval and paid for by tax dollars taken from the O&M account set up to pay for fuel, ammunition, etc. Some of these airfields are being extended to 8,000 feet which could easily accommodate jet attack or jet fighter bombers. The U.S. is quickly building up a permanent military infrastructure which could easily lead to the loss of American lives and a Vietnam-like involvement. Administration actions raise concern that the Nation will become embroiled in an extended military action in a foreign place without a clear definition of goals or the support of the American people.

Opponents of the amendment pointed out that the matter debated and voted on two years ago (Vote No. 204) authorized construction of airfields in Honduras. U.S. guardsmen and reservists need areas where they can train and carry out exercises. This has been a training zone for seven years, and our temporary construction benefits this very poor country. Between exercises, there are only 1,200 Americans there who are located at permanent medical facilities, for the most part. This amendment only nips at the heels of any serious restriction on the continued intrusion of the Soviet Union into our hemisphere. Total assistance to El Salvador in FY 1985 represents only 3 percent of U.S. aid worldwide. They pointed out that the Sasser amendment deletes his own amendment adopted in committee which makes a similar prohibition but gives the President more flexibility regarding permanent facilities.

H.J. Res. 492: Vote Nos. 40-44, 46-56, 155, 156.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (50)			NAYS (44)		NOT VOTING (5)		
Democrats (1 or 2%)	Republicans (49 or 92%)		Democrats (40 or 98%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)	Democrats (3)	Republicans (2)	
Heflin	Abdnor	Jepsen	Baucus	Kennedy	Hatfield	Burdick—1	Evans—2
	Andrews	Kassebaum	Bentsen	Lautenberg	Mathias	DeConcini—1	Stafford—1
	Armstrong	Kasten	Biden	Leahy	Pressler	Hart—2PN	
	Baker	Laxalt	Bingaman	Levin	Weicker		
	Boschwitz	Lugar	Boren	Matsunaga			
	Chafee	Mattingly	Bradley	Melcher			
	Cochran	McClure	Bumpers	Metzenbaum			
	Cohen	Murkowski	Byrd	Mitchell			
	D'Amato	Nickles	Chiles	Moynihan			
	Danforth	Packwood	Cranston	Nunn			
	Denton	Percy	Dixon	Pell			
	Dole	Quayle	Dodd	Proxmire			
	Domenici	Roth	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Durenberger	Rudman	Exon	Randolph			
	East	Simpson	Ford	Riegle			
	Garn	Specter	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Goldwater	Stevens	Hollings	Sasser			
	Gorton	Symms	Huddleston	Stennis			
	Grassley	Thurmond	Inouye	Tsongas			
	Hatch	Tower	Johnston	Zorinsky			
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

LIVE PAIRS (1)	
PRESENT AND GIVING:	RECEIVING:
Long (PY).....	Hart (PN)

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
1—Official Business	
2—Necessarily Absent	
3—Illness	
4—Other	

SYMBOLS:	
AY—Announced Yea	
AN—Announced Nay	
PY—Paired Yea	
PN—Paired Nay	

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—98%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (50)
Democrats—1 or 2%
Republicans—49 or 98%

Against (44)
Democrats—40 or 91%
Republicans—4 or 9%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 62

98th Congress
2nd Session

April 11, 1984, 11:49 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-4292

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 2930

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Heinz-Riegle, et al, amendment (to the Dole-Long modified amendment) to amend the Social Security Act to authorize a two-year program of grants to States to provide health care insurance to qualified unemployed workers (\$450 million in the first year and \$250 million in the second year). Specifically the amendment would require private employers with 10 or more employees to meet the open enrollment requirements of the bill and those with 25 or more employees to continue health insurance coverage for three months after unemployment begins or be taxed at a rate equaling \$500 multiplied by the number of failures to meet the open enrollment and continuous coverage requirements. The Secretary of HHS is required to conduct a study and report the results to Congress by January 1, 1985, on recommended legislative changes in employer provided coverage necessary to providing adequate continuing health care coverage and conversion privileges for employees who are terminated involuntarily.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment cited recent CBO estimates showing that there are at least 5 million people who lost health care coverage due to unemployment. Many Americans who are unemployed today have been out of work for at least one year and a majority are steel workers. Unfortunately, the average duration of unemployment is increasing. The longer an individual is unemployed and without health insurance, the longer his or her health concerns are
(OVER)

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote Nos. 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (39)		NAYS (57)		NOT VOTING (4)		
Democrats (28 or 67%)	Republicans (11 or 20%)	Democrats (14 or 33%)	Republicans (43 or 80%)	Democrats (3)	Republicans (1)	
Biden	Cochran	Baucus	Abdnor	Kasten	Bentsen— ²	Goldwater— ²
Bingaman	Cohen	Boren	Andrews	Laxalt	DeConcini— ²	
Bradley	D'Amato	Bumpers	Armstrong	Lugar	Hart— ²	
Burdick	Hawkins	Chiles	Baker	Mattingly		
Byrd	Heinz	Exon	Boschwitz	McClure		
Cranston	Jepsen	Heflin	Chafee	Murkowski		
Dixon	Mathias	Hollings	Danforth	Nickles		
Dodd	Percy	Johnston	Denton	Packwood		
Eagleton	Quayle	Long	Dole	Pressler		
Ford	Specter	Mitchell	Domenici	Roth		
Glenn	Weicker	Nunn	Durenberger	Rudman		
Huddleston		Pryor	East	Simpson		
Inouye		Stennis	Evans	Stafford		
Kennedy		Zorinsky	Garn	Stevens		
Lautenberg			Gorton	Symms		
Leahy			Grassley	Thurmond		
Levin			Hatch	Tower		
Matsunaga			Hatfield	Trible		
Melcher			Hecht	Wallop		
Metzenbaum			Helms	Warner		
Moynihan			Humphrey	Wilson		
Pell			Kassebaum			
Proxmire						
Randolph						
Riegle						
Sarbanes						
Sasser						
Tsongas						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
1—Official Business	
2—Necessarily Absent	
3—Illness	
4—Other	

SYMBOLS:	
AY—Announced Yea	
AN—Announced Nay	
PY—Paired Yea	
PN—Paired Nay	

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats— 67%
Republicans— 80%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (39)
Democrats— 28 or 72%
Republicans— 11 or 28%

Against (57)
Democrats— 14 or 25%
Republicans— 43 or 75%

neglected, and the greater the ultimate health costs to the government or the individual. Proponents emphasized that this amendment would not create a permanent entitlement program but would institute a limited transitional block grant program that would enable States to alleviate some of the distress of unemployment coupled with the loss of health insurance.

Opponents argued that there is no longer a pressing need for a Federal program to fund health benefits since the civilian unemployment rate has dropped from 10.7 percent in November 1982 to 7.8 percent today, and many large private employers already are providing health care coverage to workers after termination of employment. The health benefits this amendment would provide are not financed by new dollars, but by provisions included in the deficit reduction package. It would not be appropriate to fund a new program with savings made on the deficit. The cost of health and accident insurance, some contended, is about \$2,000 annually per family and to provide this coverage for the 9 to 10 million people on unemployment would cost about \$20 billion. Since this proposal allocates only \$700 million, it would constitute the first segment of a plan which constantly would increase over time.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 86

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 3, 1984, 3:55 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5312

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 3045

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Mattingly motion to table the Chiles point of order that the Mattingly amendment (to provide the President with the power to veto or reduce line items of appropriations in FY 1985 and 1986, except for legislative or judicial branch appropriations, and to require a majority vote of both Houses to override the veto or reduction) violates the Constitution. (See also Vote No. 87.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment contended that the line item veto provision simply cedes back to the President the authority which Congress has taken away by attaching riders and nongermane amendments to appropriations bills. The threat of vetoing a whole appropriations bill no longer exerts enough control. The legislative branch would be protected by this proposal in two ways: a line item veto could be overridden by a simple majority and this authority would sunset in two years. This approach, they asserted, is constitutionally permissible under the necessary and proper clause. The President's authority is limited more than that of any other executive in the U.S.; four-fifths of the States allow line item veto by their governors, and most of those States have balanced budgets. The veto would be a single tool for focusing on specific items in appropriations bills, which, in theory, already should have the support of a majority of both Houses; thus, hidden or doubtful projects could be judged on their own merits. The United States cannot wait for Congressional passage and ratification of a Constitutional amendment to control the Federal deficit, and this amendment would be an interim response. There has been no determination by a Federal court concerning the constitutionality of a line item veto. Since the constitutional question is unsettled, Congress should act on the legislation and leave the final decision to the Supreme Court.

(OVER)

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote Nos. 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE DEFEATED

YEAS (45)			NAYS (46)			NOT VOTING (9)	
Democrats (8 or 21%)	Republicans (37 or 71%)		Democrats (31 or 79%)	Republicans (15 or 29%)		Democrats (6)	Republicans (3)
Biden	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Bentsen-2	Hawkins-2
Boren	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Baker	Glenn-2	Murkowski-2
Dixon	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bradley	Levin	Cohen	Hart-2	Wallop-2
Exon	Chafee	Mattingly	Bumpers	Long	Danforth	Hollings-2	
Leahy	Cochran	McClure	Burdick	Matsunaga	Domenici	Pryor-2	
Nunn	D'Amato	Nickles	Byrd	Meicher	Durenberger	Tsongas-2	
Proxmire	Denton	Percy	Chiles	Metzenbaum	Gorton		
Zorinsky	Dole	Pressler	Cranston	Mitchell	Hatch		
	East	Quayle	DeConcini	Moynihan	Hatfield		
	Evans	Roth	Dodd	Pell	Mathias		
	Garn	Simpson	Eagleton	Randolph	Packwood		
	Goldwater	Specter	Ford	Riegle	Rudman		
	Grassley	Stevens	Heflin	Sarbanes	Stafford		
	Hecht	Symms	Huddleston	Sasser	Tower		
	Heinz	Thurmond	Inouye	Stennis	Weicker		
	Helms	Trible	Johnston				
	Humphrey	Warner					
	Jepser	Wilson					
	Kassebaum						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—79%
Republicans—71%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (45)
Democrats—8 or 18%
Republicans—37 or 82%

Against (46)
Democrats—31 or 67%
Republicans—15 or 33%

Opponents of the amendment contended that a line item veto would disrupt the constitutional balance of power between the executive and legislative and would allow the President to dictate spending priorities over individual programs and to frustrate the decisions of Congress. The Federal government is much larger than any State government and must provide for national defense, foreign policy, and broad-based social welfare programs. This mechanism would achieve no meaningful reduction of the Federal deficit because the largest and fastest growing parts of the budget—permanently funded entitlement programs—would not be affected by the line item veto. A budget reduction resulting from a line item veto at the Federal level is estimated at only one percent. Revenue bills, according to the separation of powers doctrine laid out in the Constitution, should originate in the House of Representatives, be concurred in by the Senate, and approved by the President. The President has a primary budgetary power already, as the one who proposes the budget. This amendment would create in the President a new constitutional power equivalent to originating or appropriating an item, without necessitating executive compromise with the legislature. In a representative democracy, power should not be concentrated in the hands of one person. This amendment, which would, in effect, make Congress less accountable, addresses a constitutional issue in statutory form. The Constitution says that the President shall consider a full bill and, if he vetoes it, two-thirds, not a simple majority, of Congress can override the veto. Members of Congress, who have sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution, should not ignore their duty to judge whether the amendment is constitutional on the grounds that the Supreme Court will have final authority over the question.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 88

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 8, 1984, 3:04 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5390

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 3044

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Chiles, et al, amendment (as a substitute for the Baker amendment) setting forth a 3-year budget plan which provides for a 4 percent real growth rate in defense spending, 2 percent growth in non-defense programs, and an additional \$31 billion in revenues by delaying income tax indexing for two years, except for indexing for zero brackets and the personal exemption for low- and middle-income individuals; and states the sense of the Congress that appropriations for defense and non-defense discretionary spending should be capped at \$431.3 billion, \$462.8 billion, and \$497.5 billion for FY 1985-87, respectively. (The Chiles amendment, which was endorsed by the Democratic Caucus, would provide for reduced deficits of \$173.8 billion, \$170.7 billion, and \$169.0 billion in FY 1985-87 compared to the Baker package which would provide for increased deficits for the same period of \$180.7 billion, \$185.6 billion, and \$203.5 billion.)

NOTE: Proponents maintained that the cardinal responsibility of any plan is to set a course that leaves the country better off in 1987 than today. The Republican "Rose Garden" plan will result in deficits that increase from \$181 billion in 1985 to \$204 billion in 1987. In contrast, the Democratic alternative amendment would reduce the deficits in the next three years, restrain defense as well as domestic spending, and provide some additional revenue. Unless we pass a plan with sufficient restraints, interest rates will continue to rise, as they did after the Rose Garden plan was announced. While the Administration claims that their plan will reduce the deficit by \$150 billion, CBO estimated it actually will reduce it by only \$87 billion. The Democrat's amendment would save \$200 billion, using their figures, or \$150 billion according to CBO. It would raise \$81 billion—instead of \$48 billion—in revenue. Although one-third of the indexing provisions would be delayed for 2 years, indexing would (OVER)

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote Nos. 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (49)			NAYS (49)		NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (43 or 100%)	Republicans (6 or 11%)		Democrats (0 or 0%)	Republicans (49 or 89%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (0)
Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Glenn—2	
Bentsen	Lautenberg	Chafee	Armstrong	Kasten	Hollings—2	
Biden	Leahy	Heinz	Baker	Laxalt		
Bingaman	Levin	Mathias	Boschwitz	Lugar		
Boren	Long	Pressler	Cochran	Mattingly		
Bradley	Matsunaga	Weicker	Cohen	McClure		
Bumpers	Melcher		D'Amato	Murkowski		
Burdick	Metzenbaum		Danforth	Nickles		
Byrd	Mitchell		Denton	Packwood		
Chiles	Moynihan		Dole	Percy		
Cranston	Nunn		Domenici	Quayle		
DeConcini	Pell		Durenberger	Roth		
Dixon	Proxmire		East	Rudman		
Dodd	Pryor		Evans	Simpson		
Eagleton	Randolph		Garn	Specter		
Exon	Riegle		Goldwater	Stafford		
Ford	Sarbanes		Gorton	Stevens		
Hart	Sasser		Grassley	Symms		
Heflin	Stennis		Hatch	Thurmond		
Huddleston	Tsongas		Hatfield	Tower		
Inouye	Zorinsky		Hawkins	Tribble		
Johnston			Hecht	Wallop		
			Helms	Warner		
			Humphrey	Wilson		
			Jepsen			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—100%
Republicans—89%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (49)
Democrats—43 or 88%
Republicans—6 or 12%

Against (49)
Democrats—0 or 0%
Republicans—49 or 100%

go into effect for those at the bottom of the economic ladder. Proponents questioned the need for the appropriations caps, since the Appropriations Committee over the last several years has stayed under the targets in the budget resolution for defense and non-defense. The intent of the Leadership plan to cap defense and non-defense separately is to require more spending on defense and protect it from Appropriations Committee priorities favoring non-defense spending.

Opponents pointed to the binding appropriations caps as a significant enforcement mechanism to keep spending down—a mechanism omitted in the Democratic amendment. While the alternative targets reductions in the outyears, it contains only sense of the Senate language. The economic assumptions used for the Leadership plan that yield a deficit trend line going up instead of down, some insisted, were too pessimistic and were based on outdated information. This alternative also cuts defense more and increases taxes, mainly by eliminating indexing of personal income taxes—the only insurance the average taxpayer has against higher taxes. The difference in savings between the two plans is minimal and not sufficient to make any real difference in the economy.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 89

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 8, 1984, 4:52 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5394

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 3048

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Domenici motion to table the Bradley, et al, amendment (to the Baker amendment) reducing real growth in defense spending from 7 to 5 percent for a \$5.4 billion reduction in 1985; providing for a \$3.6 billion increase in high priority, nondefense discretionary programs, including education, medical research, and environmental programs (equal to a 3 percent nominal increase); restoring \$600 million of the \$9 billion in medicare cuts already included in this package by striking the proposed increase in the part B deductible and returning the proposed part B premium increase to current law so that the premium increases at the rate of general inflation instead of medical cost inflation; and requiring the Secretary of HHS to monitor physician behavior and report to Congress every six months during the physician services fee freeze in order to be able to protect medicare beneficiaries better from unfair cost-shifting. (This amendment would reduce the Federal deficit \$3 billion more than the Baker amendment over the 3-year period FY 1985-87.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment contended that a lower rate of growth for defense would make possible a rational balance between defense and nondefense spending and savings of \$3 billion more than the underlying amendment. Previous votes prove Senate support for such an approach. Sustained 5 percent real growth would break the feast or famine cycle in spending and allow the Pentagon to plan more efficiently and deliberately. Stronger defense at lower long-term cost would result. The indispensable support of the public, which has begun to erode as a result of rigid demands for inordinately high defense budgets, also might be preserved, proponents claimed. Transferring two-thirds of the resulting defense savings to social programs would help counteract the sharp cuts they have undergone in the last 3 years, which hit lower income families especially hard. The social program

(OVER)

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote Nos. 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (51)			NAYS (43)			NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (5 or 12%)	Republicans (46 or 90%)		Democrats (38 or 88%)	Republicans (5 or 10%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (4)
Dixon	Abdnor	Helms	Baucus	Inouye	Cohen	Glenn—2	Hawkins—2
Long	Andrews	Humphrey	Bentsen	Johnston	Percy	Hollings—2	Laxalt—2AY
Nunn	Armstrong	Jepsen	Biden	Kennedy	Pressier		Stevens—2
Stennis	Baker	Kassebaum	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Specter		Warner—2AY
Zorinsky	Boschwitz	Kasten	Boren	Leahy	Weicker		
	Chafee	Lugar	Bradley	Levin			
	Cochran	Mathias	Bumpers	Matsunaga			
	D'Amato	Mattingly	Burdick	Melcher			
	Danforth	McClure	Byrd	Metzenbaum			
	Denton	Murkowski	Chiles	Mitchell			
	Dole	Nickles	Cranston	Moynihan			
	Domenici	Packwood	DeConcini	Pell			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Dodd	Proxmire			
	East	Roth	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Evans	Rudman	Exon	Randolph			
	Garn	Simpson	Ford	Riegle			
	Goldwater	Stafford	Hart	Sarbanes			
	Gorton	Symms	Heflin	Sasser			
	Grassley	Thurmond	Huddleston	Tsongas			
	Hatch	Tower					
	Hatfield	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—88%
Republicans—90%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—5 or 10%
Republicans—46 or 90%

Against (43)
Democrats—38 or 88%
Republicans—5 or 12%

freeze contained in the Baker amendment will continue the funding levels which already have driven education assistance to a 20-year low, and now jeopardize toxic waste cleanup as well as progress on life- and money-saving medical research breakthroughs. They further argued that the underlying amendment would force the elderly to shoulder an unfair burden of deficit reduction.

Opponents argued against dismantling this package, approved unanimously in Committee and by a vote of 76 to 5 by the Senate. If real savings are stripped out of the bill, with only taxes and defense cuts remaining, the President is likely to veto it. This amendment overturns justifiable program revisions. Medicare part B premiums, paid by beneficiaries, have increased less than 270 percent, while the government's share of costs went up 1,720 percent; the part B deductible remained at \$60 from 1972 until 1981, despite a more than 430 percent increase in total program benefit payments. The Committee amendment allows a balance between general revenue and premium financing, with the government's share locked in at 75 percent. Savings are shared among doctors, hospitals, and beneficiaries, and represent efforts to spread the burden of deficit reduction over the largest possible population. The proposed amendment offers insignificant deficit reduction and miniscule relief for the elderly.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 90

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 9, 1984, 3:15 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5511

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 3050

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table Division I of the Kennedy-Cranston amendment (to the Baker amendment) striking the sections of the bill which would permanently establish the medicare part B premium paid by enrollees at 25 percent of the program cost, and index the medicare part B deductible paid by participants in 1985, 1986, and 1987 (from its current level of \$75, to \$78 in 1985, \$82 in 1986, and \$86 from 1987). (These provisions as reported would cost medicare beneficiaries an additional \$1.525 billion over the next 3 years.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment asserted that the pending bill incorporates the most objectionable of the President's medicare proposals, and will result in the imposition of \$9.9 billion in additional health costs on elderly and disabled beneficiaries over the next five years. Almost a majority of Americans over 65 are dependent upon social security for their income and simply cannot afford the out of pocket increases that will result from these part B revisions. Under the Finance Committee's provisions, the annual \$175.20 premium for medicare part B, which pays physician fees, would nearly double by 1990 because it would be indexed to the growth in medicare costs and be required to cover 25 percent of the program, whatever the cost. In 1982, Congress adopted a similar approach, only for about two years, to let the beneficiary share of program costs rise from 24.8 percent to 25 percent but provided that beginning in 1986, increases in the part B premium would again be limited to the annual percentage increase in social security cash benefits. This amendment would restore the cap on increases to the level of social security COLA's. It also would reverse the Committee's increase in the part B (OVER)

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote Nos. 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (58)			NAYS (36)			NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (10 or 23%)	Republicans (48 or 94%)		Democrats (33 or 77%)	Republicans (3 or 6%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (4)
Baucus	Abdnor	Jepsen	Biden	Kennedy	Cohen	Bumpers—2	Baker—2
Bentsen	Andrews	Kassebaum	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Pressler	Glenn—2	Hawkins—2
Boren	Armstrong	Kasten	Bradley	Leahy	Specter		Mathias—2
Exon	Aoschwitz	Laxalt	Burdick	Levin			Stevens—2
Johnston	Chafee	Lugar	Byrd	Matsunaga			
Long	Cochran	Mattingly	Chiles	Melcher			
Nunn	D'Amato	McClure	Cranston	Metzenbaum			
Proxmire	Danforth	Murkowski	DeConcini	Mitchell			
Stennis	Denton	Nickles	Dixon	Moynihan			
Zorinsky	Dole	Packwood	Dodd	Pell			
	Domenici	Percy	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Ford	Randolph			
	East	Roth	Hart	Riegle			
	Evans	Rudman	Heflin	Sarbanes			
	Garn	Simpson	Hollings	Sasser			
	Goldwater	Stafford	Huddleston	Tsongas			
	Gorton	Symms	Inouye				
	Grassley	Thurmond					
	Hatch	Tower					
	Hatfield	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Weicker					
	Humphrey	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—77%
Republicans—94%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (58)
Democrats—10 or 17%
Republicans—48 or 83%

Against (36)
Democrats—33 or 92%
Republicans—3 or 8%

deductible, which was raised in 1981 by 25 percent to \$75. There is even less justification for increasing the deductible than the premium, proponents argued, because it affects those who are already sick, and will discourage the elderly from seeking early health care when it can do the most good. Despite the presence of medicare, which currently covers about 40 percent of their health costs, the elderly pay approximately 15 percent of their annual income for medical care and supplementary health insurance—roughly the same as before enactment of medicare. Even under current law, health care could consume 19 percent of their income by the year 2000. The pending bill increases the terrible financial pressures on the elderly but does nothing to control soaring medical cost inflation which grows more than twice as fast as general inflation, or to assure the solvency of the medicare hospital trust fund which will be over \$1 trillion in deficit by the year 2005 if no significant steps are taken. The rapid increase in the cost of medicare is a budget problem, but the solution should not be pushed off onto beneficiaries in the form of continual cost increases and benefit cuts since they already pay too much and, as a rule, do not make treatment decisions. Some argued that Congress must stop looking the other way while doctors and hospitals charge what the market will bear. The wasteful practices that permeate the entire health care system must be curbed. Congress must resolve medicare's problems separately as it did with social security. Otherwise, large numbers of the elderly and disabled will have to choose between destitution and tragic health problems, because they cannot afford treatment. Finally, proponents noted the absence of comparable House provisions.

Opponents of the amendment argued that beneficiary contributions have failed to keep pace with their intended portion of the cost of the medicare program; copayments and deductibles are needed to encourage efficiency and discourage unnecessary utilization of the health care system by making beneficiaries cost-conscious; and a balanced approach, such as the Finance Committee's, spreads the burden of increasing health costs fairly and across more sections of the population and is preferable to attempts to legislate away health care cost increases which would inevitably lead hospitals and doctors to ration services. The cost-sharing provisions are justifiable and have wide support as evidenced by the unanimous, bipartisan 20 to 0 committee vote, and the 76 to 5 floor vote to adopt them. Opponents contended that senior citizens' share of medical care is manageable; between 1959 and 1982, the number of elderly persons living in poverty has dropped from 35.2 percent to 14.6 percent. For the noninstitutionalized elderly, per capita out-of-pocket expenditures average about 6 percent of their income; proponents' figures include people in nursing homes. While it is estimated that the elderly will have to spend the same percent of their income on health care in 1984 as in 1966, opponents argued that the elderly are healthier and receive better care at no greater cost since the range and intensity of services made available to the elderly today has been greatly improved. Over the last 10 years, beneficiary part B premiums have increased 94 percent while the government's contribution has increased by over 275 percent. If permitted to revert to current law, the part B premium would represent only 18 percent of program costs for the elderly by the year 1989 although it was intended to cover 50 percent when the program started. As for the part B deductible, about 70 percent of an estimated 29.1 million enrollees in 1984 would be affected. The remaining 9 million will not have incurred more than \$75 worth of part B services. Moreover, depletion of the medicare trust fund imperils the benefits senior citizens depend on, and a deficit fueled by growing medicare costs drives interest rates higher for everybody.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 91

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 9, 1984, 4:01 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5514

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 3052

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Kennedy-Cranston amendment deleting the provision of the bill which would delay medicare parts A and B eligibility until the first of the month following the 65th birthday, instead of the first day of the month in which the individual turns 65 as in current law, at a cost of \$630 million to medicare beneficiaries.

NOTE: Proponents argued that this aspect of medicare, unchanged since 1965, should remain unchanged. Eligibility for both part A, which covers hospital costs, and part B, for doctor bills, would be delayed even though elderly Americans turning 65 have contributed to part A throughout their working years via payroll deductions. Congress should not break the promise that medicare would be available in the month they turn 65. The Finance Committee report expresses concern that some people could find themselves with gaps in protection as a result of the delay, and offers the suggestion that private insurance plans can be amended or adjusted to assure continuity of coverage until medicare begins. The Committee also directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to the extent feasible, to make sure that these people do not suffer undue hardships. The Committee's suggested remedies are impractical—the gaps in coverage are real, and undue hardships are inevitable. The delay may be only a few days in any given individual's case but will leave many of the elderly—up to 160,000, according to the Committee's report—exposed to the devastating costs of illness just when they are sick and need

(OVER)

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED ~~TO~~

YEAS (59)			NAYS (36)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (11 or 26%)	Republicans (48 or 92%)		Democrats (32 or 74%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)
Baucus	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Biden	Inouye	Chafee	Bumpers—2	Hawkins—2
Bentsen	Andrews	Kasten	Bingaman	Kennedy	Cohen	Glenn—2	Mathias—2
Boren	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bradley	Lautenberg	Hatfield		Stevens—2
Dixon	Baker	Lugar	Burdick	Leahy	Packwood		
Johnston	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Byrd	Levin			
Long	Cochran	McClure	Chiles	Matsunaga			
Melcher	D'Amato	Murkowski	Cranston	Metzenbaum			
Moynihan	Danforth	Nickles	DeConcini	Mitchell			
Nunn	Denton	Percy	Dodd	Pell			
Proxmire	Dole	Pressler	Eagleton	Pryor			
Stennis	Domenici	Quayle	Exon	Randolph			
	Durenberger	Roth	Ford	Riegle			
	East	Rudman	Hart	Sarbanes			
	Evans	Simpson	Heflin	Sasser			
	Garn	Specter	Hollings	Tsongas			
	Goldwater	Stafford	Huddleston	Zorinsky			
	Gorton	Symms					
	Grassley	Thurmond					
	Hatch	Tower					
	Hecht	Trible					
	Heinz	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Weicker					
	Jepsen	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—74%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (59)
Democrats—11 or 19%
Republicans—48 or 81%

Against (36)
Democrats—32 or 89%
Republicans—4 or 11%

help most. The reason this provision will raise almost \$700 million over the next 3 years is because thousands of the 160,000 who are at risk, are going to fall through the cracks; they are going to get ill and find a lifetime of savings wiped out. This approach also opens the way to further incremental delays in eligibility, and they emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach to the problems of health care cost inflation, senior citizens' limited resources, and the gaps which exist under the health care system at the present time under Medicare.

Opponents argued that although 1.9 million people will become newly entitled to medicare in 1985, less than 160,000 will be potentially without coverage. In a normal year, only 25 percent of those newly eligible actually sign up for the program and make use of it. This amendment simply delays coverage up to one month, not a year, so the number of people who are likely to be deprived of needed benefits and have no other coverage, is infinitesimal. In addition, nearly 92 percent of all people turning 65 have some form of public or private health expense protection. Private insurers have confirmed that in most cases protection will not lapse. The Committee acted responsibly and in a bipartisan fashion when it voted 20-0 for the medicare package, opponents contended. The net result will delay trust fund bankruptcy. Others argued that the deficit can never be cut if all areas are off-limits. This provision, which has been considered at length, will not alter the eligibility of the 26.8 million elderly current beneficiaries, nor will it alter eligibility for the 2.8 million disabled individuals currently entitled or who will become entitled in the future. This proposal represents an attempt to reduce expenditures in a way that is least disruptive to the majority. It is a small change, but one that represents large savings to the program of roughly \$630 million—savings badly needed at this time.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 93

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 10, 1984, 4:31 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5569

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 3054

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Baker motion to table the Chafee, et al, perfecting amendment (to the Baker amendment) capping appropriations for defense and non-defense discretionary spending at \$434.5 billion for FY 1985, \$472.3 billion for 1986, and \$514.6 billion for 1987—caps which are \$2.3 billion, \$5.6 billion, and \$8.8 billion lower than the combined defense and non-defense caps under the Baker amendment. (This amendment's unitary caps would retain the Appropriation Committee's authority to determine priorities between defense and non-defense spending.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment pointed out that, by providing for a unitary cap, it restores to the Appropriation Committee a good deal of the authority and flexibility it always has had. In addition, it costs \$16.7 billion less than the leadership plan. While it still would alter the legislative process by writing into law the maximum amount that can be appropriated for the next 3 years, it is a significant improvement over the dual caps. The Republican plan would foreclose the flexibility necessary to shift budget savings between defense and non-defense programs. To put Congress on automatic pilot for three years, which the two-cap proposal would do, is very poor fiscal practice. Some voiced their support for this amendment because of the smaller deficit and the more appropriate mix of defense/non-defense spending but felt it did not reduce the deficit enough, as the Chiles amendment would have. The deficits which are the key to an improving economy may well be totally out of control. Yet in the last three years, Congress has approved the largest cuts to the deficit in the outyears, with minimal cuts to the current year—as in the leadership plan.

Opponents of the amendment noted that it provides for higher non-defense discretionary spending than the House bill. The dual cap of the leadership plan, they contended, will keep spending down, whereas a unitary cap will not do the job. A unitary cap, some argued, is only a smokescreen to allow Congress to whittle down defense spending and use it for domestic programs. They pointed to the compromise nature of the Rose Garden package, saying that it had been difficult to get an agreement on these defense figures which the President, the Secretary of Defense, and others felt too low.

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote Nos. 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (48)			NAYS (46)			NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (3 or 7%)	Republicans (45 or 85%)		Democrats (38 or 93%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (2)
Heflin	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Johnston	Andrews	Glenn ⁻²	Hecht ⁻²
Nunn	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bentsen	Kennedy	Chafee	Hart ⁻²	Mathias ^{-2AN}
Zorinsky	Baker	Lugar	Biden	Lautenberg	Cohen	Inouye ⁻²	
	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Bingaman	Leahy	Grassley	Tsongas ⁻²	
	Cochran	McClure	Boren	Levin	Heinz		
	D'Amato	Murkowski	Bradley	Long	Pressler		
	Danforth	Nickles	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Stafford		
	Denton	Packwood	Burdick	Melcher	Weicker		
	Dole	Percy	Byrd	Metzenbaum		EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
	Domenici	Quayle	Chiles	Mitchell			
	Durenberger	Roth	Cranston	Moynihan			
	East	Rudman	DeConcini	Pell			
	Evans	Simpson	Dixon	Prxmire		SYMBOLS:	
	Garn	Specter	Dodd	Pryor			
	Goldwater	Stevens	Eagleton	Randolph			
	Gorton	Symms	Exon	Riegle			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Ford	Sarbanes		AY—Announced Yea	
	Hatfield	Tower	Hollings	Sasser		AN—Announced Nay	
	Hawkins	Trible	Huddleston	Stennis		PY—Paired Yea	
	Helms	Wallop				PN—Paired Nay	
	Humphrey	Warner					
	Jepsen	Wilson					
	Kassebaum						

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—93%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (48)
Democrats—3 or 6%
Republicans—45 or 94%

Against (46)
Democrats—38 or 83%
Republicans—8 or 17%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 97

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 17, 1984, 12:42 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5922

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 3070

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Baucus, et al, perfecting amendment (to the Baker amendment) reducing medicare cuts from \$9 billion to \$8.4 billion by striking the proposed increase in the medicare part B deductible; returning the part B deductible increase in 1987 to current law so that the premium increases at the rate of general inflation rather than the higher rate of medical cost inflation; and requiring the Secretary of HHS to monitor physician behavior and report to Congress every six months during the two-year physician fee freeze period in order to protect medicare beneficiaries from unfair cost-shifting. (See also Vote Nos. 90 and 91.)

NOTE: Proponents supported the amendment as a fairness measure to alleviate the burden of the spending cuts in the deficit reduction package which would be felt twice as much by medicare beneficiaries as by physicians or hospitals. The proposed increase would raise the out-of-pocket expenses of the sick elderly which go up along with health care costs. The rate of increase in health care costs is twice the rate of inflation, and indexing the premium to the medical cost inflation rate would erode the buying power of recipients' social security checks, which under current law are subject to cost-of-living adjustments based on the general inflation rate. The amendment would delay applying the medical cost inflation rate to premiums until 1987, at which time the rate of increase in health care costs should be reduced. The amendment would cost only \$588 million in three years, reducing savings in the package by only 6 percent. This amendment is a compromise to balance medicare cuts with cuts in other areas, especially military, which were not as severely constrained by their committees of jurisdiction as were proposals for medicare. The medicare program is in trouble, but the budget process is not the appropriate place for its reform, and budget cuts will not solve the problem, which is mostly due to rising health care costs. The amendment, through its monitoring provision, also would assure Congress, the elderly, and the disabled of having information about which physicians are honoring the congressional intent of the fee freeze by not increasing charges to medicare patients.

(OVER)

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote Nos. 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YLAS (44)			NAYS (50)			NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (37 or 90%)		Republicans (7 or 13%)	Democrats (4 or 10%)		Republicans (46 or 87%)	Democrats (4)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Huddleston	Andrews	Exon	Abdnor	Kasten	Hart ⁻²	Jepsen ⁻²
Bentsen	Inouye	Cohen	Johnston	Armstrong	Laxalt	Matsunaga ⁻²	Stafford ⁻²
Biden	Kennedy	Hatfield	Long	Baker	Lugar	Pryor ⁻²	
Bingaman	Lautenberg	Hawkins	Proxmire	Boschwitz	Mathias	Riegle ⁻²	
Boren	Leahy	Kassebaum		Chafee	Mattingly		
Bradley	Levin	Pressler		Cochran	McClure		
Bumpers	Melcher	Specter		D'Amato	Murkowski		
Burdick	Metzenbaum			Danforth	Nickles		
Byrd	Mitchell			Denton	Packwood		
Chiles	Moynihan			Dole	Percy		
Cranston	Nunn			Domenici	Quayle		
DeConcini	Pell			Durenberger	Roth		
Dixon	Randolph			East	Rudman		
Dodd	Sarbanes			Evans	Simpson		
Eagleton	Sasser			Garn	Stevens		
Ford	Stennis			Goldwater	Symms		
Glenn	Tsongas			Gorton	Thurmond		
Heflin	Zorinsky			Grassley	Tower		
Hollings				Hatch	Trible		
				Hecht	Wallop		
				Heinz	Warner		
				Helms	Weicker		
				Humphrey	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—90%
Republicans—87%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (44)
Democrats—37 or 84%
Republicans—7 or 16%

Against (50)
Democrats—4 or 8%
Republicans—46 or 92%

Opponents maintained that the deficit reduction package is a reasonable, balanced approach which necessarily includes spending reductions, as well as revenue raising provisions. Congress must address program areas of rapid growth where it can influence behavior and effectuate cost sharing, a reasonable and integral part of any deficit reduction package. Part B of the medicare program has grown more than 960 percent since 1970 and is the fastest growing portion of that program. The premium provision effects substantial savings with relatively little expense to each of the 29 million participants (an actual reduction of 70 cents per month from projections for 1985 and an increase of only 50 cents per month over baseline projections in 1986. A "hold harmless" provision ensures that social security benefits will not be reduced as a result of the premium provision. The deductible provision has only a small effect—\$3 per participant or less than a 4 percent increase—while it is estimated that the cost of medicare for the government will increase by 15 percent by 1988. Thus, the act provides for significant cost savings as a whole and the majority of reforms will affect States and providers of health care rather than recipients. This amendment should be defeated, opponents asserted, because maintaining the provisions of the package is the best means to bringing the minimum spending reductions proposed by the House closer to this balanced approach by the Senate.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 98

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 17, 1984, 1:33 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5926

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 3071

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Weicker motion to table the Kennedy amendment (to the Baker amendment) providing additional funding in the non-defense discretionary cap during FY 1985-87 in the amount of \$322 million to provide a 7 percent increase for five primary health care block grant programs—alcohol and drug abuse, mental health, maternal and child health, migrant health centers, and childhood immunization; and to provide \$4.4 million over the same period for child abuse prevention and treatment.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment asserted that it reflects fairness and a decent sense of national priorities. Since the Reagan Administration took office, funding for these five health programs has been cut an average of 55 percent (after adjustment for inflation). Under the Republican proposal, the programs will fall to 51 percent of their 1980 level by 1987. Decreasing these programs by 49 percent while increasing defense by 62 percent illustrates the lopsided budget priorities of the current proposal. The need for these programs is greater today than in 1980. A majority of States surveyed reported an increase in the proportion of pregnant women receiving late or no prenatal care; women receiving late or no care are more likely to have low birthweight babies who are three times more likely to die in their first year. Immunization funding also has been cut 30 percent below the 1980 level; many

(OVER)

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote Nos. 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (63)			NAYS (32)		NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (13 or 30%)	Republicans (50 or 96%)		Democrats (30 or 70%)	Republicans (2 or 4%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)
Baucus	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Biden	Cohen	Hart—2	Jepsen—2
Bentsen	Andrews	Kasten	Bingaman	Hawkins	Pryor—2	Mathias—2
Chiles	Armstrong	Laxalt	Boren			Stafford—2
DeConcini	Baker	Lugar	Bradley			
Dixon	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Bumpers			
Exon	Chafee	McClure	Burdick			
Heflin	Cochran	Murkowski	Byrd			
Johnston	D'Amato	Nickles	Cranston			
Mitchell	Danforth	Packwood	Dodd			
Nunn	Denton	Percy	Eagleton			
Proxmire	Dole	Pressler	Ford			
Stennis	Domenici	Quayle	Glenn			
Zorinsky	Durenberger	Roth	Hollings			
	East	Rudman	Huddleston			
	Evans	Simpson	Inouye			
	Garn	Specter	Kennedy			
	Goldwater	Sievens	Lautenberg			
	Gorton	Symms	Leahy			
	Grassley	Thurmond	Levin			
	Hatch	Tower	Long			
	Hatfield	Trible	Matsunaga			
	Hecht	Wailop	Melcher			
	Heinz	Warner	Metzenbaum			
	Helms	Weicker	Moynihan			
	Humphrey	Wilson	Pell			
			Randolph			
			Riegle			
			Sarbanes			
			Sasser			
			Tsongas			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—70%
Republicans—96%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (63)
Democrats—13 or 21%
Republicans—50 or 79%

Against (32)
Democrats—30 or 94%
Republicans—2 or 6%

additional children will be exposed to polio, measles, rubella, and mumps. An increase in child abuse was reported in 1983 in one of every four States. The child abuse prevention program has never been fully funded to the levels authorized in 1974. When the current Administration took office, those authorizations were cut in half, and appropriations reduced by 30 percent. The American family is our greatest resource, proponents asserted, and its preservation should be a congressional priority. With the exception of child and maternal care, these items have been unanimously reported out of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, illustrating bipartisan support for a 7 percent increase—an increase in funds which is identical to the levels for the five health programs in the House budget resolution.

Opponents of the amendment emphasized the Senate's obligation to move deficit reduction legislation along in the legislative process. They noted the difficulty in pinpointing those programs suggested for increase because some were not yet authorized. Consideration of these programs, they maintained, should be postponed until the Senate has before it the Labor-HHS appropriations bill. There will be time, then, to shift priorities in funding.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 100

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 17, 1984, 5:41 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5968

DEFICIT REDUCTION/BUDGET

BILL NO.: H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170)

AMENDMENT NO.: 3027

TITLE: "Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984."

SUBJECT: Baker modified amendment containing the President's so-called "Rose-Garden" (or Republican leadership) budget plan which provides for a 6.8 percent real growth in defense spending in FY 1985 and 5 percent in 1986 and 1987; provides for a 1.5 percent growth in non-defense discretionary spending in FY 1985 and inflation pegged growth in FY 1986 and 1987; creates a new point of order against appropriations bills which exceed caps for defense (\$299 billion in FY 1985, \$333.7 billion in 1986, and \$333.7 billion in 1987) and non-defense functions (\$139.8 billion in FY 1985, \$144.3 billion in 1986, and \$151.51 billion in 1987) with provision for a waiver in the Senate by a majority vote or unanimous consent; and contains the provisions of S. 2062, the FY 1983 Omnibus Reconciliation bill, that have not yet been enacted, and the provisions of S. 2522, as reported by the Senate Banking Committee, "increasing the capitalization of the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund. (The Baker amendment would result in deficits of \$181.7 billion in FY 1985, \$187.2 billion in 1986, and \$204 billion in 1987.)

NOTE: Proponents described their amendment as a very significant, well-balanced deficit reduction package. While some opposed the statutory caps or appropriations for the next three years, they supported the modified amendment because of the enormity of present and projected deficits. Even though they were uncomfortable with the inadequacy of the domestic spending cap, they noted that over three years, military spending under the defense cap would be reduced \$56.8 billion below the President's request. This represents, they claimed, a major breakthrough with the White House. Under this method, they argued, these defense cuts will be made and not added to a subsequent year's request.

(OVER)

H.R. 2163 (H.R. 4170): Vote Nos. 58-78, 80-101, 160, 161.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (65)			NAYS (32)		NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (12 or 27%)	Republicans (53 or 100%)		Democrats (32 or 73%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Bentsen	Kennedy	Hart-2	Jepson-2
Biden	Andrews	Kasten	Bingaman	Lautenberg		Mathias-2
Boren	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bradley	Leahy		
Dodd	Baker	Lugar	Bumpers	Levin		
Exon	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Burdick	Matsunaga		
Heflin	Chafee	McClure	Byrd	Melcher		
Huddleston	Cochran	Murkowski	Chiles	Metzenbaum		
Long	Cohen	Nickles	Cranston	Mitchell		
Nunn	D'Amato	Packwood	DeConcini	Moynihan		
Proxmire	Danforth	Percy	Dixon	Pell		
Pryor	Denton	Pressler	Eagleton	Randolph		
Zorinsky	Dole	Quayle	Ford	Riegle		
	Domenici	Roth	Glenn	Sarbanes		
	Durenberger	Rudman	Hollings	Sasser		
	East	Simpson	Inouye	Stennis		
	Evans	Specter	Johnston	Tsongas		
	Garn	Stafford				
	Goldwater	Stevens				
	Gorton	Symms				
	Grassley	Thurmond				
	Hatch	Tower				
	Hatfield	Trible				
	Hawkins	Wallop				
	Hecht	Warner				
	Heinz	Weicker				
	Helms	Wilson				
	Humphrey					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—73%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (65)
Democrats—12 or 18%
Republicans—53 or 82%

Against (32)
Democrats—32 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%

Opponents rejected the amendment as doing too little to reduce deficits. Rather than reduced deficits and a balanced budget, the deficit in 1987 would increase to over \$200 billion. In contrast, the Hollings and Chiles alternatives would have made much larger deficit reductions which would greatly improve the economic outlook. The Republican majority however, would support none but the President's plan. In addition, this amendment would seriously tamper with the legislative process and alter the careful balance embodied in the budget/appropriations process. Spending priorities would no longer be the product of committee work but would become the product of negotiations among the members of only one political party, the majority party. In other words, the two-cap scheme would let the White House impose its priorities rather than the Congress collectively setting spending priorities. This two-cap system treats non-defense discretionary spending as if it were the cause of runaway government spending. In fact, it will be a lower share of the GNP this year than in any of the past three. Even though this amendment was modified to increase non-defense spending, it is still insufficient to fund adequately high priority programs involving education, health, and environmental programs. Indeed, this \$2 billion add-on may well go for the President's foreign policy in Central America and the Middle East. In addition, this amendment rescinds \$2 billion from the the Synfuels Corporation at a time when we face the prospect of another oil supply disruption.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 103

99th Congress
1st Session

June 4, 1985, 11:35 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p.

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 260

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Wallop, et al, amendment which requires that \$800 million of the \$2.97 billion authorized for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) be spent on the research and development of non-nuclear ballistic missile defense systems, to be deployed within five to seven years, and requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress by February 1, 1986, on how these systems can better enhance the survivability and effectiveness of U.S. strategic forces. (See also Vote Nos. 99-102.)

NOTE: Proponents contended that this amendment would ensure that part of SDI funding will be spent on the actual production and deployment of conventional defenses against ballistic missiles. The Soviets achieved superiority in counterforce missiles years ago and continue to develop antimissile devices. The U.S. has the technological capability to produce such weapons, yet not one cent of SDI funding is set to be spent for building any ballistic missile defense component. The SDI program also has seriously downgraded research into conventional ABM systems, despite an Armed Services Committee report which declared that a "higher priority should be assigned to research on near-term deployment options in support of our deterrent capability." The American people are entitled to protective weapons which can be built now and not in the 21st century, and Congress should authorize the production of such defense systems while awaiting development of more advanced defense technologies.

No opposing statements were offered.

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (33)		NAYS (62)		NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (5 or 11%)	Republicans (28 or 56%)	Democrats (40 or 89%)	Republicans (22 or 44%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)
Boren	Abdnor	Baucus	Inouye	Andrews	
Heflin	Armstrong	Bentsen	Johnston	Boschwitz	
Hollings	D'Amato	Biden	Kennedy	Chafee	
Long	Denton	Bingaman	Kerry	Cohen	
Zonnsky	Domenici	Bradley	Lautenberg	Danforth	
	Garn	Bumpers	Leahy	Dole	
	Gramm	Burdick	Levin	Durenberger	
	Grassley	Byrd	Matsunaga	Evans	
	Hatch	Chiles	Melcher	Goldwater	
	Hawkins	Cranston	Metzenbaum	Gorton	
	Hecht	DeConcini	Mitchell	Hatfield	
	Helms	Dixon	Moynihan	Heinz	
	Humphrey	Dodd	Nunn	Kassebaum	
	Kasten	Eagleton	Pell	Mathias	
	Laxalt	Exon	Proxmire	McConnell	
	Lugar	Ford	Riegle	Packwood	
	Mattingly	Glenn	Rockefeller	Roth	
	McClure	Gore	Sarbanes	Stevens	
	Murkowski	Harkin	Sasser	Thurmond	
	Nickles	Hart	Simon	Trible	
	Pressler			Warner	
	Quayle			Weicker	
	Rudman				
	Simpson				
	Specter				
	Symms				
	Wallop				
	Wilson				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—89%
Republicans—56%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (33)
Democrats—5 or 15%
Republicans—28 or 85%

Against (62)
Democrats—40 or 65%
Republicans—22 or 35%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 110

98th Congress
2nd Session

May 24, 1984, 12:01 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-6409

NOMINATION OF JAMES HARVIE WILKINSON, III

POSITION: U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

SUBJECT: Kennedy motion to recommit to the Judiciary Committee the nomination of James Harvie Wilkinson III, of Virginia, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

NOTE: Proponents of the motion to recommit pointed out that Mr. Wilkinson would be the first judge to take a seat on a Circuit Court of Appeals without trial experience despite this being one of the American Bar Association's basic criteria for endorsing a nominee. The ABA, they claimed, used a double standard for the benefit of Mr. Wilkinson even though it has applied the guidelines for trial experience inflexibly in recent years to the detriment of women and minority candidates. Other academics have been confirmed to such courts in recent years, but all have had at least limited trial experience. Mr. Wilkinson has had no experience as a practicing lawyer. The nominee, in fact, may have used confidential information about the ABA investigation of his qualifications, which he had improperly received, to launch a lobbying campaign in his support. There have been allegations that members of the ABA nominating committee may have changed their votes as a result. These matters should be examined in hearings before a vote is taken by the Senate to confirm a position that provides life tenure.

Opponents to recommitment noted that Mr. Wilkinson is currently an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School, clerked in the Supreme Court for Justice Powell, served briefly as a deputy attorney general in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department during the Reagan Administration, and was a newspaper editor for the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot newspaper for three years after his admission to the bar. The ABA, when considering a nominee for the Federal bench, not only looks at basic criteria relating to Federal bar membership and trial experience, but also reviews experience that is similar to court trial work (such as appearing before or serving on administrative

(OVER)

RESULT: MOTION REJECTED

YEAS (36)			NAYS (54)			NOT VOTING (9)	
Democrats (31 or 9%)		Republicans (5 or 10%)	Democrats (8 or 21%)		Republicans (46 or 90%)	Democrats (5)	Republicans (4)
Bentsen	Leahy	Hatfield	Baucus	Abdnor	Jepsen	Bingaman-2	Goldwater-2
Biden	Levin	Heinz	Boren	Andrews	Kassebaum	Bradley-2	Hawkins-2
Bumpers	Long	Mathias	Dixon	Armstrong	Kasten	Hart-2	Packwood-2
Burdick	Melcher	Rudman	Exon	Baker	Laxalt	Matsunaga-2	Wallop-2
Byrd	Metzenbaum	Specter	Heflin	Boschwitz	Lugar	Moynihan-2PY	
Chiles	Mitchell		Johnston	Chafee	Mattlingly		
Cranston	Pell		Nunn	Cochran	McClure		
Dodd	Proxmire		Zorinsky	Cohen	Murkowski		
Eagleton	Pryor			D'Amato	Nickles		
Ford	Randolph			Danforth	Percy		
Glenn	Riegle			Denton	Pressler		
Hollings	Sarbanes			Dole	Quayle		
Huddleston	Sasser			Domenici	Roth		
Inouye	Stennis			Durenberger	Simpson		
Kennedy	Tsongas			East	Stafford		
Lautenberg				Evans	Stevens		
				Garn	Symms		
				Gorton	Thurmond		
				Grassley	Tower		
				Hatch	Tribble		
				Hecht	Warner		
				Helms	Weicker		
				Humphrey	Wilson		

LIVE PAIRS (1)

PRESENT AND
GIVING:

RECEIVING:

DeConcini (PN)..... Moynihan (PY)

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—79%
Republicans—90%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (36)
Democrats—31 or 86%
Republicans—5 or 14%

Against (54)
Democrats—8 or 15%
Republicans—46 or 85%

agencies or arbitration boards, and teaching trial advocacy or other clinical law school courses) and, in exceptional cases, may find an individual with limited trial experience qualified. An appellate judge deals primarily with records, briefs, appellate advocates, and colleagues which sometimes causes the ABA nominating committee to place less emphasis on trial experience as a qualification. Concerning allegations of improper lobbying, they claimed that it is not out of the ordinary for individuals with special information about a candidate to voluntarily supply that information to the investigating committee members. They concluded by pointing out that the ABA nominating committee solicited other Supreme Court Justices' views in addition to Justice Powell, and was, therefore, in a unique position to judge his abilities and performance. The members of the ABA committee are experienced in receiving this information and do not let it interfere with impartial judgments.

NO. 130

June 14, 1984, 1:50 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7234

BILL NO.: S. 2723

TITLE: "Omnibus Defense Authorization Act 1985."

SUBJECT: Baker motion to table the Dixon, et al, motion to recommit the bill to the Armed Services Committee, for no more than 5 days of Senate session, with instructions to report the bill back with such changes as needed to authorize total new budget authority for defense-related programs for FY 1985 of not more than \$293.7 billion, reducing real growth from roughly 7 percent to 5 percent.

NOTE: Proponents argued that 5 percent growth is entirely adequate to meet U.S. defense needs. Unrealistically high defense budgets threaten to bankrupt the economy, ensure continuation of \$200 billion deficits, and threaten the public consensus for adequate defense spending. The bill's total is unjustified by defense requirements, especially in light of the dramatic real reductions in spending for vital domestic programs. Over the last 3 years, the only real budget cuts have been aimed at the least vocal, most vulnerable segment of the population. As a percent of GNP, social security and Medicare are the only major domestic spending programs which have increased, yet in spite of these increases, overall domestic spending has declined as a percentage of GNP, and will continue to decline in the years ahead. In contrast, defense and interest payments continue to consume ever greater amounts. Defense budgets have doubled since 1980, climbing from \$145 billion to \$299 billion; even if this motion is accepted, \$30 billion will be added to defense over last year. Soviet defense spending grew at a rate of about 2 percent annually from 1976 to 1982 and only 3 or 4 percent in 1982-83, according to preliminary estimates from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Moreover, comparisons between the current percentage of GNP spent on defense and that spent in the 1950's and 1960's are meaningless since Medicare, health, and nutrition programs had not yet come into being and GNP was significantly

(OVER)

S. 2723: Vote Nos. 113-152.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (55)			NAYS (43)		NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (9 or 20%)	Republicans (46 or 87%)		Democrats (36 or 80%)	Republicans (7 or 13%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Boren	Abdnor	Jepsen	Baucus	Inouye	Chafee	Andrews ²
Exon	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Benisen	Kennedy	Grassley	Percy ²
Glenn	Baker	Kasten	Biden	Lautenberg	Hatfield	
Heflin	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Bingaman	Leahy	Mathias	
Johnston	Cochran	Lugar	Bradley	Levin	Simpson	
Long	Cohen	Mattingly	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Stafford	
Nunn	D'Amato	McClure	Burdick	Melcher	Weicker	
Stennis	Danforth	Murkowski	Byrd	Metzenbaum		
Zorinsky	Denton	Nickles	Chiles	Mitchell		
	Dole	Packwood	Cranston	Moy nichan		
	Domenici	Pressler	DeConcini	Pell		
	Durenberger	Quayle	Dixon	Proxmire		
	East	Roth	Dodd	Pryor		
	Evans	Rudman	Eagleton	Randolph		
	Garn	Specter	Ford	Riegle		
	Goldwater	Stevens	Hart	Sarbanes		
	Gorton	Symms	Hollings	Sasser		
	Hatch	Thurmond	Huddleston	Tsongas		
	Hawkins	Tower				
	Hecht	Tribie				
	Heinz	Wallop				
	Helms	Warner				
	Humphrey	Wilson				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

1—Official Business
2—Necessarily Absent
3—Illness
4—Other

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

Democrats—80%
Republicans—87%

For (55)
Democrats—9 or 16%
Republicans—46 or 84%

Against (43)
 Democrats—36 or 84%
 Republicans—7 or 16%

smaller. This motion is a responsible effort to allow the Committee with the most defense expertise to make the cuts, rather than having adjustments made randomly on the floor. Many cuts made in Committee were from the President's wildly inflated proposal for 13 percent real growth and were the result of bookkeeping changes or updated cost estimates. The Senate should endorse this motion and the concept of stable spending for national security at 5 percent annual growth over a period of time, allowing the Pentagon to plan effectively, and ending the wasteful boom-bust approach to defense.

Opponents pointed out that the President's request already has been reduced. The Armed Services Committee and the Senate have given the bill's funding level long consideration and expressed support on several occasions. The problems of high interest rates and deficits will not be resolved by saving a mere \$5 billion. Even if none of the programs authorized in the bill were funded, outlay savings would amount to only \$8 billion. It is the growth in entitlement programs that is driving up the deficit. The effects of underfunding defense for the past 2 decades must be reversed by spending more for defense now than some would like, especially in view of the waning public consensus for defense spending. In 1960, 12 percent of the GNP was devoted to defense; today, only 6 percent is spent, yet the world is no more secure, and our security does not warrant such a reduction. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has warned that if current trends continue, the USSR will eclipse the U.S. in strategic and conventional capability. The resulting world instability will be an encouragement to Soviet adventurism. Some deemed Russian spending on defense irrelevant, arguing that defense budgets must be determined by our own military experts, based on our needs, at the level necessary to avoid war. We are stumbling piecemeal into self-enforced weakness, isolationism, and unilateral disarmament by continuing to reduce our defense budget, they contended. This motion reflects the foolish and naive isolationism of the 1920's and 1930's that produced not peace, but the greatest war in our history. Unfair press coverage, which highlights failures and overruns but not successes, and the political basis of support for many systems and bases have made defense budgeting more complicated. Some were skeptical that the short time remaining on the legislative calendar would allow completion of this bill if it were recommitted; some claimed that the higher Senate figure is needed to provide bargaining room in conference with the House which had recommended only 3-4 percent growth; others were unwilling to reduce defense since the expected level of domestic savings was not reached. In the past, some noted, the Committee tried to adhere to the Senate-passed first budget resolution, without trying to anticipate the conference level. Today, the Senate is anticipating that level, and while it waits, is getting squeezed by appropriations action. There is a danger, they contended, that the authorizing committee—the one with the most expertise—will be rendered irrelevant.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 131

98th Congress
2nd Session

June 14, 1984, 6:32 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7266

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION

BILL NO.: S. 2723

AMENDMENT NO.: 3207

TITLE: "Omnibus Defense Authorization Act, 1985."

SUBJECT: Tower motion to table the Leahy, et al, amendment eliminating \$2.62 billion for the production of 21 MX missiles and transferring \$442.8 million for operations and maintenance, \$878 million for the improvement of conventional forces of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and \$92.6 million for the improvement of the National Guard and reserve forces for a total overall reduction of \$1.208 billion.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment contended that the defense budget has become overbalanced toward nuclear weapons. Direct challenges to this country are more likely to come from conventional rather than nuclear means. Putting money into necessary improvements of our conventional military forces and combat readiness would do more to strengthen our defense than production of the MX, which would further weaken our national security by spending scarce tax dollars and escalating the deficit. This amendment would reinvest \$1.4 billion of the funds earmarked for the MX in conventional forces and the remaining \$1.2 billion would represent a deficit reduction. Increased funding to remedy deficiencies and shortages in ammunitions, supplies, and equipment for conventional forces represents a justifiable priority in military spending to "optimize our defense capability." The nuclear balance does not depend on the MX. As an interim missile between the Minuteman and the Midgetman, the D-5 which will be brought onstream by the late 1980's, has identical offensive capability to the MX. The vulnerability of MX missiles deployed in Minuteman silos makes the system useless as a second-strike weapon. The MX, therefore, is not a bargaining chip. It is destabilizing, proponents maintained.

(OVER)

S. 2723: Vote Nos. 113-152.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (55)			NAYS (41)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (10 or 23%)	Republicans (45 or 87%)		Democrats (34 or 77%)	Republicans (7 or 13%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (3)
Byrd	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Inouye	Durenberger	Bentsen—2	Andrews—2
Chiles	Armstrong	Kasten	Biden	Kennedy	Hatfield		Chafee—2
DeConcini	Baker	Laxalt	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Humphrey		Percy—2
Heflin	Boschwitz	Lugar	Boren	Leahy	Mathias	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Johnston	Cochran	Mattingly	Bradley	Levin	Packwood		
Long	Cohen	McClure	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Stafford		
Nunn	D'Amato	Murkowski	Burdick	Meicher	Weicker		
Randolph	Danforth	Nickles	Cranston	Metzenbaum		SYMBOLS:	
Stennis	Denton	Pressler	Dixon	Mitchell			
Zorinsky	Dole	Quayle	Dodd	Moynihan			
	Domenici	Roth	Eagleton	Pell			
	East	Rudman	Exon	Proxmire		AY—Announced Yea	
	Evans	Simpson	Ford	Pryor		AN—Announced Nay	
	Garn	Specter	Glenn	Riegle		PY—Paired Yea	
	Goldwater	Stevens	Hart	Sarbanes		PN—Paired Nay	
	Gorton	Symms	Hollings	Sasser			
	Grassley	Thurmond	Huddleston	Tsongas			
	Hatch	Tower					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Jepsen						

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—77%
Republicans—87%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (55)
Democrats—10 or 18%
Republicans—45 or 82%

Against (41)
Democrats—34 or 83%
Republicans—7 or 17%

because it may be perceived by the Soviets as a first-strike weapon; the system would have to be launched on warning (a flawed strategy), as most of the missiles could be destroyed by an attack. The MX offers no greater survivability to land-based defenses, and the retaliatory capacity of the other two legs of the triad is a greater factor in Soviet first-strike deterrence. Deployment of the MX would further escalate the arms race, and make arms control even more remote than it has been under the current Administration. Some favored a small mobile system as a survivable alternative to the MX and a better deterrent to a Soviet first-strike. Others expressed the view that the MX could be viable if the basing mode offered more mobility and deceptivity against a strike.

Opponents of the amendment suggested that cancellation of the MX program would reward the Soviets for their departure from the bargaining table and therefore, maintained that it is important not to abandon the MX program in this context. The Scowcroft Commission recommended that the U.S. proceed with production of the MX. The MX will help the President get the Soviets back to the negotiations by showing them Congressional resolve. The fact that we have the MX would mean that the USSR would be more willing to negotiate a limitation on it. Improved capability, even without improved survivability, will enhance rather than inhibit the U.S. ability to negotiate. Self-restraint on the part of the U.S. has never guaranteed Soviet cooperation. The USSR has no popular restraint, thus we must be prudent in maintaining a balance so that the risks involved in a nuclear war do not become acceptable to the Soviets. With reference to criticism of the basing mode, some opponents noted that the U.S. has never had any proof of the accuracy of Soviet missiles and their ability to destroy missiles in silos. Even if a large part of the MX force were decimated, those missiles which survived a first-strike would have more offensive capability than current land-based missiles. This "unfavorable exchange ratio" would be a deterrent to a Soviet first-strike. Opponents distinguished "launch on warning" and "launch under attack," and maintained that deployment of the MX would not result in the former strategy over the latter. They further noted that the U.S. is spending only 11.9 percent of our DOD funding on strategic weapons, compared to 25 percent in 1962, and it is spending a greater percentage of the budget on conventional weapons.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 132

98th Congress
2nd Session

June 14, 1984, 9:22 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7283

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION

BILL NO.: S. 2723

AMENDMENT NO.: 3208

TITLE: "Omnibus Defense Authorization Act, 1985."

SUBJECT: Tower motion to table the Moynihan amendment (taking with it the Chiles-Moynihan-Grassley-Johnston, et al, perfecting amendment prohibiting all funds for procuring MX missiles beyond the 21 authorized for FY 1984 and authorizing instead \$3.07 billion—\$2 billion less than bill—for testing and R&D) prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of funds under this Act for the deployment of an MX missile; and stating the sense of the Congress that efforts to modernize the land-based strategic force should be focused on small, mobile, single-warhead ICBM's.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment contended that this is not an anti-MX amendment, but an initiative to follow the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation of rapid movement toward single-warhead ICBM's to modernize our land-based force. The amendment would put the Midgetman on a faster track and retain the MX as a bargaining chip, while saving approximately \$2 billion. The U.S. policy of deterrence, they asserted, is to avoid war by making it clear that a war would not be successful. The goal is, therefore, to deploy nuclear weapons in ways that make them invulnerable to a first strike. The MX situated in Minuteman silos would make our land-based strategic force increasingly vulnerable; its multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) could be destroyed at a lower cost to an attacker because of the high ratio of warheads to targets, thus placing a premium on a first strike. While not affecting deployment of the 31 MX missiles presently authorized, the amendment proposes to give the U.S. an option to produce a Midgetman sooner, possibly in 6 or 7 years, while keeping the MX production line ready if the Midgetman proves not to be the best alternative for our land-based force. Other proponents asserted that the U.S. cannot have production of large numbers of MX missiles and a policy of nuclear build-down too, for such a policy would leave

(OVER)

S. 2723: Vote Nos. 113-152.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO, WITH VICE PRESIDENT VOTING YEA TO BREAK TIE

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (48)		NAYS (48)		NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (5 or 12%)	Republicans (43 or 81%)	Democrats (38 or 88%)	Republicans (10 or 19%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Byrd	Abdnor	Jepson	Baucus	Johnston	Durenberger
Heflin	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Biden	Kennedy	Grassley
Nunn	Baker	Kasten	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Hatfield
Stennis	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Boren	Leahy	Humphrey
Zorinsky	Chafee	Lugar	Bradley	Levin	Mathias
	Cochran	Mattlingly	Bumpers	Long	Packwood
	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Matsunaga	Pressler
	D'Amato	Murkowski	Chiles	Melcher	Specter
	Danforth	Nickles	Cranston	Metzenbaum	Stafford
	Denton	Quayle	Dixon	Mitchell	Weicker
	Dole	Roth	Dodd	Moynihan	
	Domenici	Rudman	Eagleton	Pell	
	East	Simpson	Exon	Proxmire	
	Evans	Stevens	Ford	Pryor	
	Garn	Symms	Glenn	Randolph	
	Goldwater	Thurmond	Hart	Riegle	
	Gorton	Tower	Hollings	Sarbanes	
	Hatch	Trible	Huddleston	Sasser	
	Hawkins	Wallop	Inouye	Tsongas	
	Hecht	Warner			
	Heinz	Wilson			
	Helms				

LIVE PAIRS (1)

PRESENT AND
GIVING:

RECEIVING:

DeConcini (PY) Bentsen (PN)

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—88%
Republicans—81%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (48)
Democrats—5 or 10%
Republicans—43 or 90%

Against (48)
Democrats—38 or 79%
Republicans—10 or 21%

the U.S. with only the vulnerable MX, having been required to dismantle warheads in some of our more survivable systems. The MX production program, others noted, is wasteful, and the Administration has not balanced the policy recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission by creatively pursuing arms control. Continued full-scale production of the MX, therefore, is not necessary to balance our arms program.

Opponents of the amendment, citing Soviet advantages in strategic nuclear forces, asserted that the U.S. must not make the triad a two-legged defense by scaling down production of the MX. Scaling down would be a sign of weakness and lack of confidence. It would kill the MX program rather than maintain its viability. Inefficiencies will not be remedied by stopping production, and national security needs are weightier than the concerns of efficiency of production hours. Furthermore, opponents contended, the amendment would probably raise costs of the MX system. The MX was recommended by the Scowcroft Commission as a bridge to the small mobile missile, and the U.S. needs something with which to negotiate at the bargaining table. U.S. commitment must match the scope of the threat; thus the cost of MX production is not too great in terms of national security.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 149

98th Congress
2nd Session

June 20, 1984, 9:44 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7782

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION

BILL NO.: S. 2723

AMENDMENT NO.: 3268

TITLE: "Omnibus Defense Authorization Act, 1985."

SUBJECT: Tower motion to table the Nunn perfecting amendment (to the Nunn-Roth amendment) limiting to 326,414 the ceiling on U.S. forces stationed in Europe in support of NATO in FY 1986; providing for a 3-year period beginning in FY 1987 that this ceiling would be reduced each year by 30,000 unless European NATO members have increased their defense spending by an aggregate average of at least 3 percent, after inflation; permits the Secretary to waive the required reduction if he certifies that European NATO members have accomplished three specified objectives during the previous calendar year and provides that the ceiling would be reduced by 10,000 for each objective the Secretary is unable to certify; contains reporting requirements; authorizes an additional \$50 million to acquire certain weapons, subsystems, and munitions of European NATO manufacture for testing with comparable U.S. manufactured items; and specifies that these provisions would not apply in the event of a declaration of war or an armed attack on any NATO member and may be waived by the President in times of emergency. (See also Vote No. 150.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment noted that the goals sought by this amendment emerged from a series of Alliance meetings in 1977-78 and have been reaffirmed annually. In an effort to comply, the U.S. has exceeded the 3 percent annual increase for the last 4 years while our allies have increased their spending by barely half the target. U.S. stocks of munitions in Europe, already well above NATO goals, will be further increased by the commitment of \$52 billion over the next 5 years. In contrast, most allies plan little or no progress toward NATO's 30-day stockpile goals in their current 5-year

(OVER)

S. 2723: Vote Nos. 113-152.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (55)			NAYS (41)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (6 or 14%)	Republicans (49 or 92%)		Democrats (37 or 86%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (2)
Dodd	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Johnston	Grassley	Huddleston ⁻²	Chafee ⁻²
Hart	Andrews	Kasten	Bentsen	Kennedy	Humphrey	Long ⁻²	Symms ^{-2AY}
Heflin	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Lautenberg	Pressler		
Mitchell	Baker	Lugar	Bingaman	Leahy	Roth		
Moy nihan	Boschwitz	Mathias	Boren	Levin			
Tsongas	Cochran	Mattingly	Bradley	Matsunaga			
	Cohen	McClure	Bumpers	Melcher			
	D'Amato	Murkowski	Burdick	Metzenbaum			
	Danforth	Nickles	Byrd	Nunn			
	Denton	Packwood	Chiles	Pell			
	Dole	Percy	Cranston	Proxmire			
	Domenici	Quayle	DeConcini	Pryor			
	Durenberger	Rudman	Dixon	Randolph			
	East	Simpson	Eagleton	Riegle			
	Evans	Specter	Exon	Sarbanes			
	Garn	Stafford	Ford	Sasser			
	Goldwater	Stevens	Glenn	Stennis			
	Gorton	Thurmond	Hollings	Zorinsky			
	Hatch	Tower	Inouye				
	Hatfield	Trible					
	Hawkins	Wallop					
	Hecht	Warner					
	Heinz	Weicker					
	Heims	Wilson					
	Jepsen						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—86%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (55)
Democrats—6 or 11%
Republicans—49 or 89%

Against (41)
Democrats—37 or 90%
Republicans—4 or 10%

projections even though some types of munitions are in critically short supply. Our allies committed themselves 6 years ago to a \$1 billion project to provide facilities to arm, fuel, and shelter the \$50 billion worth of reinforcing U.S. aircraft that would be put in Europe within 10 days of an attack. Less than 20 percent of the minimal essential facilities are in place. By their unwillingness to fulfill their commitment, the NATO allies have moved themselves—and us—closer to a choice between capitulation to the USSR, as a result of purely conventional intimidation, and early resort to nuclear weapons. "Early resort" should be interpreted as a matter of days—not weeks or months—according to General Rogers, the European NATO Supreme Commander. Americans and Europeans should question why their huge defense investment buys only a limited conventional defense and reliance on such an untenable military strategy. In an era of pronounced NATO theater nuclear disadvantage and rough strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and USSR, it makes no sense. This amendment is neither blackmail nor punishment: it merely recognizes that continued, even redoubled U.S. sacrifices to improve conventional defenses and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe are to no avail without similar allied efforts. European intentions should be put to a reasonable test by measuring programmatic progress. If, upon reflection and with 2 years in which to plan and begin responses, the allies are nonetheless unwilling to make essential, agreed upon improvements and if it is evident that they are content with a nuclear tripwire, reductions on our part are in order. In summary, the U.S. cannot continue to expend billions to prepare for the conventional war our allies are not prepared to fight.

Opponents argued that the issue raised by this amendment is not whether individual Senators condone the poor level of allied performance in meeting common defense goals. The question is whether the amendment itself takes a realistic approach that is likely to succeed. They contended it would provoke confusion and resentment in Europe, and set in motion a divisive confrontation that in time could lead to the fundamental unraveling of the alliance. The Soviets, of course, would be pleased to see that happen. The U.S. must face the challenge to encourage its allies, by example, force of logic, and persuasion, to make greater efforts and sacrifices. To pull 90,000 U.S. troops out of Europe, because some of our allies are lagging in their defense efforts would be a total abdication of leadership. The effect of the amendment, if its conditions are not met, will be to trigger an abandonment of the strategy of flexible response and put us on the road back toward a nuclear tripwire strategy. Therefore, more time is needed to consider carefully the full ramifications of such a fundamental shift in NATO doctrine. Some argued further that our presence in Europe and NATO-related spending protects the U.S. by keeping battles far from our own shores.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 153

98th Congress
2nd Session

June 21, 1984, 3:14 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7940

ENERGY-WATER APPROPRIATION, 1985

BILL NO.: H.R. 5653

AMENDMENT NO.: 3304

SUBJECT: Hatfield motion to table the DeConcini amendment to increase by \$5 million funds available for solar-thermal research in the Department of Energy and offsetting the increase by reducing appropriations for the high energy physics (nuclear fission) program.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment argued that this additional money would bring the solar energy program up to par with its recommended FY 1984 funding levels, and guarantee that important research would continue. The development of this technology, especially solar absorption cooling and passive solar cooling, would eventually provide significant contributions to U.S. energy conservation efforts. It is sensible to reduce the appropriation for high energy physics research—an area which cannot offer concrete results in this century—to offset the extra money needed now for solar research.

Opponents of the amendment claimed that the solar energy program had already been increased by \$1.4 million this year, and the high energy physics program—an area that has yet to be explored fully—has been cut by more than \$19 million. Much of the research into solar energy already has been conducted and funneling more resources into this area would be wasteful. Implementation of the findings from solar research must be carried out now, not more research.

H.R. 5653 became Public Law 98-360, approved July 16, 1984.

H.R. 5653: Vote No. 153.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (60)			NAYS (33)		NOT VOTING (7)	
Democrats (22 or 76%)	Republicans (48 or 92%)		Democrats (29 or 71%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)	Democrats (4)	Republicans (3)
Baucus	Abdnor	Laxalt	Bentsen	D'Amato	East-2	Chafee-2
Bingaman	Andrews	Lugar	Biden	Hawkins	Eng-2	Denton-2
Bumpers	Armstrong	Mattingly	Boren	Heinz	Matsumaga-2	Doie-2
Eagleton	Baker	McClure	Bradley	Mathias	Montgomery-2	
Exon	Boschwitz	Murkowski	Burdick			
Hollings	Cochran	Nickles	Burdick			
Huddleston	Cohen	Packwood	Burdick			
Johnston	Danforth	Percy	Chiles			
Levin	Domenici	Pressler	Cranston			
Pell	Durenberger	Quayle	DeConcini			
Proxmire	East	Roth	Dixon			
Zorinsky	Evans	Rudman	Dodd			
	Garn	Simpson	Ford			
	Goldwater	Specter	Glenn			
	Gorton	Stafford	Heflin			
	Grassley	Stevens	Inouye			
	Hatch	Symms	Kennedy			
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Lautenberg			
	Hecht	Tower	Leahy			
	Helms	Trible	Melcher			
	Humphrey	Wallop	Metzenbaum			
	Jepsen	Warner	Mitchell			
	Kassebaum	Weicker	Moynihan			
	Kasten	Wilson	Nunn			
			Pryor			
			Randolph			
			Riegle			
			Sarbanes			
			Sasser			
			Stennis			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—71%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (60)
Democrats—12 or 20%
Republicans—48 or 80%

Against (33)
Democrats—29 or 88%
Republicans—4 or 12%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 162

98th Congress
2nd Session

June 27, 1984, 11:08 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-8431

MATH/SCIENCE EDUCATION

BILL NO.: H.R. 13109

AMENDMENT NO.: 3342

TITLE: "Education for Economic Security Act."

SUBJECT: Baker motion to table the Riegle, et al, amendment authorizing \$15 million for each of the next three years to establish a program, administered by the Secretary of HHS, to encourage schools and private facilities to provide care before and after school and during holidays and vacation periods for school-age children who would have no supervision at home during these times.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment asserted that it would provide a cost-effective and commonsense approach to the increasing problem of unsupervised school-age children by establishing and fostering Federal-State-local partnerships that use public school buildings, encourage in-kind contributions from the community and develop community coalitions of concerned individuals. In 1982, 59 percent of all mothers with children under age 18 were in the labor force, accounting for about five million children. This number has certainly increased since then. Studies have shown that these "latchkey" children are at a greater risk of developing emotional and psychological problems, such as alcoholism and drug abuse, than are supervised children. Since the cost of many private programs is prohibitive to the majority of parents and Federal support for such programs has been drastically reduced, there is an urgent need for State and local governments to begin providing such care. While this program would not reach all those in need, it would begin to address a serious problem confronting this nation.

Opponents of the amendment argued that the need for these services is already being addressed by State, local, and private sector initiatives and by the support of existing Federal programs. This amendment inappropriately involves the Federal government in decisions concerning the use of schools and other local public facilities which are traditionally the province of State and local governments, and it

(OVER)

H.R. 1310 became Public Law 98-377, approved August 11, 1984.

H.R. 1310: Vote Nos. 112, 159, 162.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (51)			NAYS (42)			NOT VOTING (7)	
Democrats (7 or 17%)	Republicans (44 or 85%)		Democrats (34 or 83%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (3)
Boren	Abdnor	Laxalt	Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Bentsen ²	Durenberger ²
Dixon	Armstrong	Lugar	Biden	Lautenberg	Cohen	Hart ²	Goldwater ²
Heflin	Baker	Mathias	Bingaman	Leahy	D'Amato	Inouye ²	Tower ²
Huddleston	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Bradley	Levin	Hatfield	Stennis ²	
Nunn	Chafee	McClure	Bumpers	Long	Hawkins		
Proxmire	Cochran	Murkowski	Burdick	Matsunaga	Kassebaum		
Zorinsky	Danforth	Nickles	Byrd	Melcher	Packwood		
	Denton	Percy	Chiles	Metzenbaum	Pressler		
	Dole	Quayle	Cranston	Mitchell			
	Domenici	Roth	DeConcini	Moynihan			
	East	Rudman	Dodd	Pell			
	Evans	Simpson	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Carn	Specter	Exon	Randolph			
	Gorton	Stafford	Ford	Riegle			
	Grassley	Stevens	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Hatch	Symms	Hollings	Sasser			
	Hecht	Thurmond	Johnston	Tsongas			
	Heinz	Trible					
	Helms	Wallop					
	Humphrey	Warner					
	Jepsen	Weicker					
	Kasten	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—83%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—7 or 14%
Republicans—44 or 86%

Against (42)
Democrats—34 or 81%
Republicans—8 or 19%

does not include protections which would insure that the Federal funds would not replace existing State, local, or private plans. The problem of "latchkey" children certainly deserves a nationwide response, but that does not mean that the initiative should emanate from Washington, D.C. This amendment would represent the first step in the creation of a new Federal categorical program whose budget eventually would grow bigger and bigger in a time when fiscal restraint should be exercised. Lastly, the Math-Science bill is not the proper vehicle for this costly and controversial amendment and could cause the bill to be vetoed.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 208

98th Congress
2nd Session

July 31, 1984, 5:04 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-9511

NOMINATION OF JAMES HARVIE WILKINSON, III (CLOTURE)

POSITION: U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

SUBJECT: Baker, et al, motion to close further debate on the nomination of James Harvie Wilkinson III, of Virginia, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (See also Vote No. 225.)

NOTE: The cloture petition, presented on July 26, 1984, was signed by Senators Baker, Stevens, Thurmond, Denton, Wilson, D'Amato, Helms, Danforth, Jepsen, Durenberger, Hecht, Laxalt, Armstrong, Kasten, Cochran, Dole, Simpson, East, Trible, Nickles, Quayle, Hatch, Symms, Gorton, Abdnor, Hawkins, Garn, Hatfield, Kassebaum, Murkowski, McClure, Wallop, Domenici, Boschwitz, Zorinsky, Humphrey, Evans, and Grassley.

NOTE: Proponents of the cloture motion pointed out that a substantial majority of the American Bar Association nominating committee found Mr. Wilkinson to be qualified, making it highly unlikely that Mr. Wilkinson's telephone calls made a real difference in the vote. Mr. Wilkinson was not a candidate for the judgeship, they added, when he met, at the request of the Office of Legal Policy, with another candidate for the vacancy. In regard to allegations against the nominee's incompetence during his year of service for the Justice Department, they maintained that the charges were lodged by three disgruntled attorneys, two of whom resigned rather than face disciplinary action.

Opponents of the cloture motion noted that Mr. Wilkinson was the least qualified nominee ever submitted for an appellate court vacancy because he has no appellate court or litigation experience, no clinical legal courses in his teaching, and only eight years of actual law experience. The nominee may have used confidential information about the ABA investigation of his qualifications, which he had improperly received, to launch an extensive telephone lobbying campaign in his support. There have been allegations that members of the ABA nominating committee, whose initial investigator found

(OVER)

Vote Nos. 110, 208, 225, 226.

RESULT: CLOTURE MOTION REJECTED

YEAS (57)			NAYS (39)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (6 or 15%)	Republicans (51 or 93%)		Democrats (35 or 85%)	Republicans (4 or 7%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (0)
Boren	Abdnor	Jepsen	Baucus	Inouye	Heinz	Hart ²	
DeConcini	Andrews	Kassebaum	Bentsen	Johnston	Mathias	Kennedy—ZPN	
Heflin	Armstrong	Kasten	Biden	Lautenberg	Packwood	Sasser ²	
Long	Baker	Laxalt	Bingaman	Leahy	Specter		
Stennis	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bradley	Levin			
Zorinsky	Chafee	Mattingly	Bumpers	Matsunaga			
	Cochran	McClure	Burdick	Melcher			
	Cohen	Murkowski	Byrd	Metzenbaum			
	D'Amato	Nickles	Chiles	Mitchell			
	Danforth	Percy	Cranston	Moynihan			
	Denton	Pressler	Dixon	Nunn			
	Dole	Quayle	Dodd	Proxmire			
	Domenici	Roth	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Durenberger	Rudman	Exon	Randolph			
	East	Simpson	Ford	Riegle			
	Evans	Stafford	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Garn	Stevens	Hollings	Tsongas			
	Goldwater	Symms	Huddleston				
	Gorton	Thurmond					
	Grassley	Tower					
	Hatch	Trible					
	Hatfield	Wallop					
	Hawkins	Warner					
	Hecht	Weicker					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

LIVE PAIRS (1)

PRESENT AND

GIVING:

Pell (PY) Kennedy (PN)

RECEIVING:

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—85%
Republicans—93%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (57)
Democrats—6 or 11%
Republicans—51 or 89%

Against (39)
Democrats—35 or 90%
Republicans—4 or 10%

Wilkinson unqualified, may have changed their votes as a result. Mr. Wilkinson's actions raise questions as to his temperament and suitability for a Federal judgeship. Mr. Wilkinson participated in interviewing at least one candidate for the Fourth Court judgeship after he himself expressed interest in being nominated to fill that vacancy. Hearings need to be held to address these allegations before a vote is taken by the Senate to confirm a position with life tenure.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 214

98th Congress
2nd Session

August 8, 1984, 12:28 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-9911

AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.R. 5743

SUBJECT: Baker motion to waive section 303(a) of the Budget Act in order to permit consideration of the bill. (Section 303 requires waiver of the Act for consideration of any appropriation measure if the First Budget Resolution has not been agreed to.) (See also Vote Nos. 211 and 213.)

NOTE: Proponents of the motion stated that it would be unfair to tie up the agriculture appropriations bill while arguing about the procedural shortcomings of the budget process. Important programs including WIC, school lunches, and farm loans are contained in this bill which need to be passed so that State and local governments can properly plan and budget for the coming fiscal year. While opponents of the waiver do not disagree with the bill's contents, they are using it as a pawn in a political game. The agriculture bill is well within the fixed amount allocated to it by the Appropriations Committee and is \$292 million below FY 1984 spending levels, including supplemental appropriations. Passing this appropriation bill would be an excusable precedent, they contended, and would not "kill" the budget system. The First Budget Resolution only sets spending targets which have been exceeded by an average of 4 percent from 1980-84. Furthermore, the House already has passed 10 of the 13 appropriations bills without any budget resolution, and the Senate has passed 7.

Opponents of the motion declared that the Budget Act has forced Congress to restrain spending and set budgetary priorities and should not be abandoned for the sake of expediency and political convenience. Without a binding First Budget resolution, Congress will again find itself drowning in uncontrolled spending and "piecemeal" budgeting. This is the first time since the budget process began 10 years ago that the nation has been without a budget resolution so late in the year. Because the President is unwilling to compromise on defense spending, he and the Republican members of Congress have unofficially agreed to ignore the budget process and force everyone else to disregard the law. Their ad

(OVER)

H.R. 5743: Vote Nos. 211, 213, 214, 227-231.

RESULT: MOTION AGREED TO

YEAS (63)			NAYS (34)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (13 or 30%)	Republicans (50 or 94%)		Democrats (31 or 70%)	Republicans (3 or 6%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Boren	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Leahy	Gorton	Bentsen-2	Goldwater-2
Bumpers	Andrews	Kasten	Biden	Levin	Grassley		McClure-2
Burdick	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bingaman	Long	Weicker		
DeConcini	Baker	Lugar	Bradley	Matsunaga			
Dixon	Boschwitz	Mathias	Byrd	Melcher			
Exon	Chafee	Mattingly	Chiles	Metzenbaum			
Ford	Cochran	Murkowski	Cranston	Mitchell			
Heflin	Cohen	Nickles	Dodd	Moynihan			
Huddleston	D'Amato	Packwood	Eagleton	Nunn			
Pryor	Danforth	Percy	Glenn	Pell			
Stennis	Denton	Pressler	Hart	Proxmire			
Tsongas	Dole	Quayle	Hollings	Randolph			
Zorinsky	Domenici	Roth	Inouye	Riegle			
	Durenberger	Rudman	Johnston	Sarbanes			
	East	Simpson	Kennedy	Sasser			
	Evans	Specter	Lautenberg				
	Garn	Stafford					
	Hatch	Stevens					
	Hatfield	Symms					
	Hawkins	Thurmond					
	Hecht	Tower					
	Heinz	Trible					
	Helms	Wallop					
	Humphrey	Warner					
	Jepsen	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—70%
Republicans—94%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (63)
Democrats—13 or 21%
Republicans—50 or 79%

Against (34)
Democrats—31 or 91%
Republicans—3 or 9%

hoc agreement that appropriations bills will not be proposed which exceed ceilings established by the Appropriations Committee is not sanctioned by law, therefore is nonbinding, and does not apply to the defense function. Furthermore, any amendment can be offered to bills on the Senate floor without being subject to points of order. Only 4 budget conference meetings, totaling less than 6 hours, have been held. The conferees should be ordered to meet until they agree on a fair compromise between the \$299 billion and \$287 billion defense targets set by the Senate and the House, respectively. The Senate leadership proposal that a \$299-\$287 billion range be established would render conference procedures unnecessary and make a mockery of the budget process. While it is undesirable to hold up this measure, passing appropriations bills without a budget resolution will only further reduce the pressure to reach a binding budget resolution.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 215

98th Congress
2nd Session

August 8, 1984, 3:13 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-9925

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

BILL NO.: H.R. 6040

AMENDMENT NO.: 3620

TITLE: "Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1984."

SUBJECT: Dodd-Glenn, et al, amendment stipulating that the levels of appropriation in this bill may not exceed those levels already authorized for foreign aid, thereby achieving savings of \$386 million in the foreign assistance section of the bill.

NOTE: Proponents argued that the amendment is intended to bring the bill into compliance with the Constitutional requirement for authorization prior to appropriation. The Senate Appropriations Committee's bill contains \$1 billion in new foreign aid spending, including \$565 million for Central America. This exceeds existing authorization ceilings by \$400 million and House-approved levels by \$800 million. In addition, a substantial portion of the bill's foreign aid section represents a downpayment on unauthorized legislation to implement the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission on Central America that will cost more than \$8 billion over 5 years. The Senate has yet to debate this package—the largest single foreign aid program to be proposed since President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Although many of the Commission's ideas are worthwhile, other existing programs which are essential would go unfunded. The Foreign Relations Committee debated the foreign aid authorization containing the Commission's proposals for more than 3 days and resolved almost all the issues in the bill except for specific military aid provisions, which were to be introduced as amendments. However, the bill was not brought before the Senate as scheduled. In the absence of a Senate consensus, the Appropriations Committee, which ordinarily squeezes figures below the authorizations, is appropriating above them. Proponents predicted that their amendment would be

(OVER)

H.R. 6040: Vote Nos. 215-221.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (37)			NAYS (62)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (34 or 77%)		Republicans (3 or 5%)	Democrats (10 or 23%)	Republicans (52 or 95%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (0)
Baucus	Leahy	Hatfield	Boren	Abdnor	Jepsen	Bentsen—2	
Biden	Levin	Pressler	Bradley	Andrews	Kassebaum		
Bingaman	Matsunaga	Weicker	Chiles	Armstrong	Kasten		
Bumpers	Melcher		Dixon	Baker	Laxalt		
Burdick	Metzenbaum		Heflin	Boschwitz	Lugar		
Byrd	Mitchell		Hollings	Chafee	Mathias		
Cranston	Moynihan		Huddleston	Cochran	Mattingly		
DeConcini	Pell		Johnston	Cohen	McClure		
Dodd	Proxmire		Long	D'Amato	Murkowski		
Eagleton	Pryor		Nunn	Danforth	Nickles		
Exon	Randolph			Denton	Packwood		
Ford	Riegle			Dole	Percy		
Glenn	Sarbanes			Domenici	Quayle		
Hart	Sasser			Durenberger	Roth		
Inouye	Stennis			East	Rudman		
Kennedy	Tsongas			Evans	Simpson		
Lautenberg	Zorinsky			Garn	Specter		
				Goldwater	Stafford		
				Gorton	Stevens		
				Grassley	Symms		
				Hatch	Thurmond		
				Hawkins	Tower		
				Hecht	Trible		
				Heinz	Wallop		
				Helms	Warner		
				Humphrey	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yes
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yes
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats— 77%
Republicans— 95%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (37)
Democrats— 34 or 92%
Republicans— 3 or 8%

Against (62)
Democrats— 10 or 16%
Republicans— 52 or 84%

portrayed unfairly as anti-aid to Central America, or more specifically, as anti-military aid to El Salvador, when in fact, it contains \$67.95 million in previously authorized military aid for Central America, of which \$25.3 million is meant for El Salvador, a figure that matches the military's current monthly spending rate. In addition, millions remain unspent from the most recent continuing and supplemental appropriations. Together, these funds are sufficient to finance the military through the end of the fiscal year.

Opponents argued that the amendment is an effort to gut current policy, especially the initiative which began with the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America or Kissinger Commission. This modification would convey to the rest of the world that "fatigue of leadership" has made the U.S. no longer willing to act as a major power which will eventually lead to a Marxist-Leninist takeover of Central America. Moreover, the Foreign Relations Committee stalemate on the issue of Central America left the full Senate with no guidance since no dollar amounts were listed in the reported authorization. Granted, this is not the correct procedure, but it is not new and is one the Senate is forced to work with since there has not been an authorization for 3-1/2 years. Nevertheless, the Senate must recognize the urgency of the situation and realize that it is in the interest of the U.S. to see that Central America has a military shield behind which it can develop economically as Europe did under the Marshall Plan and NATO.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 218

98th Congress
2nd Session

August 8, 1984, 6:47 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-9946

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

BILL NO.: H.R. 6040

AMENDMENT NO.: 3625

TITLE: "Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1984."

SUBJECT: Dixon, et al, amendment appropriating an additional \$60 million for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program to be distributed by FEMA and administered by private voluntary organizations and local governments.

NOTE: Proponents contended that an \$80 million reduction in the funding level for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program makes little sense when the estimated 250,000 homeless individuals in this country exceed by 2 to 1 the 91,000 available beds in shelters. These estimates are based on the most conservative figures released by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Other figures from community organizations estimate there are 2 million to 3 million homeless people in this country. In light of this staggering need, it seems only fair to increase funding for the program to \$120 million, the same amount as is provided under the bill for economic assistance to El Salvador. The \$120 million funding level is still \$20 million less than the FY 1984 level of \$140 million.

Opponents pointed out that the original intent in last year's funding for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program was temporary in nature. They also argued that the Federal Emergency Management Agency should not be managing such a program, rather it should be administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The program should be referred to the Senate Banking Committee, and funds appropriated only after being properly authorized.

H.R. 6040: Vote Nos. 215-221.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

YEAS (57)			NAYS (40)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (39 or 91%)		Republicans (18 or 33%)	Democrats (4 or 9%)		Republicans (36 or 67%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (1)
Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Exon	Abdnor	Laxalt	Bentsen—2	D'Amato—2
Biden	Lautenberg	Baker	Glenn	Armstrong	Lugar	Hollings—2	
Bingaman	Leahy	Boschwitz	Proxmire	Cochran	Mattingly		
Boren	Levin	Chafee	Zorinsky	Danforth	McClure		
Bradley	Long	Cohen		Denton	Murkowski		
Bumpers	Matsunaga	Domenici		Dole	Nickles		
Burdick	Melcher	Evans		Durenberger	Quayle		
Byrd	Metzenbaum	Hatfield		East	Roth		
Chiles	Mitchell	Hawkins		Garn	Rudman		
Cranston	Moynihan	Heinz		Goldwater	Simpson		
DeConcini	Nunn	Kassebaum		Gorton	Specter		
Dixon	Pell	Mathias		Grassley	Stafford		
Dodd	Pryor	Packwood		Hatch	Stevens		
Eagleton	Randolph	Percy		Hecht	Symms		
Ford	Riegle	Pressler		Helms	Thurmond		
Hart	Sarbanes	Trible		Humphrey	Tower		
Heflin	Sasser	Warner		Jepsen	Wallop		
Huddleston	Stennis	Weicker		Kasten	Wilson		
Inouye	Tsongas						
Johnston							

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—91%
Republicans—67%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (57)
Democrats—39 or 68%
Republicans—18 or 32%

* Against (40)
Democrats—4 or 10%
Republicans—36 or 90%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 225

98th Congress
2nd Session

August 9, 1984, 3:05 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-10211

NOMINATION OF JAMES HARVIE WILKINSON, III (CLOTURE)

POSITION: U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

SUBJECT: Baker, et al, second motion to close further debate on the nomination of James Harvie Wilkinson III, of Virginia, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (See also Vote No. 208.)

NOTE: Proponents of the cloture motion contended that the latest hearing disclosed no new derogatory information concerning Mr. Wilkinson. Members of the American Bar Association nominating committee present at the hearing indicated that their votes were not influenced by Mr. Wilkinson's lobbying nor would they change their votes in light of the facts discovered about his lobbying. Mr. Wilkinson's professional reputation was at stake, they contended, and he, therefore, had a right to tender evidence in his own behalf. They recommended that in the future there should be specific procedures for disseminating all information available to any member to all members of the committee.

Opponents of the cloture motion noted that at the hearing confirmed allegations that Mr. Wilkinson used confidential information about the ABA investigation of his qualifications to launch an extensive telephone lobbying campaign in his own support. Notwithstanding the strong disapproval of the ABA committee for this lobbying, Mr. Wilkinson announced that he would do the same thing again. Opponents pointed out that it was not until Mr. Wilkinson discovered that his confirmation was in trouble that he began lobbying. Instead, he should have previously requested that certain individuals be contacted as part of the normal ABA investigation. The ABA used a double standard to the benefit of Mr. Wilkinson by rating him as qualified while equally qualified women and minority candidates have been rejected as unqualified. Several ABA committee members excused Mr. Wilkinson's actions as "youthful indiscretion," but a nominee in need of further experience and maturity should not be hastily confirmed for a position of life tenure. The important issue is not whether any ABA votes were changed by the lobbying efforts but that Mr. Wilkinson tried hard to change them.

Vote Nos. 110, 208, 225, 226.

RESULT: CLOTURE MOTION AGREED TO, 3/5THS HAVING VOTED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE
ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (65)			NAYS (32)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (11 or 26%)	Republicans (54 or 98%)		Democrats (31 or 74%)	Republicans (1 or 2%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (0)
Baucus	Abdnor	Jepsen	Biden	Kennedy	Packwood	Bentsen ⁻²	
Boren	Andrews	Kassebaum	Bingaman	Lautenberg		Heflin ⁻²	
Chiles	Armstrong	Kasten	Bradley	Leahy		Pryor ⁻²	
DeConcini	Baker	Laxalt	Bumpers	Levin			
Dixon	Boschwitz	Lugar	Burdick	Matsunaga			
Exon	Chafee	Mathias	Byrd	Melcher			
Long	Cochran	Mattingly	Cranston	Metzenbaum			
Pell	Cohen	McClure	Dodd	Mitchell			
Randolph	D'Amato	Murkowski	Eagleton	Moynihan			
Stennis	Danforth	Nickles	Ford	Nunn			
Zorinsky	Denton	Percy	Glenn	Proxmire			
	Dole	Pressler	Hart	Riegle			
	Domenici	Quayle	Hollings	Sarbanes			
	Durenberger	Roth	Huddleston	Sasser			
	East	Rudman	Inouye	Tsongas			
	Evans	Simpson	Johnston				
	Garn	Specter					
	Goldwater	Stafford					
	Gorton	Stevens					
	Grassley	Symms					
	Hatch	Thurmond					
	Hatfield	Tower					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Weicker					
	Humphrey	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—74%
Republicans—98%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (65)
Democrats—11 or 17%
Republicans—54 or 83%

Against (32)
Democrats—31 or 97%
Republicans—1 or 3%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 226

98th Congress
2nd Session

August 9, 1984, 3:35 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-10211

NOMINATION OF JAMES HARVIE WILKINSON, III

POSITION: U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

SUBJECT: Confirmation of the nomination of James Harvie Wilkinson III, of Virginia, to be U.S. Circuit Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

NOTE: Mr. Wilkinson's nomination was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee by a vote of 11-5 after two days of hearings. A subsequent hearing was held to address concerns over the nominee's judicial inexperience and his lobbying of the American Bar Association investigation committee. He currently serves as an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School. He has clerked in the Supreme Court for Justice Powell, served briefly as a deputy attorney general in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department during the Reagan Administration, and was a newspaper editor for the Norfolk Virginian Pilot newspaper for 3 years after his admission to the bar.

Opposition to Mr. Wilkinson's appointment to this life-tenured position centered on his lack of experience as a lawyer and his telephone lobbying of members of the ABA nominating committee when he was given confidential information that the committee might find him unqualified. For further arguments, see Vote Nos. 110, 208, and 225.

Vote Nos. 110, 208, 225, 226.

RESULT: NOMINATION CONFIRMED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (58)			NAYS (39)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (8 or 19%)	Republicans (50 or 91%)		Democrats (34 or 81%)	Republicans (5 or 9%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (0)
Baucus	Abdnor	Humphrey	Biden	Kennedy	Hatfield	Bentsen ⁻²	
Boren	Andrews	Jepsen	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Mathias	Heflin ⁻²	
DeConcini	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Bradley	Leahy	Packwood	Pryor ⁻²	
Dixon	Baker	Kasten	Bumpers	Levin	Rudman		
Exon	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Burdick	Matsunaga	Stevens		
Long	Chafee	Lugar	Byrd	Melcher			
Stennis	Cochran	Mattingly	Chiles	Metzenbaum			
Zorinsky	Cohen	McClure	Cranston	Mitchell			
	D'Amato	Murkowski	Dodd	Moynihan			
	Danforth	Nickles	Eagleton	Nunn			
	Denton	Percy	Ford	Pell			
	Dole	Pressler	Glenn	Proxmire			
	Domenici	Quayle	Hart	Randolph			
	Durenberger	Roth	Hollings	Riegle			
	East	Simpson	Huddleston	Sarbanes			
	Evans	Specter	Inouye	Sasser			
	Garn	Stafford	Johnston	Tsongas			
	Goldwater	Symms					
	Gorton	Thurmond					
	Grassley	Tower					
	Hatch	Tribble					
	Hawkins	Wallop					
	Hecht	Warner					
	Heinz	Weicker					
	Helms	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—81%
Republicans—91%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (58)
Democrats—8 or 14%
Republicans—50 or 86%

* Against (39)
Democrats—34 or 87%
Republicans—5 or 13%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 230

98th Congress
2nd Session

August 10, 1984, 1:51 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-10442

AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.R. 5743

AMENDMENT NO.: 3695

SUBJECT: Cochran motion to table the Bumpers, et al, amendment expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should submit a report to Congress by October 2, 1984, on (1) specific changes in fiscal and agricultural policy that the Administration will take to increase farm income, expand farm exports, lower interest rates, assure an adequate flow of credit, and otherwise ameliorate the severe impacts on the family farmer which its fiscal policy has created, and (2) contemplated changes in farm commodity and credit programs, their effect on net farm income, exports, availability of credit and other indicators of the economic condition of family farms, and the effect of such changes on the Federal budget.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment pointed out that almost every measure used in determining the plight of the American farmer has deteriorated in the past 4 years. High interest rates have led to an overvaluation of the dollar, causing an \$8 billion loss in exports since 1981; commodity prices have declined—in some cases they are less than the cost of production; farm income has dropped 25 percent since 1979 while inflation has gone up by 25-30 percent during that period; interest rates on agricultural loans remain at excessively high levels; real estate values are declining and thus destroying the ability of farmers to secure credit; and foreclosures and forced sales of farms have tripled since 1980. Last year, 27 percent of all Farmers Home borrowers were delinquent and 2-1/2 times the normal number of farmers have gone out of business. In 1983, less than half of the \$425 million promised by the President was provided for direct export credits and promotion. Any sustained economic recovery will depend on the health of our agricultural industry, and Congress and the American farmer deserve to know if the President's reluctance to use available authority will continue or worsen. The President needs to tell Congress if he is planning, as OMB Director David Stockman has stated, to cut Federal funding for farm programs. The time is now to chart the policy—not after the Presidential election.

(OVER)

H.R. 5743: Vote Nos. 211, 213, 214, 227-231.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (46)		NAYS (34)		NOT VOTING (20)	
Democrats (0 or 0%)	Republicans (46 or 100%)	Democrats (34 or 100%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (11)	Republicans (9)
Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Huddleston	Bentsen ⁻²	Armstrong ⁻²
Andrews	Jepsen	Biden	Inouye	Cranston ⁻²	Cohen ⁻²
Baker	Kassebaum	Bingaman	Leahy	Ford ⁻²	Heinz ^{-2AY}
Boschwitz	Kasten	Boren	Levin	Hart ⁻²	Laxalt ⁻²
Chafee	Lugar	Bradley	Long	Johnston ⁻²	Simpson ⁻²
Cochran	Mathias	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Kennedy ⁻²	Stafford ⁻²
D'Amato	Mattingly	Burdick	Metzenbaum	Lautenberg ⁻²	Tower ⁻²
Danforth	McClure	Byrd	Mitchell	Melcher ^{-2AN}	Wallop ⁻²
Denton	Murkowski	Chiles	Nunn	Moynihan ^{-2AN}	Weicker ⁻²
Dole	Nickles	DeConcini	Pell	Pryor ⁻²	
Domenici	Packwood	Dixon	Proxmire	Stennis ⁻²	
Durenberger	Percy	Dodd	Randolph		
East	Pressler	Eagleton	Riegle		
Evans	Quayle	Exon	Sarbanes		
Garn	Roth	Glenn	Sasser		
Goldwater	Rudman	Heflin	Tsongas		
Gorton	Specter	Hollings	Zorinsky		
Grassley	Stevens				
Hatch	Symms				
Hatfield	Thurmond				
Hawkins	Trible				
Hecht	Warner				
Helms	Wilson				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—100%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (46)
Democrats—0 or 0%
Republicans—46 or 100%

Against (34)
Democrats—34 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%

Opponents of the amendment noted that the Administration has aided farmers by lowering interest rates, lifting the grain embargo, and reducing inflation. This amendment would not do anything to help solve the average farmer's problems and is totally unnecessary. The Secretary of Agriculture already submits an annual report to Congress on the state of agriculture and the farm economy and holds an annual outlook conference to discuss every aspect of agriculture. The Joint Economic Committee also reports annually on the status of the agricultural economy, and the Committee on Agriculture is currently conducting hearings to get recommendations for the next farm bill.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 253

98th Congress
2nd Session

September 27, 1984, 5:59 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12166

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 5508

SUBJECT: Byrd question of germaneness of the Byrd, et al, amendment (as a substitute for the first committee amendment) adding the Civil Rights Act of 1984 (Grove City) to the bill. The question is: "Is the amendment germane to the bill?" (See also Vote Nos. 255-262).

NOTE: Proponents of germaneness contended that the House had already opened the door to amendments by attaching its crime package to this bill, and the Senate should not deprive itself, except by supermajority, of an opportunity to offer its own amendments to be negotiated in conference with the House. This amendment is germane, in fact, since the continuing resolution is an appropriation of billions of dollars in Federal spending and this amendment would restore the law that governed every Federal expenditure for 20 years. The Supreme Court in Grove City v. Bell violated principles of judicial restraint and statutory construction by narrowing the construction of Title IX of the Education Amendments. The other key civil rights statutes are subject to the new interpretation because their language is virtually identical to the Education Amendments. This legislation to restore the vitality of those civil rights laws, which has not been scheduled for consideration in the last few days of the session, cannot wait. Support for this legislation is bipartisan, proponents noted, and the substitute has been modified to specify that no new coverage of previously unaffected institutions is provided in the legislation.

Opponents of germaneness contended that the continuing resolution, which includes \$472 billion for vital programs to keep the government functioning, is not the place to load unfinished legislation. It would open the floodgates for countless amendments. Noting the poor procedures followed for the passage of the measure in the House, they stressed that any legislation which possibly injects the Federal government into State, local, and private affairs, should be considered under the proper procedures. Since there were differing interpretations prior to the decision of the Court, the bill is unclear in its attempt to reinstate pre-Grove City interpretations, and such ambiguities should be examined more fully and discussed in the committee process.

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: AMENDMENT GERMANE

YEAS (51)			NAYS (48)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (39 or 87%)	Republicans (12 or 22%)		Democrats (6 or 13%)	Republicans (42 or 78%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Baucus	Inouye	Andrews	Boren	Abdnor	Kassebaum		
Bentsen	Johnston	Boschwitz	Heflin	Armstrong	Kasten		
Biden	Kennedy	Chafee	Long	Baker	Laxalt		
Bingaman	Lautenberg	Cohen	Nunn	Cochran	Lugar		
Bradley	Leahy	D'Amato	Stennis	Danforth	Mattingly		
Bumpers	Levin	Durenberger	Zorinsky	Denton	McClure		
Burdick	Matsunaga	Heinz		Dole	Murkowski		
Byrd	Melcher	Mathias		Domenici	Nickles		
Chiles	Metzenbaum	Packwood		East	Pressler		
Cranston	Mitchell	Specter		Evans	Quayle		
DeConcini	Moynihan	Stafford		Garn	Roth		
Dixon	Pell	Weicker		Goldwater	Rudman		
Dodd	Proxmire			Gorton	Simpson		
Eagleton	Pryor			Grassley	Stevens		
Exon	Randolph			Hatch	Symms		
Ford	Riegle			Hatfield	Thurmond		
Glenn	Sarbanes			Hawkins	Tower		
Hart	Sasser			Hecht	Trible		
Hollings	Tsongas			Helms	Wallop		
Huddleston				Humphrey	Warner		
				Jepsen	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—87%
Republicans—78%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—39 or 76%
Republicans—12 or 24%

Against (48)
Democrats—6 or 13%
Republicans—42 or 87%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 262

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 2, 1984, 8:59 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12643

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 5508

SUBJECT: Packwood motion to table the Byrd, et al, amendment (as a substitute for the first committee amendment) adding the Civil Rights Act of 1984 (Grove City) to the bill. (See also Vote Nos. 253 and 255-260).

NOTE: After this amendment was tabled, the Baker-Hatch gun control amendment (and the Hatch busing amendment thereto) was tabled by voice vote. The first committee amendment (striking the words "Title I") was then adopted without amendment by voice vote.

Proponents of the amendment contended that the Supreme Court in *Grove City v. Bell* violated principles of judicial restraint and statutory construction by narrowing the construction of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The other key civil rights statutes—Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, and the 1975 Age Discrimination Act—are subject to the new interpretation because their language is virtually identical to that in the Education Amendments. This bill to restore the vitality of the civil rights laws, which has not been scheduled for the last few days of the session, cannot wait. Support for this legislation is bipartisan, they noted, and the bill has been modified in the substitute to specify that no new coverage of previously unaffected institutions is provided in the legislation. Opponents rejected a compromise reversing *Grove City* in cases of discrimination in educational institutions only in favor of the principle that the original intent was to prevent discrimination in all Federally assisted programs, educational and non-educational.

Opponents of the amendment maintained that poor procedures were followed for the passage of the measure in the House and stressed that any legislation which possibly injects the Federal government into State, local, and private affairs should be considered under the proper procedures. Since there were differing interpretations prior to the decision of the Court, the bill is unclear in its attempt to reinstate pre-*Grove City* interpretations, and such ambiguities should be examined more fully and discussed in the committee process. The legislation, they maintained, would expand application of the antidiscrimination statutes to affect entities beyond the original Congressional intent. They noted the differences of opinion among supporters in the House when questioned about possible applications of the legislation.

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (53)			NAYS (45)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (2 or 5%)	Republicans (51 or 93%)		Democrats (41 or 95%)	Republicans (4 or 7%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (0)
Exon	Abdnor	Jepsen	Baucus	Johnston	Cohen	Glenn—2	
Zorinsky	Andrews	Kassebaum	Bentsen	Kennedy	Percy	Stennis—2	
	Armstrong	Kasten	Biden	Lautenberg	Specter		
	Baker	Laxalt	Bingaman	Leahy	Weiacker		
	Boschwitz	Lugar	Boren	Levin			
	Chafee	Mathias	Bradley	Long			
	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Matsunaga			
	D'Amato	McClure	Burdick	Melcher			
	Danforth	Murkowski	Byrd	Metzenbaum			
	Denton	Nickles	Chiles	Mitchell			
	Dole	Packwood	Cranston	Moynihan			
	Domenici	Pressler	DeConcini	Nunn			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Dixon	Pell			
	East	Roth	Dodd	Proxmire			
	Evans	Rudman	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Garn	Simpson	Ford	Randolph			
	Goldwater	Stafford	Hart	Riegle			
	Gorton	Stevens	Heflin	Sarbanes			
	Grassley	Symms	Hollings	Sasser			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Huddleston	Tsongas			
	Hatfield	Tower	Inouye				
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Walllop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—95%
Republicans—93%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (53)
Democrats—2 or 4%
Republicans—51 or 96%

Against (45)
Democrats—41 or 91%
Republicans—4 or 9%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 264

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 2, 1984, 10:53 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12658

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 6930

SUBJECT: Bradley question of germaneness of the Bradley-Lautenberg amendment authorizing an additional \$6 billion over 5 years for the environmental Superfund. The question is: "Is it the judgment of the Senate that the amendment is germane to the bill?"

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it would improve and expand the Federal government's efforts to clean up hazardous waste sites and protect the public health and environment from these dangerous substances. With a Superfund appropriation of \$410 million in FY 1984, only 6 priority sites were cleaned up and 128 new feasibility and design studies begun. The EPA has estimated that it will take between \$8 billion and \$16 billion to clean up the 2,200 sites it expects to list soon, excluding costs for health studies, natural resource damage claims, cleaning up groundwater contamination, and replacing contaminated household water as provided for in the Committee bill. All but \$20 million in available funding will have been appropriated by the end of FY 1985. Reauthorization is necessary now to ensure that the EPA and the States will have adequate time, funding, and direction in order to be able to pursue efficiently the awesome and urgent cleanup task ahead. It is among the Federal government's first responsibilities to protect the health of its citizens. Americans who live in constant danger from being exposed to contaminated water, soil, and air from abandoned waste sites deserve to have the Superfund program fully implemented as quickly and effectively as possible.

Opponents of the amendment declared that it would be irresponsible to take \$3 billion out of the general revenues for the Superfund program, thereby adding that amount to the Federal deficit, and not seek to make the perpetrators of these problems pay for the cleanup. Superfund is a \$300 million per year program which is working well. Both the EPA and OTA have testified, however, that the maximum amount of money which they could spend efficiently for cleanup would be \$1 billion annually. This funding is not urgently needed, and this amendment should not be adopted since it might endanger the passage of the continuing appropriations resolution. Congress also must be careful, they warned, not to "run the chemical industry off the shores" of the U.S. by overtaxing the industry.

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: AMENDMENT NOT GERMANE

YEAS (38)			NAYS (59)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (30 or 70%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)		Democrats (13 or 30%)	Republicans (46 or 85%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (1)
Baucus	Inouye	Boschwitz	Bentsen	Abdnor	Laxalt	Glenn ⁻²	East ⁻²
Biden	Kennedy	Chafee	Boren	Andrews	Lugar	Stennis ⁻²	
Bingaman	Lautenberg	Cohen	DeConcini	Armstrong	Mathias		
Bradley	Leahy	Hawkins	Exon	Baker	Mattlingly		
Bumpers	Levin	Humphrey	Heflin	Cochran	McClure		
Burdick	Meicher	Kasten	Johnston	D'Amato	Murkowski		
Byrd	Metzenbaum	Percy	Long	Danforth	Nickles		
Chiles	Mitchell	Rudman	Matsunaga	Denton	Packwood		
Cranston	Moynihan		Nunn	Dole	Pressler		
Dixon	Pell		Proxmire	Domenici	Quayle		
Dodd	Riegle		Pryor	Durenberger	Roth		
Eagleton	Sarbanes		Randolph	Evans	Simpson		
Ford	Sasser		Zorinsky	Garn	Specter		
Hart	Tsongas			Goldwater	Stafford		
Hollings				Gorton	Stevens		
Huddleston				Grassley	Symms		
				Hatch	Thurmond		
				Hatfield	Tower		
				Hecht	Trible		
				Heinz	Wallop		
				Helms	Warner		
				Jepsen	Weicker		
				Kassebaum	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yeas
- AN—Announced Nays
- PY—Paired Yeas
- PN—Paired Nays

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—70%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (38)
Democrats—30 or 79%
Republicans—8 or 21%

Against (59)
Democrats—13 or 22%
Republicans—46 or 78%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 265

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 2, 1984, 11:58 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12678

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 6936

SUBJECT: Bumpers question of germaneness of the Bumpers amendment which would require the Secretary of the Interior to use competitive bidding to lease any onshore lands for oil and gas development. The question is: "Is it the judgment of the Senate that the amendment is germane to the bill?"

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that an all competitive system for onshore Federal land leases would assure a fair return to the Federal government, promote the orderly development of the Nation's natural resources, and eliminate the fraudulent practices and abuses that exist under the present lottery system. It is scandalous that 97 percent of Federal lands are being leased for \$1 an acre by a lottery system which violates Federal gaming laws. In Amos Draw, Wyoming, the BLM leased 18 tracts totalling 22,000 acres and surrounded by 500 producing gas wells for \$1 an acre. Twelve of these tract leases were resold by the lottery winners for \$50 million to \$100 million. This outrageous system of leasing Federal lands, which CBO estimates will cost the Federal Treasury \$1.2 billion over the next 5 years, should not be tolerated. Both OMB and the CBO have concluded that a competitive system would increase leasing revenues substantially and eliminate many of the fraudulent practices induced by the present system. The present system has led to the entry of dead or fictitious peoples' names and the development of a nationwide industry devoted to deceiving and defrauding the public by charging exorbitant fees to enter them in the lottery. Secretary Clark has hiked the entry fee to \$75 and recently required applicants also to prepay one year's rent in an effort to combat such practices. These actions will only further reduce Federal revenues by discouraging the number of lottery entries, even though OMB has stated that a competitive leasing system would be far less vulnerable to fraud and abuse. The opponents' claim that independent oil and gas companies will not be able to compete effectively in a competitive system is unfounded. Independents are competing quite well in State competitive bidding systems and of the 3 percent of Federal lands competitively leased, independents won 82 percent of the bids.

(OVER)

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: AMENDMENT NOT GERMANE

YEAS (33)			NAYS (63)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (28 or 67%)		Republicans (5 or 9%)	Democrats (14 or 33%)		Republicans (49 or 91%)	Democrats (3)	Republicans (1)
Biden	Kennedy	Chafee	Feucus	Abdnor	Laxalt	Glenn—2	East—2
Bradley	Lautenberg	Cohen	Beutson	Andrews	Lugar	Matsunaga—2	
Bumpers	Leahy	Durenberger	Bingaman	Armstrong	Mathias	Stennis—2	
Byrd	Levin	Humphrey	Boren	Baker	Mattingly		
Chiles	Metzenbaum	Packwood	Burdick	Boschwitz	McClure		
DeConcini	Mitchell		Cranston	Cochran	Murkowski		
Dixon	Moynihan		Exon	D'Amato	Nickles		
Dodd	Pell		Hart	Danforth	Percy		
Eagleton	Proxmire		Johnston	Denton	Pressler		
Ford	Pryor		Long	Dol	Quayle		
Heflin	Riegle		Melcher	Domenici	Roth		
Hollings	Sarbanes		Nunn	Evans	Rudman		
Huddleston	Sasser		Randolph	Garn	Simpson		
Inouye	Tsongas		Zorinsky	Goldwater	Specter		
				Gorton	Stafford		
				Grassley	Stevens		
				Hatch	Symms		
				Hatfield	Thurmond		
				Hawkins	Tower		
				Hecht	Trible		
				Heinz	Wallop		
				Helms	Warner		
				Jepson	Weicker		
				Kassebaum	Wilson		
				Kasten			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—67%
Republicans—91%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (33)
Democrats—28 or 85%
Republicans—5 or 15%

Against (63)
Democrats—14 or 22%
Republicans—49 or 78%

Opponents of the amendment stated that it would adversely affect domestic energy production, thereby increasing our independence on foreign energy; create an unmanageable new leasing system which would favor major energy production companies at the expense of independent producers; and reduce Federal income from leasing and production. It also ignores the major reforms implemented by the Administration to curtail fraudulent operations and improve the leasing program. Secretary Clark has instituted lottery reforms; the BLM has returned to using geologic data in delineating all known geologic structures (KGS) and ceased its occasional reliance solely on well-spacing criteria in making such determinations as in the Amos Draw incident; and the relevant Federal agencies are jointly investigating the lottery filing services and working to combat fraud within the system. Even if a completely competitive system were instituted, unsophisticated investors could still be exploited. While all competitive leasing would increase up-front revenues, it would ultimately decrease the greater revenues from oil and gas production. Independent producers, who have been responsible for 80 to 90 percent of the significant oil and gas discoveries on Federal lands, cannot possibly compete with the billion dollar treasuries of the large oil and gas corporations. Furthermore, the vast majority of Federal lands have little potential for oil and gas development. If competitively leased, these tracts probably would not be bid upon at all, thereby measurably reducing annual leasing revenues. Non-competitive leasing of Federal lands earned about \$90 million in 1983, but an all-competitive system could produce an annual net loss of \$40 million, according to the Interior Department. This estimate is supported by an examination of the Wyoming leasing program where average payments on a per-tract basis have fallen from \$36 to \$28 per acre. Completely abandoning non-competitive leasing, therefore, would only cause the Federal government to lose millions in leasing funds and income from oil and gas production and force Federal agencies to contend with the higher administrative costs of competitive leasing. Congress should not make such a major shift in national energy policy until the Administration's program reforms have had a chance to work, and the GAO report on the onshore leasing program has been completed early in 1985.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 266

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 3, 1984, 2:16 a.m.
Session of October 2, 1984
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12733

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO. H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 6977

SUBJECT: Kasten motion to table the Melcher-Baucus, et al, amendment providing that not less than 5 percent (about \$144 million) of the Economic Support Fund (ESF) shall be used only for primary health care services and basic health education (such as oral hydration and immunization) with not more than one-third of the amount to be used in any one country (does not affect a \$1.2 billion earmark for Israel).

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment declared that providing primary health care assistance was a vital part of U.S. foreign policy efforts which deserves to be funded. This proposal has widespread bipartisan support, has been overwhelmingly endorsed by private and voluntary international development organizations, would not require the appropriation of new monies, and is already included in the House continuing resolution. With no prospect of passing a foreign assistance authorization bill during this session or of expanding health care programs under the development assistance account, this earmark would provide an excellent opportunity to combat immediately the crisis situation in which 40,000 children are dying every day from malnutrition and disease.
No opposing statements were made

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (51)		NAYS (46)		NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (0 or 0%)	Republicans (51 or 94%)	Democrats (43 or 100%)	Republicans (3 or 6%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (1)
Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Inouye	Long ⁻²	East ⁻²
Armstrong	Laxalt	Bentsen	Johnston	Stennis ⁻²	
Baker	Lugar	Biden	Kennedy		
Boschwitz	Mathias	Bingaman	Lautenberg		
Chafee	Mattingly	Boren	Leahy		
Cochran	McClure	Bradley	Levin		
D'Amato	Murkowski	Bumpers	Matsunaga		
Danforth	Nickles	Burdick	Melcher		
Denton	Packwood	Byrd	Metzenbaum		
Dole	Percy	Chiles	Mitchell		
Domenici	Quayle	Cranston	Moynihan		
Durenberger	Roth	DeConcini	Nunn		
Evans	Rudman	Dixon	Pell		
Garn	Simpson	Dodd	Proxmire		
Goldwater	Specter	Eagleton	Pryor		
Gorton	Stafford	Exon	Randolph		
Grassley	Stevens	Ford	Riegle		
Hatch	Symms	Glenn	Sarbanes		
Hatfield	Thurmond	Hart	Sasser		
Hawkins	Tower	Heflin	Tsongas		
Hecht	Trible	Hollings	Zorinsky		
Heinz	Wallop	Huddleston			
Helms	Warner				
Humphrey	Weicker				
Jepsen	Wilson				
Kassebaum					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—100%
Republicans—94%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—0 or 0%
Republicans—51 or 100%

Against (46)
Democrats—43 or 93%
Republicans—3 or 7%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 267

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 3, 1984, 12:24 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12828

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 6981

SUBJECT: Kasten motion to table the Zorinsky, et al, amendment prohibiting the use of funds appropriated under this resolution to pay the U.S. share of capital stock (\$51 million) of the Inter-American Investment Corporation (Caribbean Bank), and deleting the \$13 million earmarked in the bill as the first U.S. installment to the Bank's \$200 million startup capital.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment argued that funding the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) under this Continuing Resolution would be a usurpation of the authorizing committee's jurisdiction. While the IIC's goals are worthy, the Foreign Relations Committee has held no formal hearings on this proposal, deferring action on the IIC until early next session. Beyond general concepts, there has been no opportunity to examine how the IIC actually will work and what sort of a bureaucracy will be created. Further, the U.S. is already a member of the International Finance Corporation and the Inter-American Development Bank, both designed to do basically the same thing in the same part of the world as the IIC. To join another multilateral development bank (MBD) when we are facing the biggest budget deficits in history and when other MBD commitments are not fully funded would be nothing more than an abuse and misuse of the American taxpayer's dollar.

Opponents of the amendment pointed out that there are other items in the Foreign Aid Chapter that are not authorized, including the U.S. contribution to the International Development Association. Rather than being a new bureaucracy, the IIC is a new window of the Inter-American Development Bank and has 25 countries participating. Its objective is more narrowly defined than the other MDB's and is aimed strictly at private sector development in Latin America. Opponents asserted that when the Foreign Relations Committee received testimony from the Secretary of the Treasury on the IIC, only one Committee member was present. The Appropriations Committee held in-depth hearings and included this language when it became clear that the authorizing legislation would not move forward.

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (50)			NAYS (49)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (4 or 9%)	Republicans (46 or 85%)		Democrats (41 or 91%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Johnston	Cohen		Percy-2
Inouye	Andrews	Kasten	Biden	Kennedy	Denton		
Moyনিহান	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bingaman	Lautenberg	East		
Stennis	Baker	Lugar	Boren	Leahy	Hatch		
	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bradley	Levin	Helms		
	Chafee	Mattingly	Bumpers	Long	Nickles		
	Cochran	McClure	Burdick	Matsunaga	Pressler		
	D'Amato	Murkowski	Byrd	Meicher	Roth		
	Danforth	Packwood	Chiles	Metzenbaum			
	Dole	Quayle	Cranston	Mitchell			
	Domenici	Rudman	DeConcini	Nunn			
	Durenberger	Simpson	Dixon	Pell			
	Evans	Specter	Dodd	Proxmire			
	Garn	Stafford	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Goldwater	Stevens	Exon	Randolph			
	Gorton	Symms	Ford	Riegle			
	Grassley	Thurmond	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Hatfield	Tower	Hart	Sasser			
	Hawkins	Trible	Heflin	Tsongas			
	Hecht	Wallop	Hollings	Zorinsky			
	Heinz	Warner	Huddleston				
	Humphrey	Weicker					
	Jepsen	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yes
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—91%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (50)
Democrats—4 or 8%
Republicans—46 or 92%

Against (49)
Democrats—41 or 84%
Republicans—8 or 16%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 268

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 3, 1984, 1:38 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12835

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 6986

SUBJECT: Pryor, et al, amendment reducing foreign military assistance appropriations for non-Central American countries by \$211.5 million, from \$695 million to \$483.5 million, the level contained in the House-passed bill—a \$61 million increase over the FY 1984 level of funding for the program. (This amendment would not affect Egypt-Israel or the Camp David Accords which receive their funding from the Foreign Military Sales Program).

NOTE: Proponents pointed out that the military assistance program (MAP) is the fastest growing program in the Federal budget. The Committee-approved funding level would represent an increase in the overall military grant program of 600 percent since the Reagan Administration took office in 1981. During this same period, domestic programs were cut or increased by small percentage points—the Department of Transportation increased by 0.6 to 1 percent, the Department of Health and Human Services by 9 percent, and the Department of Education by 2 percent. These restraints were necessary, we told our hungry, homeless, unemployed, and young people who wish to get a college education, because of the enormous budget deficits. Congress must be serious about cutting deficits throughout the budget—not just for domestic programs. According to the State Department, only \$95 million of the MAP program is tied to military base rights agreements directly affecting U.S. security interests. The Bread for the World and National Taxpayers Union, they noted, have identified the MAP program as one of the growth programs that Congress needs to cut before considering additional tax increases. Opponents maintained that this is not the time or the place to start cutting military appropriations to countries, many of whom come under Soviet domination or Cuban influence at the present time. The MAP increases are in almost every case tied to arrangements which directly relate to U.S. security interests; therefore, if the amendment is adopted, U.S. security interests would be cut, not foreign aid. Further, the combined increase of all three of the military assistance programs funded in this legislation is approximately \$70 million. The increase in the MAP program is less than 1/50th of 1 percent of the entire Federal budget and opponents contended, would not make a dent in terms of restoring some of the cuts made in other vitally important social programs.

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (46)			NAYS (54)			NOT VOTING (0)		
Democrats (35 or 78%)		Republicans (11 or 24%)	Democrats (10 or 22%)		Republicans (44 or 80%)			
Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Chiles	Abdnor	Kasten			
Bentsen	Lautenberg	Cohen	Dodd	Armstrong	Laxalt			
Biden	Leahy	Grassley	Heflin	Baker	Lugar			
Bingaman	Levin	Hatfield	Huddleston	Boschwitz	Mattingly			
Boren	Matsunaga	Humphrey	Inouye	Chafee	McClure			
Bradley	Meicher	Jepsen	Johnston	Cochran	Murkowski			
Bumpers	Metzenbaum	Kassebaum	Long	D'Amato	Packwood			
Burdick	Mitchell	Mathias	Moynihan	Danforth	Percy			
Byrd	Pell	Nickles	Nunn	Denton	Quayle			
Cranston	Proxmire	Pressler	Stennis	Dole	Roth			
DeConcini	Pryor	Weicker		Domenici	Rudman			
Dixon	Randolph			Durenberger	Simpson			
Eagleton	Riegle			East	Specter			
Exon	Sarbanes			Evans	Stafford			
Ford	Sasser			Garn	Stevens			
Glenn	Tsongas			Goldwater	Symms			
Hart	Zorinsky			Gorton	Thurmond			
Hollings				Hatch	Tower			
				Hawkins	Trible			
				Hecht	Wallop			
				Heinz	Warner			
				Helms	Wilson			

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—78%
Republicans—80%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (46)
Democrats—35 or 76%
Republicans—11 or 24%

Against (54)
Democrats—10 or 19%
Republicans—44 or 81%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 269

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 3, 1984, 6:01 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12879

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 6993

SUBJECT: Inouye modified amendment prohibiting the use of any intelligence funds to support, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual except: (1) \$2 million solely for the safe and expeditious withdrawal from Nicaragua of any individual engaged in military or paramilitary operations in that nation, and (2) \$4 million solely for humanitarian support outside Nicaragua for individuals and their families who have been engaged in paramilitary operations in Nicaragua and who are not equipped for military or paramilitary operations while outside Nicaragua. (See also Vote Nos. 141 and 271.)

NOTE: Proponents noted that the arguments outlined in June against covert aid during debate on a similar amendment remain true. Our support for the contra paramilitary operations is no longer secret; it has become increasingly difficult to control contra activities of which we disapprove; the operation has gone beyond its initial justification of interdicting arms shipments; and these Nicaragua operations are strongly eroding the credibility of the CIA and have become a tragic distraction from our role regarding the human suffering that continues in Central America. There are many troubled areas in the world, and Nicaragua should not be singled out for our overpowering opposition. Our involvement in overturning an indigenous government with whom we have diplomatic relations is counter productive and is wrong under international law. By mining harbors in Nicaragua, we have been dragged into the World Court by a Communist government and enjoined from further conduct by the Court. We must not contribute to terrorist activities but seek to make the Contadora process work without further bloodshed.

Opponents contended that the pressure should continue on the Sandinistas since more and more of the people of Nicaragua oppose the Sandinista regime and support the contras who seek a democratic government. This is the worst time to abandon their revolution. It could be disastrous to El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. The U.S. must exert strenuous effort for a peaceful solution, and the U.S. must not withdraw totally as provided by the amendment, from even indirect paramilitary operations as long as military support is going to the rebels in El Salvador via Nicaragua. The U.S. must maintain intelligence operations in the area in order to have some capacity for arms interdiction.

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (42)			NAYS (57)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (34 or 77%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)		Democrats (10 or 23%)	Republicans (47 or 85%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (0)
Baucus	Lautenberg	Andrews	Bentsen	Abdnor	Jepsen	Bradley—2	
Biden	Leahy	Cohen	Boren	Armstrong	Kasten		
Bingaman	Levin	Hatfield	Chiles	Baker	Laxalt	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Bumpers	Matsunaga	Kassebaum	Dixon	Boschwitz	Lugar		
Burdick	Melcher	Packwood	Heflin	Chafee	Mathias		
Byrd	Metzenbaum	Pressler	Hollings	Cochran	Mattlingly		
Cranston	Mitchell	Stafford	Johnston	D'Amato	McClure	1—Official Business	
DeConcini	Moynihan	Weicker	Long	Danforth	Murkowski	2—Necessarily Absent	
Dodd	Pell		Nunn	Denton	Nickles	3—Illness	
Eagleton	Proxmire		Stennis	Dole	Perry	4—Other	
Exon	Pryor			Domenici	Quayle	SYMBOLS:	
Ford	Randolph			Durenberger	Roth		
Glenn	Riegle			East	Rudman		
Hart	Sarbanes			Evans	Simpson		
Huddleston	Sasser			Garn	Specter	AY—Announced Yea	
Inouye	Tsongas			Goldwater	Stevens	AN—Announced Nay	
Kennedy	Zorinsky			Gorton	Symms	PY—Paired Yea	
				Grassley	Thurmond	PN—Paired Nay	
				Hatch	Tower		
				Hawkins	Trible		
				Hecht	Wallop		
				Heinz	Warner		
				Helms	Wilson		
				Humphrey			

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—77%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (42)
Democrats—34 or 81%
Republicans—8 or 19%

Against (57)
Democrats—10 or 18%
Republicans—47 or 82%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 271

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 3, 1984, 8:54 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12956

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 6997

SUBJECT: Dodd amendment prohibiting the appropriation of funds for planning or supporting acts of terrorism in, over, or offshore from the territory of Nicaragua; and defining terrorism as an act which (1) would endanger human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within such jurisdiction, and (2) would appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. (See also Vote Nos. 53 and 269.)

NOTE: Proponents stated they felt compelled to offer this amendment to make sure that American tax dollars would not be used to finance the acts of terrorism carried out by the contras in Nicaragua. Noted American journalists and church people have documented the torture and killings of unarmed civilians, the burning of houses, schools, and health centers, as well as the kidnapping of hundreds of people. The contras appear to believe that anyone or anything associated with the Sandinistas is fair game for murder and destruction. The American people do not want to pay for terrorism in Nicaragua. Combatting terrorism has been cited by the Administration as a number one priority and support for these covert activities constitutes an unconscionable and vicious inconsistency in American policy. Opponents found it patently absurd to take a definition of terrorism and try to extend it to the whole concept of covert activity in a guerrilla war. One man's act of patriotism is another man's act of terrorism, they claimed, in guerrilla warfare. Others considered it inappropriate for Congress to prohibit funding for acts of terrorism because such congressional action presumes the likelihood for such expenditures in the absence of a prohibition. Such a prohibition casts an unwarranted aspersion on the executive branch. This amendment would have the same effect as the preceding amendment in blocking funds to aid to contras in bringing about a democratic government.

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (45)			NAYS (53)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (35 or 80%)		Republicans (10 or 19%)	Democrats (9 or 20%)		Republicans (44 or 81%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Boren	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Bradley—2	Percy—2
Bentsen	Lautenberg	Boschwitz	Byrd	Armstrong	Kasten		
Biden	Leahy	Chafee	Heflin	Baker	Laxalt		
Bingaman	Levin	Cohen	Hollings	Cochran	Lugar		
Bumpers	Matsunaga	Hatfield	Johnston	D'Amato	Mathias		
Burdick	Melcher	Heinz	Long	Danforth	Mattingly		
Chiles	Metzenbaum	Packwood	Nunn	Denton	McClure		
Cranston	Mitchell	Pressler	Randolph	Dole	Murkowski		
DeConcini	Moynihan	Stafford	Stennis	Domenici	Nickles		
Dixon	Pell	Weicker		Durenberger	Quayle		
Dodd	Proxmire			East	Roth		
Eagleton	Pryor			Evans	Rudman		
Exon	Riegle			Garn	Simpson		
Ford	Sarbanes			Goldwater	Specter		
Glenn	Sasser			Gorton	Stevens		
Hart	Tsongas			Grassley	Symms		
Huddleston	Zorinsky			Hatch	Thurmond		
Inouye				Hawkins	Tower		
				Hecht	Trible		
				Helms	Wallop		
				Humphrey	Warner		
				Jepsen	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—80%
Republicans—81%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (45)
Democrats—35 or 78%
Republicans—10 or 22%

Against (53)
Democrats—9 or 17%
Republicans—44 or 83%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 273

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 4, 1984, 11:49 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-13003

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 7010

SUBJECT: Baker question of germaneness of the Cranston, et al, amendment prohibiting appropriations for the Office of Personnel Management unless a study on pay equity is reported to Congress by September 1, 1985. The question is: "Is the Cranston amendment germane to the bill?"

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment noted that the House had voted last June by 413 to 6 to require this study and that its importance requires that it be offered as an amendment since the Senate leadership has refused to go to conference on the bill containing this provision. Some suspected that the Administration and others oppose a pay equity study because they fear its result. It may well find that the Federal government is guilty of discrimination. While women constitute 40 percent of the Federal work force, only 3 percent of Federally employed women earn more than \$20,000. Traditional female occupations are not financially remunerative. The job classification system should be examined to determine if the wages paid in job classifications filled predominantly by women are set lower than those classifications filled predominantly by men because of the sex of the employees, rather than because of the relative value of the work performed, or the working conditions. For too long, indispensable occupations traditionally held by women, such as teachers, librarians and nurses, have been severely undervalued and underpaid.

Opponents of the amendment stressed that it was inappropriate to try to attach this amendment to the Continuing Appropriations bill at this late hour in the Congress. Some questioned the accuracy of the premise of comparable worth. Women earn 68 percent on the male dollar but this statistic does not account for variations within occupational classifications nor does it account for the fact that men work longer hours and invest more into training, education, and job searches. This hasty action should not be undertaken on a proposal with unclear long-term ramifications.

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: AMENDMENT NOT GERMANE

YEAS (41)			NAYS (57)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (37 or 82%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)		Democrats (8 or 18%)	Republicans (49 or 92%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Inouye	Andrews	Boren	Abdnor	Kasten		East— ²
Bentsen	Kennedy	Cohen	Heflin	Armstrong	Laxalt		Percy— ²
Biden	Lautenberg	Evans	Hollings	Baker	Lugar		
Bingaman	Leahy	Packwood	Johnston	Boschwitz	Mathias		
Bradley	Levin		Long	Chafee	Mattingly		
Bumpers	Matsunaga		Nunn	Cochran	McClure		
Burdick	Melcher		Stennis	D'Amato	Murkowski		
Byrd	Metzenbaum		Zorinsky	Danforth	Nickles		
Chiles	Mitchell			Denton	Pressler		
Cranston	Moynihan			Dole	Quayle		
DeConcini	Pell			Domenici	Roth		
Dixon	Proxmire			Durenberger	Rudman		
Dodd	Pryor			Garn	Simpson		
Eagleton	Randolph			Goldwater	Specter		
Exon	Riegle			Gorton	Stafford		
Ford	Sarbanes			Grassley	Stevens		
Glenn	Sasser			Hatch	Symms		
Hart	Tsongas			Hatfield	Thurmond		
Huddleston				Hawkins	Tower		
				Hecht	Trible		
				Heinz	Wallop		
				Helms	Warner		
				Humphrey	Weicker		
				Jepsen	Wilson		
				Kassebaum			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—82%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (41)
Democrats—37 or 90%
Republicans—4 or 10%

Against (57)
Democrats—8 or 14%
Republicans—49 or 86%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 275

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 4, 1984, 1:59 a.m.
Session of October 3, 1984
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-13029

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 648

AMENDMENT NO.: 7018

SUBJECT: Rudman motion to table the Biden amendment (to the Rudman amendment appropriating \$110 million for embassy security to be made available only upon enactment of authorizing legislation) prohibiting the appropriation of funds for embassy security until the President certifies to Congress that: (1) the funds provided for U.S. embassy security are sufficient to provide adequate security at an acceptable level of risk, or (2) the funds are insufficient and an acceptable level of security risk could be achieved by such additional funds as the President may specify. (Subsequently, the Senate agreed to the Rudman amendment by voice vote.)

NOTE: Proponents described their amendment as an "accountability amendment" meant to address the President's subtle implication that the latest bombing of the Beirut embassy could have been prevented if Congress had appropriated more money for security or intelligence. It merely states that the \$110 million emergency supplemental funding contained in the Rudman amendment cannot be spent until the President certifies that it is all he needs. It asks for no guarantees that U.S. embassies will be totally safe nor does he have to define his "acceptable level of risk." Congress has always fully funded any appropriation request dealing with embassy security and continues to be willing to appropriate whatever amount is needed. It is not a money problem—over \$6 million is still available from the FY 1984 appropriation. The problem is the refusal of the Department of State's security division to take the necessary steps to improve embassy security for fear of being too "provocative or destabilizing." The President must take responsibility for the matter and focus his attention on providing adequate protection for U.S. embassies.

Opponents of the amendment contended that it demands guarantees in security areas which would be impossible to keep. No matter how much money is appropriated and what security measures are implemented, there always will be a devious terrorist who will be able to break through these barriers. Adoption of the amendment will result in a political and media "lynch party" blaming the President for any security incident because he has certified that the appropriation was sufficient for adequate security.

H.J. Res. 648: Vote Nos. 253-269, 271-281, 287.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (61)			NAYS (37)		NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (8 or 18%)	Republicans (53 or 100%)		Democrats (37 or 82%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Bingaman	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Kennedy		East—2
Boren	Andrews	Kasten	Bentsen	Lautenberg		Percy—2
Byrd	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Leahy		
Dixon	Baker	Lugar	Bradley	Levin		
Exon	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bumpers	Long		
Moynihan	Chafee	Mattingly	Burdick	Matsunaga		
Stennis	Cochran	McClure	Chiles	Melcher		
Zorinsky	Cohen	Murkowski	Cranston	Metzenbaum		
	D'Amato	Nickles	DeConcini	Mitchell		
	Danforth	Packwood	Dodd	Nunn		
	Denton	Pressler	Eagleton	Pell		
	Dole	Quayle	Ford	Proxmire		
	Domenici	Roth	Glenn	Pryor		
	Durenberger	Rudman	Hart	Randolph		
	Evans	Simpson	Heflin	Riegle		
	Garn	Specter	Hollings	Sarbanes		
	Goldwater	Stafford	Huddleston	Sasser		
	Gorton	Stevens	Inouye	Tsongas		
	Grassley	Symms	Johnston			
	Hatch	Thurmond				
	Hatfield	Tower				
	Hawkins	Trible				
	Hecht	Wallop				
	Heinz	Warner				
	Helms	Weicker				
	Humphrey	Wilson				
	Jepson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yes
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yes
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—82%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (61)
Democrats—8 or 13%
Republicans—53 or 87%

Against (37)
Democrats—37 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 292

98th Congress
2nd Session

October 12, 1984, 1:58 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-14582

PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT INCREASE

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 654

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Vote No. 290 by which the Senate defeated the joint resolution increasing the permanent public debt limit by \$251 billion, from \$1.573 trillion to \$1.8328 trillion.

NOTE: H.J. Res. 654 became Public Law 98-475, approved October 12, 1984.

H.J. Res. 654: Vote Nos. 283-286, 289-292.

RESULT: JOINT RESOLUTION PASSED

YEAS (37)		NAYS (30)		NOT VOTING (33)	
Democrats (0 or 0%)	Republicans (37 or 90%)	Democrats (26 or 100%)	Republicans (4 or 10%)	Democrats (19)	Republicans (14)
Abdnor	Lugar	Baucus	Humphrey	Bingaman—2AN	Andrews—2
Baker	Mathias	Bentsen	Kassebaum	Boren—2AN	Armstrong—2
Boschwitz	Murkowski	Biden	Kasten	Bradley—2AN	D'Amato—2
Chafee	Packwood	Burdick	Nickles	Bumpers—2	Goldwater—2
Cochran	Pressler	Byrd		Cranston—2	Grassley—2AN
Cohen	Quayle	Chiles		Dixon—2	Hatfield—2AY
Danforth	Roth	DeConcini		Eagleton—2	Hawkins—2
Denton	Rudman	Dodd		Hart—2	Helms—2AN
Dole	Simpson	Exon		Heflin—2	Jepsen—2
Domenici	Specter	Ford		Hollings—2	Mattingly—2AN
Durenberger	Stafford	Glenn		Huddleston—2	McClure—2
East	Stevens	Inouye		Kennedy—2	Percy—2
Evans	Thurmond	Johnston		Lautenberg—2	Symms—2
Garn	Tower	Leahy		Levin—2	Wallop—2AY
Gorton	Trible	Matsunaga		Long—2	
Hatch	Warner	Melcher		Metzenbaum—2	
Hecht	Weicker	Mitchell		Pryor—2AN	
Heinz	Wilson	Moynihan		Sarbanes—2	
Laxalt		Nunn		Stennis—2	
		Pell			
		Proxmire			
		Randolph			
		Riegle			
		Sasser			
		Tsongas			
		Zorinsky			

GENERAL PAIRS

Bingaman—Bradley
Grassley—Hatfield
Wallop—Helms

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

2—Necessarily Absent

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yes
AN—Announced Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—100%
Republicans—90%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (37)
Democrats—0 or 0%
Republicans—37 or 100%

Against (30)
Democrats—26 or 87%
Republicans—4 or 13%